What the Death of Iran's President Means for the Middle East and the World

I know that it is tempting to  say—hey, it was “just” the president, 

not the Ayatollah, so none of this matters.

But that is oversimplifying things. It matters for here. 

And here. And here. 

Back to here, obviously. 

And here. And here. 

And here. And even here.

Oh, and it also matters for this. Let’s dive in. On May 19, 2024,  

Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi took a trip to his country’s border 

with Azerbaijan.

It was an important visit to inaugurate a  

dam and hydroelectric plant built  along the countries’ river border.

And it was not too long ago that there  were concerns about a war between the two,

with Azerbaijan trying to  strengthen relations with Israel, 

and Iran having strong feelings about  Azerbaijan’s border with Armenia.

In fact, former Iranian Foreign  Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, 

who will play a recurring role in today’s story, 

once described any changes to that border as a red line for Iran.

Of course, the peacekeeping forces in that  region were Russian, and it turns out that 

the Kremlin was distracted elsewhere in the world. Long story short, Azerbaijan made its move, 

and Iran’s “red line” turned out to be a bluff.

Anyway, everything seemed to be back on  track with Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan,

and the trip itself was going normally enough,  

with Azerbaijan’s Office of the President  publishing these standard press release photos.

But with the event concluded, it was  time for Iran’s president to head home. 

And that is when the trouble began.

Returning to Iran aboard a Bell 212  helicopter like this one, it appears  

that the pilot struggled to navigate through a thick fog and, unable to see in front of him, 

he ultimately crashed the  chopper in East Azerbaijan, 

not far from the dam site.

Quick confusing geographical note: 

This is Azerbaijan. And this is also Azerbaijan, 

even though the two parts are disconnected  due to Armenia being in the middle. 

East Azerbaijan is a province in Iran, and it is south of the country of Azerbaijan 

even though its name would suggest  that it should be over here.

Anyway, the point is that  the crash occurred in Iran

and due to that thick fog, it  took about a half of a day for  

rescuers to locate the crash site and declare that Raisi had died.

In the immediate aftermath, the question  turned to whether foul play was involved.

Political scientists find such  operations particularly concerning 

because the absence of obvious  attribution makes it impossible  

to sustain a situation where no one wants to  take an opportunity that is in front of them.

Here, if so many countries do  not like Iran at the moment, 

someone will be tempted to  commit a sabotage operation 

given the default suspicion might fall elsewhere.

But that ironically makes the  likelier suspects tempted to attack, 

because there is no guarantee  it will trace back to them.

And we know from some recent  attacks on Iranian targets

that this can lead to some more  serious escalation concerns,  

even if a true powder keg has not yet exploded.

However, the prevailing theory at the moment  is that this is just a case of bad piloting—

if the Kobe Bryant crash from  2020 taught the public anything, 

it is that helicopters and fog do not mix.

Now, I realize this argument  is a little bit circular, 

but for the sake of world peace, it is fortunate that the crash  

happened in bad weather conditions and not under clear blue skies.

So, as interesting as the logic of  deterrence with imperfect attribution is, 

it will have to wait for another day.

There is, of course, always  the possibility that Iran uses  

the potential for sabotage to create a  crisis that was not actually happening.

After all, Iran’s population would  have a difficult time knowing for a  

fact that the accident was  truly due to pilot error.

The endgame intent there would be to  create a rally round the flag effect  

and build support for some type of offensive.

Indeed, it was not that long ago that Iran was in the middle of a back-and-forth with Israel—

though it seemed at the time that  Iran was actively looking for a  

way to end the turmoil, not escalate further.

Still, the accident plausibly traces  back to political decisions in the West.

The Bell 212 was produced 

in Texas and Quebec. I say 

“was” because production ended in 1999.

What this means is that Iran was operating  antiquated Western equipment without simple  

access to Western markets for replacement parts.

Enter Mohammed Javad Zarif once more. Best known in the West for his role  

in negotiating the Iran Deal almost a decade ago, 

he said in response to the crash that “One of the main culprits of [the] tragedy  

is the United States, which ... embargoed the  sale of aircraft and aviation parts to Iran.”

It is worth making a mental bookmark here, as the same sorts of sanctions are placed  

against Russia at the moment, and Russia  also continues to operate Western aircraft.

Those planes have not had any serious problems as  of yet, but they are a bunch of ticking timebombs.

Now, it would be easy to dismiss Raisi’s death as  politically irrelevant for the country of Iran.

After all, Iran is an autocracy,  and the real political power 

lies in the hands of the Ayatollah.

Then again, that perhaps overstates the  relationship. It might help to think of  

the president as sometimes setting Iran’s agenda,

deciding whom to meet with and whom not to, with the Ayatollah exercising final veto power.

Nevertheless, the crash raises both a  long-term and a short-term political  

power problems within the Islamic Republic.

In the long run, Raisi was a consensus  likely successor to Ayatollah Khamenei— 

and indeed, Khamenei himself took the president-to-Ayatollah path. 

Now, I say “consensus likely successor” because we are basically back to doing  

Kremlinology here, and I just got done  

talking about how ridiculous that is. Put differently, no one really knows. 

But either way, that future path  has been permanently blocked off.

And “long run” might be a bit misleading here too.

Quick survey of world leaders. For all that everyone makes about Putin’s age, 

or Trump’s age, or Biden’s age, 

Khamenei has them all beat at 85 years young. In fact,  

to give you a better sense of the situation, he was born before Germany invaded Poland.

Meanwhile, the short run may  bring about even greater changes.

According to Iran’s constitution, Iran’s first vice president becomes  

acting president once the Ayatollah gives  his consent—which he has already done. 

The successor’s politics appear  roughly similar to his predecssor’s, 

and he comes pre-sanctioned by Western leaders, so that is not the important story here.

Instead, the government has 50 days to run  another election to fill the position properly.

And, again, it would be easy  to dismiss the election of a  

somewhat powerless president who  caught up in an autocratic system,

but that is oversimplistic for two reasons.

First, we have discussed at  length in the context of the  

Russia-Ukraine War how election days  are frightening times for autocrats.

If popular sentiment turns  too far against the regime,  

the festive nature of election day itself turns  into a rallying cry for coordinated protests.

And unless you can get out in front of them, 

large protests can in turn result  in the fall of a government.

Indeed, the disputed results of  2009 Iranian presidential election  

led to just such protests across the  country, though the regime endured.

Second, we have also discussed before how  

autocratic leaders can use  elections as trial balloons.

If the Ayatollah wants to experiment with a risky  policy, he permits candidates with different  

perspectives to it make to the final ballot,  and allows the winner to try out that policy.

The most recent iteration of this  was the 2013 election of Hassan  

Rouhani and his subsequent  reengagement with the West.

That turned into the Iran Deal, and  with it, the final appearance for today 

of lead negotiator Foreign Minister Zarif.

Nevertheless, this plan failed from  Iran’s perspective when Trump became  

president and tore up the agreement in  fulfillment of his campaign promises.

The Rouhani approach consequently  fell out of favor in Tehran,  

and the pendulum swung back the other way

with the 2021 election of Raisi.

Raisi was a hardliner, known by his  detractors as the “butcher of Tehran” 

for his role in the 1988 execution  of thousands of political prisoners, 

on the order of Ayatollah Khomenei.

His time in office saw a strengthening  of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against  

West and Western-aligned parties in the region,

with alleged increased proxy support 

to Hamas, Hezbollah, 

the Syrian government, and the Houthis 

as a part of Iran’s broader conflict  with Irael and Saudi Arabia.

Never mind that Iran is perennially on the  verge of building its first nuclear weapon. 

Forget Mossad, 

you would be forgiven to think that Amazon  was responsible for the whole situation.

Aside from that, Iran has also played a  key role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 

supplying a large number of Shahed drones for  Russian use on targets deep inside the country.

The impending election will therefore be  a surprise referendum on those policies— 

and autocracies do not like surprises.

Of the contentious policies, 

Russian military assistance  is the least likely to change. 

It brings in tons of money and is in part  what funds the rest of Iran’s operations.

Plus the Kremlin took a proactive approach here, 

first posting condolences Monday morning  on the Kremlin’s official website, 

and followed by a phone call  to Iran’s acting president.

That said, a step back from any segment of  the Axis of Resistance is not likely either.

The only way that might arise is if turnout  and vote numbers break so heavily against  

the status quo policy that the government feels  that it is necessary to calm domestic tensions.

Still, there may be some fleeting  benefits for the West there.  

Security forces in Iran can  only do so much at once.

And, yes, there is some division between  those overseeing the situation at home and  

those overseeing the situation abroad, but  the short-run demand for security at home

will take away some level of the focus abroad.

The question is whether any of Iran’s  regional rivals can do anything of note 

with that window of opportunity.

Perhaps the most intriguing  possibility there is the  

first steps of a grand bargain among the  United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

The State Department was already spending  much of its bandwidth on that project, 

with multiple visits to the  key players in question.

But Israel’s offensive into  Rafah as a part of the Gaza  

War will remain a major stumbling block there—

though the Israeli domestic politics on the entire  situation is about to reach a boiling point, 

and any serious movement may have  to wait for a new prime minister.

Suffice to say that the Gods of  International Relations chose an  

interesting time for a helicopter to crash.  And as usual for these sorts of breakpoints,

there is a high probability that not much happens 

and a low probability that a  whole ton of stuff happens, 

with not much room in the  middle for an average outcome.

If you want to know more about the  broader conflict in the Middle East, 

check out this playlist I  have dedicated to the subject.

And if you enjoyed this video, please like,  

share, and subscribe, and I will  see you next time. Take care.