Boeing's Troubled 737 Max Plane | “Boeing’s Fatal Flaw" Update (full documentary) | FRONTLINE
Summary
TLDRThe Boeing 737 MAX crisis is explored, detailing the design flaws and oversight failures that led to two catastrophic crashes within five months, killing 346 people. The investigation reveals the pressure to compete with Airbus' fuel-efficient A320neo, the undisclosed MCAS software system, and the FAA's inadequate oversight. Boeing's subsequent attempts to address the issues and the impact on its safety culture are also discussed.
Takeaways
- 🚨 The Boeing 737 MAX faced critical issues with its design and safety features, leading to two fatal crashes and a subsequent grounding of the aircraft worldwide.
- 🛠️ The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was identified as a major factor in the crashes, with faulty angle of attack sensors triggering the system and causing the planes to dive uncontrollably.
- 🔍 A lack of proper oversight and a rush to market to compete with Airbus's A320neo contributed to the MAX's design flaws and safety issues.
- 📚 Boeing withheld crucial information about the MCAS from pilots and airlines, which was a significant factor in the pilots' inability to regain control of the aircraft during the crashes.
- 💡 The FAA's delegation system, where Boeing employees oversaw parts of the MAX's certification process on behalf of the agency, raised concerns about the independence of the oversight.
- 🚫 Despite warnings and internal concerns about the MCAS system, Boeing continued with its implementation without adequate changes or proper training for pilots.
- 🛫 The MAX's return to service after extensive recertification processes highlighted the ongoing challenges in ensuring aviation safety and the need for a robust safety culture within the industry.
- 📉 The MAX crisis significantly impacted Boeing's reputation, stock prices, and relationships with airlines and regulators, leading to leadership changes and a focus on rebuilding trust.
- 🔗 The MAX incidents exposed broader issues within Boeing's safety culture and the FAA's oversight processes, prompting calls for systemic changes to prevent future disasters.
- 🏛️ Legal and regulatory consequences, including a criminal settlement and ongoing investigations, have further emphasized the severity of the MAX issues and the need for accountability.
Q & A
What was the initial problem with the Boeing 737 MAX that led to the Lion Air Flight JT610 crash?
-The initial problem was a malfunction of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which received incorrect data from an angle of attack sensor, causing the plane to dive uncontrollably and crash.
How did Boeing respond to the first crash of the 737 MAX?
-Boeing initially stood by the MAX, diagnosing the problem internally and working on a fix while continuing to fly the planes worldwide. They issued a formal advisory to pilots about handling potential malfunctions but did not initially disclose the full extent of the MCAS system.
What was the role of the FAA in the certification and oversight of the Boeing 737 MAX?
-The FAA had a delegation system in place, which allowed Boeing employees to oversee certain aspects of the plane's certification process on behalf of the FAA. This system has been criticized for its lack of transparency and potential conflicts of interest.
What was the significance of the angle of attack (AOA) sensor in the Boeing 737 MAX crashes?
-The AOA sensor was crucial because it provided data to the MCAS system. A faulty AOA sensor sent incorrect information, triggering the MCAS to push the plane's nose down repeatedly, which was a key factor in both crashes.
How did Boeing's design and production decisions contribute to the MAX crisis?
-Boeing's design decisions, such as making the MCAS more powerful without sufficient pilot training or documentation, and production failures like missing bolts on a door plug, contributed to the MAX crisis. These decisions were driven by a desire to save costs and avoid additional pilot training needs.
What were the consequences for Boeing following the 737 MAX crashes?
-Boeing faced legal consequences, including a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States, for which they paid $2.5 billion in settlements. They also had to deal with a significant hit to their reputation and the grounding of their MAX fleet.
What actions did Boeing take to address the issues with the 737 MAX after the crashes?
-Boeing worked on a software fix for the MCAS system and made changes to ensure accidents like these never happen again. They also settled with the Department of Justice and compensated the families of the victims and affected airlines.
How did the MAX crisis impact Boeing's relationship with the FAA and the public?
-The crisis led to increased scrutiny of Boeing's practices and the FAA's oversight, revealing a need for significant improvements in both the company's safety culture and the regulatory process. Public trust in Boeing was severely damaged, and the FAA's credibility was also called into question.
What were some of the internal concerns raised by Boeing employees about the 737 MAX?
-Boeing employees raised concerns about the aggressive timeline and cost-cutting measures, the lack of transparency about the MCAS system, and the potential risks associated with relying on single AOA sensor input for MCAS.
What were the key findings of the New York Times investigation into the Boeing 737 MAX?
-The investigation found that Boeing rushed the MAX to market to compete with Airbus, downplayed the significance of MCAS, and withheld crucial information from pilots and regulators. It also highlighted the complex relationship between Boeing and the FAA, and the delegation of oversight responsibilities.
What lessons can be learned from the Boeing 737 MAX crisis?
-The crisis underscores the importance of rigorous safety testing, transparent communication with pilots and regulators, and the need for effective oversight in the aviation industry. It also serves as a reminder of the potential consequences of prioritizing cost-saving measures over safety considerations.
Outlines
🛫 The 737 MAX Crisis: An Overview
This paragraph introduces the 737 MAX crisis, highlighting the loss of the plane mid-flight and the subsequent scrutiny on Boeing and the FAA. It discusses the initial problems with the aircraft, the lack of oversight, and the existential crisis faced by Boeing. The narrative sets the stage for a deeper investigation into the issues surrounding the 737 MAX, including the role of the MCAS system and the company's response to the tragedies.
💥 Two Crashes, Broken Trust
The second paragraph delves into the aftermath of two 737 MAX crashes, emphasizing the loss of 346 lives and the damage to Boeing's reputation. It exposes corporate deception and a flawed regulatory process. The focus is on the software system, MCAS, which was intended to enhance safety but led to fatalities. The narrative follows the investigation by the New York Times, the discovery of the black box data, and the realization of the systemic issues with the 737 MAX.
🚀 The Race for Air Dominance
This paragraph explores the competitive pressure that led to the development of the 737 MAX. It starts in 2011, with Airbus gaining on Boeing in aircraft sales. The introduction of the A320neo by Airbus forced Boeing into a reactive position, leading to a rushed development of the MAX to regain market share. The narrative highlights the internal pressure at Boeing to limit changes and costs, which contributed to the design and certification issues of the MAX.
🛠️ Design Flaws and Hidden Risks
The fourth paragraph discusses the design flaws and the underestimation of risks associated with the 737 MAX. It reveals the obsession with limiting changes to reduce training costs, leading to the decision to downplay the significance of the MCAS system. The narrative includes insights from engineers and whistleblowers, who point to a degradation of Boeing's safety-first mindset and the company's failure to properly inform pilots and regulators about MCAS.
🤝 The Delegation Dilemma
This paragraph examines the relationship between Boeing and the FAA, particularly the delegation arrangement that allowed Boeing employees to oversee certain aspects of the MAX's certification process. It highlights the blurred lines between the regulator and the company, leading to a lack of proper oversight. The narrative also discusses the implications of this arrangement on the MAX's design and certification process.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Boeing 737 MAX
💡MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System)
💡FAA (Federal Aviation Administration)
💡Crash Investigations
💡Pilot Training and Awareness
💡Corporate Deception
💡Regulatory Process
💡Design Flaw
💡Safety Culture
💡Grounding of Aircraft
💡Whistleblowers
Highlights
The Boeing 737 MAX experienced critical issues leading to two fatal crashes.
The FAA panel criticized the aircraft company for oversight failures.
Boeing's 737 MAX was the fastest-selling jet in its history before the crashes.
A software system called MCAS was identified as a contributing factor in the crashes.
Boeing did not disclose the full extent of MCAS to pilots, which was a significant oversight.
After the Lion Air Flight JT610 crash, Boeing and the FAA issued a warning about malfunctioning sensors.
The Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash resulted in a global grounding of the 737 MAX.
Boeing's response to the crashes was criticized as they initially blamed the pilots for not following protocols.
The MAX was designed quickly and cheaply in response to competition from Airbus.
Boeing engineers raised concerns about the MCAS system before the crashes, but were dismissed.
The FAA's delegation process allowed Boeing to self-regulate, leading to issues with oversight.
Boeing's CEO Dennis Muilenburg faced Congress and admitted to mistakes.
Boeing settled a criminal charge by admitting to misleading statements about MCAS and agreed to pay $2.5 billion.
The 737 MAX was recertified by the FAA after 20 months of being grounded.
A new incident with a MAX 9 raised further concerns about Boeing's safety culture and the FAA's oversight.
Boeing's safety culture and quality control issues are under investigation by the Justice Department.
The MAX crisis exposed corporate deception and a broken regulatory process.
Boeing's response to the MAX issues has been to acknowledge mistakes and implement a plan to strengthen safety and quality.
Transcripts
>> The plane suddenly lost a section
of its fuselage mid-flight...
>> The FAA panel is blasting the aircraft company...
>> NARRATOR: Amid new problems with Boeing's 737 MAX,
>> Where was the oversight to make sure
the most critical pieces were there?
>> A special update to the award-winning investigation with
the "New York Times," into the problem-plagued airplane.
>> Lion Air flight JT610 went missing from radar...
>> And then the second plane crashed.
>> Crashed minutes after taking off...
>> This was going to be an existential crisis
for the company.
>> They had no idea how powerful MCAS was.
>> FAA's oversight was sorely lacking.
>> The mounting pressure on Boeing.
>> This was supposed to be one of the most highly
scrutinized planes in the world.
Here you are with another incident that
was risking passengers' lives.
>> We are going to approach this, number one,
acknowledging our mistake.
>> NARRATOR: Now on FRONTLINE,
>> It had direct echoes of everything
we had been reporting on years ago.
>> NARRATOR: Boeing's Fatal Flaw.
♪ ♪
>> On the morning of October 29,
I was woken up by a colleague
who alerted me that a Lion aircraft crashed.
He said, "It's the MAX,"
and I was surprised, because it was a new aircraft.
My company provided the air data
for aircraft flying around the Jakarta area.
So I went to the computer and looked at the data.
It was immediately apparent that, okay, something was wrong.
(indistinct radio chatter)
The plane went up to about 2,000 feet,
just over a minute after takeoff,
and the plane had a bit of a dive.
And then the plane climbed to about 5,000 feet.
(indistinct radio chatter)
But then, at 5,000 feet,
the plane was fluctuating up and down.
And then the plane just started diving.
It, it just didn't make sense.
You don't see planes diving on departure.
I was baffled. Why did it go down?
♪ ♪
>> Lion Air Flight JT610 went missing from radar...
>> NARRATOR: 189 people were killed in the crash
of Lion Air Flight 610.
>> The Boeing 737 MAX 8...
>> NARRATOR: The plane was a new Boeing 737 MAX.
>> What do we know about this 737 MAX 8?
>> NARRATOR: The fastest-selling jet in Boeing history,
just introduced the year before.
>> We don't yet know what caused this crash.
>> A breakthrough this evening,
the flight data recorder.
It holds many of the keys...
>> NARRATOR: The data from the black box
quickly got to F.A.A. engineers in the United States.
♪ ♪
>> There is a purity of this data.
It comes directly from the black boxes.
So it's recording airspeed, altitude.
>> NARRATOR: The data showed what appeared to be a glitch,
something repeatedly moving part of the plane's tail,
controlling its pitch.
>> It didn't take long, just a couple of minutes, to see
that there was rapid movement
of the horizontal stabilizer.
It's probably the fastest way to kill yourself
in an airplane, is to have the stabilizer malfunction.
♪ ♪
>> My spine literally tingled
when I saw the traces from the black box.
The plane continually tried to push the nose down,
and the pilots were trying over and over again
to stop the plane.
And in the end, they lose that battle.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: What Boeing had not told airlines
or their pilots was that it had put
a powerful software system on the new airplane.
>> In the Lion Air crash,
this system was receiving incorrect information,
and that made the plane dive straight downward
and destroy itself.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Inside Boeing,
they quickly diagnosed the problem
and began working on a fix.
But they stood by the MAX as hundreds of them
took to the air around the world,
carrying thousands of passengers.
The company alerted pilots
about handling a potential malfunction.
>> Boeing and the F.A.A. today warned airlines
that sensors on 737 MAX 8 jets can malfunction.
>> Boeing are calling this a formal advisory,
and it's been issued to the pilots.
>> The reporting showed Boeing knew
that it was risky,
but their response
was to blame the pilots.
>> Pilots did not hit two cut-off switches.
Boeing says that action was part of
well-established protocols for all 737s.
>> And that led to a series of decisions
that kept the plane in the air.
And then we got another crash.
>> Breaking news out of Ethiopia,
where a plane went down...
>> NARRATOR: It was Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302,
on its way to Nairobi from Addis Ababa.
>> ...where a new 737 MAX 8 jetliner
crashed minutes after taking off.
>> NARRATOR: Two crashes, the same plane;
346 people killed;
an iconic American company's reputation in tatters.
The story of the Boeing 737 MAX would end up
exposing corporate deception
and a broken regulatory process.
But at the center was a software system
supposed to keep people safe
that instead led to their deaths.
>> The black boxes from the Ethiopian crash
have been recovered.
>> It's the second disaster
within five months involving the Boeing 737 MAX.
>> That's the same kind of aircraft that crashed
back in October in Indonesia.
♪ ♪
>> 157 people, including passengers
and crew members on board, all are dead.
>> The first thing you get to see at the site
is a very big hole.
And then to only imagine
this is the place
that they were last alive.
♪ ♪
>> We learned that there were no survivors on the plane.
And then our objective was to go and
bring my daughter's body home.
>> Now you're in close proximity.
You're able to see the fine details.
You're able to maybe think
these are personal effects
belonged to Carol, my sister, or my mom.
Or...
This bone, whose bone is this?
♪ ♪
>> And they told us that there was
no part of a human
that was bigger than a femur that was left.
>> That whole experience is just a jumble of
images and painful thoughts
and blankness, really, to me. I don't really...
I can't really make sense of it.
>> NARRATOR: The crash of Ethiopian Flight 302
was the second time in five months
that a Boeing 737 MAX had gone down.
♪ ♪
As families gathered at the crash site,
across the world, reporters at "The New York Times"
were investigating what had been going wrong
with Boeing's new commercial jet.
>> Statistically speaking, the likelihood that
these two accidents were not in some way connected
was extremely low.
It suggested that there was something going on
with the plane, and obviously
we were determined to find out.
♪ ♪
>> It was clear from the get-go
that Boeing was in full crisis mode.
>> As the facts from
the accident become available
and we understand
the necessary next steps,
we're taking action to fully
reassure airlines and their passengers
of the safety of the 737 MAX.
>> This was going to be an existential crisis
for the company if these two events were related.
>> China grounds the plane first.
Other international regulators ground the plane.
Then the European Union grounds the plane.
>> But in the U.S., the F.A.A. says
it's not grounding the plane.
>> Boeing and the F.A.A. all were saying
that they were sort of waiting
for the facts before they rushed to judgment
and grounded such an important new plane.
>> NARRATOR: But for months,
the "Times" was reporting there was something wrong
with the 737 MAX itself:
the software system that pilots had not known existed.
>> The Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System, or MCAS.
♪ ♪
The function of this previously undisclosed system
was to save the plane
when it believed that the plane might go into a stall
and fall out of the sky.
And so this system was designed then to
sort of take over the stabilizer
and push that nose back down,
in case the pilot gets in trouble.
>> NARRATOR: Then, a major setback for the company:
Radar showed the two planes' flight patterns
were eerily similar.
>> Days after the rest of the world
had reached the same conclusion,
they finally grounded the plane.
>> NARRATOR: For the "New York Times" reporters,
all the signs pointed to MCAS.
>> We knew that MCAS was the beginning,
and we knew that we needed to start with this system.
>> This was a really
problematic software system
in the way it was designed.
Okay, well, then,
how the hell did it end up in the plane this way?
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Boeing declined to be interviewed for this film.
In a statement, the company said
safety is its top priority
and it has worked closely with regulators,
investigators, and stakeholders
"to implement changes that ensure
accidents like these never happen again."
>> This story really begins in 2011.
(jet engine roaring)
>> The 2011 Paris Air Show
officially opened Monday.
>> Boeing and Airbus had been going head-to-head
for at least a decade.
But Air... Airbus had been
quickly catching up and really
nipping at Boeing's heels.
>> It's the best air show ever for Airbus
in terms of aircraft numbers sold.
>> In 2010, Airbus introduced the A320neo,
a more fuel-efficient version
of its stalwart A320.
>> The A320 is the direct competitor to the Boeing 737.
Airlines wanted an airplane
that was more fuel-efficient
than the airplanes then in service.
Airbus chose to re-engine the A320
into what they call the "neo," the "new engine option."
>> It's a record 200 orders for its A320neo.
>> It was one of the fastest-selling programs
of aviation history.
>> And it placed enormous pressure on Boeing to respond.
♪ ♪
Boeing, frankly, was caught flat-footed.
Within a couple of weeks,
Airbus and American Airlines
have the preliminary workings
of what would become the first deal for American
to buy Airbus planes in more than a decade.
Gerard Arpey, the C.E.O. of American Airlines,
calls Jim McNerney, the C.E.O. of Boeing.
It's a courtesy call
at this point,
just letting their longtime supplier
of airplanes know they're going to go
with the competition.
>> And that is essentially
a dagger in the heart of Boeing.
>> And within 48 hours,
Boeing had decided to pull the trigger
on launching the re-engined 737,
which later became branded as the MAX.
>> From the very beginning,
from its birth,
it was marked by
competitive pressure.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Within days of the second 737 MAX crash,
another investigation
was underway in Washington, D.C.
>> We started getting information
in from whistleblowers, from people,
both current and former F.A.A. and Boeing employees.
>> NARRATOR: Doug Pasternak was leading
a congressional investigation.
This is his first interview
about what he found.
>> As soon as the second accident occurred,
we started our investigation,
and our focus was on the design, development,
and certification of the MAX.
We got hundreds of thousands of pages of documents
from Boeing.
One of the things that really struck me
from speaking to a lot of Boeing employees
was that they were so excited
to go to work at Boeing.
♪ ♪
Boeing is a tremendous engineering company
and a technical marvel, but,
almost without failure,
they point to
a degradation of that mindset
and that safety suffered as a result.
Looking backwards,
I think you can clearly see
the trajectory to tragedy
along the way at, at Boeing.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Boeing publicly said the MAX
went through a deliberate six-year development process.
But in their first stories,
the "New York Times" reporters found insiders who said
that Boeing executives had been putting the pressure on
to design the new 737 quickly and cheaply.
>> One specific engineer we spoke to was Rick Ludtke.
He helped design the cockpit in the MAX,
and he talked a lot about how there was an obsession
in limiting changes.
>> This program was a much more intense pressure cooker
than I've ever been in.
The company was trying to avoid costs...
minimum change to simplify the training differences,
and to get it done quickly.
It put what had happened
in the context of this
broader corporate narrative.
>> Yeah.
>> Speed was what they seemed to desire.
There was a lot of decision-making
that was somewhat arbitrary and didn't involve as much of the,
of what engineering considers healthy debate.
The challenge to the Boeing designers was that
any designs we create would not drive any new training
that required a simulator.
>> NARRATOR: In his recorded interview with the "Times,"
Ludtke said Boeing management was so determined
to avoid the expense of new training,
they made a bold promise.
>> Sales had made a commitment
with Southwest that for any airplane they delivered
that had a new Level D differences training,
Boeing would pay the company $1 million
per every airplane delivered.
>> If the MAX required simulator training,
it would rebate Southwest a million dollars per plane.
And there's that incentive.
That's why it was so important to Boeing
that pilot training be kept to a minimum.
All of this comes out of
trying to give airlines
the most fuel-efficient
version of a plane
that they can spend as little money training their pilots on.
♪ ♪
>> That meant Boeing had to do a number of things
to make this plane fly like the old one,
and that was because the MAX had much bigger engines on it
to make them more fuel efficient.
>> But because the 737 was
a 50-year-old airplane at this time, practically,
when it came time for Boeing
to put those engines on the wings,
the engines were so darn big,
they had to mount them further forward on the wings.
>> They were testing in this wind tunnel,
and they were discovering the plane was handling
just a little bit differently-- but they didn't even have
a plane built yet, so this wasn't, you know,
happening in real flight-- this is something you have to fix.
And they leaned on
a system that they had used once before in a military tanker.
It was designed as a system on the plane
to really just smooth out the way the plane handled.
>> NARRATOR: It was MCAS.
>> It was designed for these extremely unusual maneuvers.
Situations that, hopefully, the plane would never get in.
And to prevent the nose from getting too high,
the system would move the stabilizer
on the back of the plane to push the nose back down.
>> NARRATOR: But inside Boeing,
there were early signs of trouble.
>> One of the first documents we found
was from November of 2012.
A Boeing test pilot was flying the MAX
in a flight simulator
and trying to respond
to an activation of MCAS.
And that resulted
in what he described as a catastrophic event.
♪ ♪
It showed that if that had been in real life,
he could have lost the airplane.
They realize from that moment on,
even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to MCAS.
>> NARRATOR: The company kept quiet
about the simulator experience
and appeared to have discounted the test results.
Still, in the following months,
some Boeing employees suggested simply removing
all references to MCAS from training manuals.
>> Boeing from almost the very beginning realized
the significance of MCAS,
and the significance MCAS would have
on pilot simulator training.
"If we emphasize MCAS is a new function,
"there may be a greater certification
"and training impact.
"Recommended action:
investigate deletion of MCAS nomenclature."
What that meant was that
if they said MCAS was a new function,
the F.A.A. was going to scrutinize it a lot more.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Boeing told Congress
it kept the F.A.A. informed about MCAS's development
and final configuration.
But Boeing has a complex and close relationship
with the agency that oversees it.
>> The airplanes are part of the story,
but so are the regulators.
The F.A.A. regulated Boeing,
in part, with a handful
of Boeing employees whose paychecks came from Boeing,
but whose jobs were
to represent the interests of the F.A.A.
>> NARRATOR: It's a decades-old arrangement
known as "delegation"
that allows federal agencies to give oversight powers
to the companies they regulate.
>> In the beginning, there was a really good reason for this.
The F.A.A. was certifying things
that made no sense to have them certify--
every single exit sign or bathroom sign or paint.
The issue that many of the F.A.A. employees
that we talked to had was that
it went way beyond bathroom signs.
Over time,
Congress passed laws that pushed
the F.A.A. to hand over the responsibility for more
and more tasks to the company, to Boeing.
>> With this level of delegation
between the company and the F.A.A.,
it became hard to understand who was working for who.
>> NARRATOR: In the design of the 737 MAX,
many things would be delegated to Boeing.
That included MCAS.
>> Under the impression that this was
a relatively benign system, the F.A.A. agreed to delegate it,
as is the custom
with the F.A.A. and Boeing.
And that's what happened in this case.
It handed it over.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: In a statement, the F.A.A. blamed
ineffective coordination and said it had not focused
on MCAS when it certified the MAX,
because Boeing had not identified MCAS as significant.
Under the orders from Congress, the F.A.A. has
since made changes to the delegation process.
♪ ♪
After years of going through design and development,
the 737 MAX prototype was rolled out
of Boeing's Renton factory for its maiden flight.
>> Look at all the excited faces, wouldn't miss it.
>> Ed Wilson is in the cockpit.
He's the new chief pilot, and he takes off.
>> And let's just take a listen
as this airplane gets ready for its very first takeoff.
(engine roars)
♪ ♪
>> A short time after this first maiden flight,
Ed Wilson, he and his co-pilots start to realize
that the 737 MAX is not handling
as smoothly as it should in certain low-speed situations.
It's shortly after takeoff, you know,
it's still kind of climbing to ascent.
It's not going full speed.
>> NARRATOR: Boeing engineers had an idea
for how to deal with this.
>> They know about MCAS
and they know that MCAS was actually used
for a similar situation in these high-speed maneuvers,
and so theoretically,
MCAS could also be used in these other situations
to also smooth out the handling.
Crucially, it's already been created,
it's already been approved,
and it's something that we could just apply,
you know, to a different phase of flight.
It's actually a pretty easy fix.
This ends up being an extremely fateful decision.
They enable the stabilizer
to move much more-- actually, four times as much.
Now the system's designed for low-speed situations,
like just after takeoff.
And after takeoff is when the plane is still
only a few thousand feet over the ground.
That means you have much less room for error.
It's happening in an automated fashion
and a repeated fashion.
This fundamentally changes MCAS.
It makes it much more aggressive, much more risky.
It's a far more dangerous system.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Boeing was doubling down on the system,
expanding it,
despite the earlier catastrophic result in a simulator test.
>> NARRATOR: The "Times'" reporting on MCAS focused
on a former Boeing pilot.
>> I started to hear about a pilot at Boeing
whose name was Mark Forkner,
the chief technical pilot for the 737.
>> He was this key liaison
between the company and the F.A.A.
>> He was the person
who personally emailed the F.A.A.
asking for MCAS to be removed from the pilot manual.
That was an important piece of this, because we understood
that the F.A.A. really didn't know
that MCAS became more powerful.
>> He was speaking absolutely on behalf of the company.
This was not some low-level employee.
And he was asking for something
that was really quite substantial:
that a new piece of software,
that made the plane behave in ways that it previously hadn't,
be concealed from the pilots.
This is where the commercial pressures
from the executive level
come right down to the development of the airplane.
>> Mark Forkner certainly was not a lone actor in what he did.
He was following through on a policy by Boeing
to ensure that the program
did not have to put pilots in a flight simulator.
>> It got to the point where Mark Forkner got an award
for keeping training on the 737 MAX to a minimum.
>> NARRATOR: Nearly eight months after requesting
that MCAS be removed from pilot training manuals,
Forkner texted a colleague with a shocking realization.
>> This appears to be the moment
where Mark Forkner learns that MCAS has been expanded.
He writes in that message,
"I basically lied to the regulators, unknowingly."
>> But he never went back and corrected the record.
He never went back and fixed the error.
>> NARRATOR: Mark Forkner wouldn't speak to us.
He was indicted for lying
to F.A.A. investigators about MCAS,
but later found not guilty of all charges in federal court.
His lawyer told the "Times" reporters
that his communications with the F.A.A. were honest
and that "he would never jeopardize the safety
of other pilots or their passengers."
♪ ♪
When Boeing engineers expanded the MCAS system,
they included a feature that would make it
particularly dangerous.
>> Planes have millions of parts in them.
And there's one little one on the 737
that sticks out of the fuselage.
>> See that little black circle there?
That is called...
>> ...the angle of attack sensor.
>> On the 737 MAX,
it had the power to trigger MCAS.
>> It's the A.O.A. sensor that is one of the crucial parameters
to the computer
to tell the plane that it's in a perilous condition.
>> The angle of attack sensor would activate MCAS
by telling the system that the plane's nose was too high
and then MCAS would try to push the nose down.
>> But if this sensor is broken, for whatever reason,
MCAS never realizes,
and so it keeps pushing the nose of the plane down,
over and over again.
>> NARRATOR: Congressional investigators
would later find documents showing that Boeing engineers
had raised this very concern.
>> An engineer asked,
"What if we have a faulty A.O.A. sensor?"
Because A.O.A. sensors are known to be faulty.
You know, what happens to the airplane?
So you have those concerns raised, and the response is,
again, from Boeing engineers,
was to essentially dismiss those.
♪ ♪
>> Three, two, one...
>> NARRATOR: Boeing began delivering the new 737 MAX
in mid-2017.
>> At the outset, 737 MAX was
arguably one of Boeing's biggest successes.
It had become its best-selling jet ever.
>> NARRATOR: Advanced sales were estimated at $370 billion.
American had orders for 100,
Southwest Airlines for 200.
Boeing had focused especially hard on selling
to developing markets in Asia,
where Lion Air's parent company became the first customer
to fly the 737 MAX,
signing an agreement worth more than $20 billion.
>> Airlines loved it.
There was a yearslong waiting list to get one.
>> But Boeing's signature new jet had a fatal flaw.
>> Breaking news-- the search for wreckage
is underway after a passenger jet
with 189 people on board crashed.
>> A Lion Air Boeing 737.
>> A nearly brand-new Boeing...
>> NARRATOR: Investigators from the U.S. National Transportation
Safety Board contributed to an analysis
of what led to the Lion Air crash.
>> Leading up to the Lion Air accident,
the angle of attack probe itself was mis-calibrated.
The maintenance crew was not able
to properly identify this miscalibration.
>> An angle of attack sensor sent bad data to MCAS.
>> The plane thought it was in a stall
because of bad information.
>> And as a consequence of this angle of attack data error,
the MCAS activated
when it really shouldn't have.
>> Five months later,
almost the exact same thing happens
halfway across the world.
>> New 737 MAX 8 jetliner crashed today.
>> Investigators say that flight
had similar problems to the Lion Air crash.
>> Once again, the angle of attack sensor is malfunctioning.
>> There is this question now
about systems within the aircraft.
>> If MCAS hadn't been on those planes,
those planes wouldn't have crashed-- it's that simple.
>> The world mourns 157 people killed in the Sunday crash.
>> On the flight of 737 MAX crash,
we, we lost five of our family members.
We had our mom, Anne Karanja;
our dear sister, Carolyne Karanja,
her three kids, Ryan Njoroge, Kelli Wanjiiku,
and Rubi Wangui.
It's not like there is a manual of how you need to react.
You're just there. It's like motionless.
You just feel infuriated
by anyone and everyone at that point.
I remember the Boeing Company blaming what they call
the "foreign pilots,"
and deflecting blame to, to them,
saying they are the cause.
♪ ♪
>> All of us at Boeing
are deeply sorry for the loss of life
in the Ethiopians Airlines Flight 302
and Lion Air Flight 610 accidents.
>> NARRATOR: Boeing C.E.O. Dennis Muilenburg
latched onto findings that inexperience
and lack of training were part of a chain of events
that led to the crashes.
It was a controversial position.
>> Understand that these airplanes are flown
in the hands of pilots, and in some cases
our system safety analysis includes
not only the engineering design but also the actions
that pilots would take
as, as part of a, a failure scenario, right...
>> Boeing's contention from the beginning
was that even though the pilots did not know
that MCAS existed, that they did not need to know that.
>> And in some cases,
those procedures were not completely followed, so...
>> Boeing believed that the pilot should have been able
to realize that it was very similar
to a runaway stabilizer situation.
>> NARRATOR: "Runaway stabilizer" is an aviation term
for a malfunctioning stabilizer.
After the Lion Air crash,
Boeing had issued a directive to pilots
to be aware of this possibility,
and told them what to do if it happened.
>> When that part of the tail
was not acting the way that it should be,
you take manual control of it.
>> The pilots could have stopped their rollercoaster ride
by turning these two switches off.
>> To shut off power to the stabilizer,
you stop it from moving on its own.
And then you start cranking a wheel in the cockpit
that literally will manually move the stabilizer back
to where you want it to move.
>> The issue was,
were there things happening inside the cockpit
that might have made that harder to do?
That's what we were asking.
♪ ♪
>> When we finally got the preliminary black box data
from the Ethiopian crash,
we called up Dennis Tajer, an American Airlines 737 pilot,
and sent him the data, and we read through it together.
>> My mission was to provide them,
"I'm in the cockpit, I see what's happening now."
So we walk through each line.
And I had no idea what was in it.
I knew that the crew had an experienced captain
and a lesser experienced first officer.
>> We go, second by second,
through the few minutes of this flight.
>> Going through the steps that the pilots had taken
and saying, "Yep, I would have done that.
Yep, I would have done that."
>> As soon as they lift off the ground,
all these different alerts started popping up:
the airspeed was unreliable,
the altitude was showing unreliable.
There were alerts related to that,
but they bring the gear up and they continue to climb out.
>> NARRATOR: Two minutes into the flight,
based on faulty data from the A.O.A. sensor,
MCAS kicked in and began pushing the nose down.
>> (computerized)" Don't sink.
>> And I have...
very clear memory...
of noting a time mark
where the first officer
is quoted as saying, "Stab trim cutout switches."
Which takes the weapon away from MCAS,
which is what Boeing told us to do.
And I have to confess...
I probably swore, I said, "The kid got it right.
The kid got it right!"
>> What had happened was the pilots did do
what they were supposed to do.
They had cut the electricity off.
>> (computerized): Don't sink.
>> They hit these switches,
and they tried to take manual control.
>> The first officer is reaching to this large wheel on his left.
and that's the manual trim wheel, and trying to turn it.
It's like lifting up a ten-ton bucket of cement
out of a deep well.
>> The problem was at that point,
the plane was going so fast,
that even after they took manual control,
they could not physically get the plane to right itself.
They shouldn't have been going that fast.
>> (computerized): Too low. Terrain.
>> And they're continuing to accelerate
towards the ground.
>> (computerized): Pull up.
>> The ground is approaching them.
>> NARRATOR: Then, with no apparent recourse,
the pilots reached for the stabilizer switches.
>> I'm yelling into the cockpit,
"Don't do that!"
But I don't know what they're facing.
>> (computerized): Caution: terrain.
>> NARRATOR: MCAS was reactivated.
>> MCAS says, "Hey, I'm back on, here we go... zzz,"
and now the airplane is in near full nose-down trim,
and you can pull back forever
and there's not enough metal in the back of the airplane
to make that airplane come up to a nose-up.
>> (computerized): Terrain, terrain, pull up, pull up,
pull up...
(birds chirping)
>> She died when she was 24.
It's unbearable that she's not with us.
And the only thing I can do
is try to prevent this for other people.
>> NARRATOR: About four months after
the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the family of Samya Stumo
was about to receive news they would find bewildering.
>> We were eating dinner,
and I hadn't looked at my phone for a long time.
And it was blowing up.
>> The Federal Aviation Administration
now in the hot seat in Washington
over its certification of Boeing's 737 MAX planes.
>> We are joined today
by Ali Bahrami,
the associate administrator
for aviation safety.
>> We continue to evaluate
Boeing's software modification to the MCAS. In addition...
>> NARRATOR: F.A.A. official
Ali Bahrami had been called before Congress,
where he was questioned about revelations
the F.A.A. had known there was a risk
of another MAX crashing after Lion Air.
>> If the agency's own analysis found MCAS
to be an unacceptable risk,
why did the F.A.A.
not take immediate action
to address those risks?
>> The families hadn't known that before.
They didn't know that the safety agency
gambled with passenger lives.
>> We knew that eventual solution would be
to have the modification,
and based on our risk assessment,
we felt that this... we had sufficient time
to be able to do the modification
you know, and, and get the final fix.
>> NARRATOR: After the Lion Air crash,
the F.A.A. had conducted an analysis
of the likelihood of another 737 MAX crashing.
The worst-case scenario was grim.
>> They looked at the probability
that there could be another crash of a 737 MAX
if the F.A.A. didn't do anything to MCAS,
and just let the plane keep flying.
And what that assessment showed
was that F.A.A. predicted
there could potentially be 15 more
fatal accidents of 737 MAX aircraft
over the lifespan of the fleet.
About one crash every other year.
>> NARRATOR: But in explaining its decision
not to ground the plane,
the F.A.A. said in its statement
that the actual risk at the time,
considering the number of planes in the air,
was as close to zero as their calculations allowed.
The agency had given Boeing 150 days to fix MCAS
and issued official directives to pilots.
>> They were gambling.
They were betting against time that they would have a fix
to MCAS before the next crash happened.
And, unfortunately, they lost that bet.
>> NARRATOR: Not everyone within the F.A.A.
agreed with the agency's gamble.
>> People too quickly jumped to that conclusion:
that the pilot should have been able
to figure out what's going wrong
and be able to intervene properly.
>> NARRATOR: F.A.A. engineer Joe Jacobsen
examined the data from the Lion Air crash
and quickly raised concerns about the safety
of the MAX.
This is his first on-camera interview.
>> I was pointing out a design flaw.
It was purposely designed and certified to use only one
A.O.A. input to drive MCAS,
to move the horizontal stabilizer at a high rate.
I talked to three managers, said this a design flaw.
They were skeptical, not really buying in,
saying the pilot should have been able to intervene.
It's a failure.
Our job is aviation safety, and when airplanes go down
we feel a, a real personal sense of loss
and remorse and failure.
And it affects a lot of people.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: In the fall of 2019,
with the MAX having been grounded for seven months,
congressional investigators released
internal communications they found
during their investigation.
>> Test pilots working for Boeing write about problems
with the MCAS system two years before
the first fatal crash in Indonesia.
>> NARRATOR: It was further evidence of the company's
attempt to avoid pilot training
for the MAX.
>> Did that ever cross their minds?
That they were going to let something go into the air
that could potentially kill people?
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: Boeing C.E.O. Dennis Muilenburg
appeared before Congress.
>> Boeing's C.E.O. is expected to acknowledge
that his company made mistakes...
>> And here's the first time this guy's in the hot seat.
>> We appreciate the opportunity to be here.
>> NARRATOR: By then, he'd become the face
of the 737 MAX crisis.
>> I've been on this a committee a long time.
We have never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude.
We intentionally put the families
close to the witness.
They're the victims here,
and it should be like, you know, a trial in court,
where you get to face the person who, you know,
who committed a violent act against you.
>> NARRATOR: The committee confronted Muilenburg
with an array of internal Boeing documents.
>> Next slide.
This shows that Boeing became aware
that the disagree alert wasn't working.
>> It does appear from this that Boeing understood how...
>> That the pilots didn't know about this is unacceptable...
>> Boeing's marketing representatives emphasized
to potential customers that F.A.A. had reduced
the length of pilot training that...
>> "Slow reaction time scenario, ten seconds,
found the failure to be catastrophic."
>> For those families,
the pain of this was accentuated
because this evidence that was going up on the screen
was information that they felt that Mr. Muilenburg
could have used to inform his decision about
keeping the plane in the air or not.
>> We do know that Boeing engineers actually proposed
placing a MCAS annunciator in the cockpit.
"Are we vulnerable to single a A.O.A. sensor failure...
Now, as you emphasized,
"Flight control will now compare inputs
from both A.O.A. sensors."
And I guess the question is,
why wasn't it that way from day one?
>> Mr. Chairman, we've asked ourselves
that same question over and over.
And if, uh, if back then we knew everything that we know now,
we would have made a different decision.
>> Nadia Milleron,
she was radiating with anger over this.
>> It's come to the point where
you're not the person anymore to solve the situation.
I want to say it to you, directly,
because I don't think you understand what we're saying.
>> She was right in front of him.
And here you have the C.E.O.
of what is one of the most important American companies,
one of the most important companies in the world...
>> In the end, it's about safety, and I--
>> Even if you're not capable of doing that?
>> Looking in the eyes
of the mother of a young woman who died on his airplane.
>> I know that she wasn't afraid of flying at all,
until the last six minutes of her life.
That's just a horrible betrayal
that Boeing and the F.A.A. caused for this person,
the last moments of their life,
and it kills me that that trust was betrayed.
>> Boeing's really kind of stuck in a hard spot here.
>> Dennis Muilenburg was blasted on Capitol Hill...
>> NARRATOR: Two months later,
with the company's stock plummeting...
>> Boeing stock has been dropping all day...
>> But it's down 22%
since the 737 MAX jet was first grounded...
>> NARRATOR: ...and the MAX still grounded,
Dennis Muilenburg was out.
(engine roaring)
♪ ♪
In March of 2021,
families gathered in Washington, D.C.,
for the second anniversary of the crash of
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
Boeing had recently settled a criminal charge of conspiracy
to defraud the United States,
brought by the Department of Justice.
>> We have some breaking news on Boeing.
>> NARRATOR: In the settlement,
Boeing admitted to "misleading statements,
half-truths, and omissions" about MCAS.
It agreed to pay $2.5 billion--
$500 million to the families of the victims,
and most of the rest to compensate the airlines.
(engine humming)
After 20 months of being grounded,
the 737 MAX was approved by the F.A.A. to fly again.
(whooshing)
♪ ♪
(radio static)
>> (indistinct radio communication)
(static)
>> (on radio): Yeah, we're about to go down.
1282, we're declaring emergency.
We're descending down to 10,000... (static)
We have 177 passengers.
>> NARRATOR: A 737 MAX,
flown by Alaska Airlines,
had taken off from Portland, Oregon
about seven minutes earlier.
>> At an altitude of 16,000 feet,
there's a very loud bang.
A piece of the plane's body is blown out at row 26.
>> I opened my eyes to...
a giant hole in the plane,
and I could see the city lights.
>> Your son is okay.
>> There's a deafening wind howling through the plane.
The cockpit door flies open.
One of the pilots loses her headset,
another pilot almost loses his after his head
slams into a display.
There's just chaos.
>> His shirt was pulled off of him.
>> A boy's shirt was sucked off him and out of the plane.
And his mother was holding onto him.
>> I saw half of his body was getting sucked out...
and then I was like, "Oh, my God."
>> And I look over and there's a hole
on the side of the plane,
and in that moment,
I'm just like, "Oh God, I'm gonna die."
>> Yes, we are emergency, we are depressurized,
but we do need to return back to... (indistinct)
>> NARRATOR: The plane was able to make
an emergency landing back in Portland.
>> Whoa!
>> NARRATOR: But the incident resurrected concerns
about Boeing and the MAX.
>> We were very fortunate we didn't have
a third crash on January 5.
>> We need everyone to remain seated
with their seatbelts fastened right now...
>> NARRATOR: Joe Jacobsen has continued to monitor the MAX
since retiring from the F.A.A. in 2021.
>> Alaska 1282
could have very easily been a fatal crash.
Higher altitudes,
some passengers may have
lost consciousness.
Pilots could have lost consciousness.
>> NARRATOR: This time,
the F.A.A. immediately grounded similar MAX 9s
so that each plane could be inspected.
>> Hundreds of flights are canceled across the U.S...
>> 737 MAX... >> Pulled out of service,
forcing hundreds... around the world...
>> I honestly wasn't surprised when I saw the news.
It had direct echoes
of everything we had been reporting on years ago
as we tried to unpack what happened during the MAX crisis.
>> NARRATOR: At the "New York Times," a new team
was picking up the reporting on the MAX
and what it meant for Boeing.
>> The real bombshell moment
comes in early February
when the National Transportation Safety Board
releases its preliminary report on the incident.
What the NTSB's report
makes clear is this was a problem
on Boeing's factory floor.
This was Boeing's problem.
>> NARRATOR: The NTSB focused on a piece of the plane
that replaced an unused emergency exit
called a door plug.
Boeing workers failed to install
four bolts that secured it to the plane.
The company later said it had
no documentation of the work.
>> Where was the oversight?
Where was the redundant checks for someone to come back
to make sure that
the most critical pieces to it were there?
>> Nothing in plane design
or plane production is done without
several layers of redundancy,
without frequent inspections, without frequent checks.
And the idea that something as important as a part
of the plane's body could leave the factory
without the bolts needed to hold it in place is shocking.
>> This was supposed to be one of the most
highly scrutinized planes in the world,
and here you are with another incident
that was risking passengers' lives.
>> NARRATOR: Boeing C.E.O. Dave Calhoun
was quick to own the failure in a series of appearances.
>> We're going to approach this...
number one, acknowledging our mistake.
I want everybody,
everybody on every airplane
to know that Boeing owns it.
Boeing is accountable for what happened.
An event like this simply must not happen.
We own it. There's not...
there's no other answer
I can give you.
♪ ♪
>> NARRATOR: The door plug was a production failure;
MCAS was a design flaw.
But both raised questions about Boeing's safety culture
and the F.A.A.'s oversight.
>> The shocking thing about the MAX
is the, the sheer number of...
of problems, design problems,
manufacturing problems.
>> NARRATOR: Joe Jacobsen is now working with
families of the victims of the 737 MAX crashes
to bring other safety concerns
to the F.A.A.
>> And this is after, you know, the supposedly
most comprehensive recertification
in the history of aviation.
>> I think what's most scary
is that you have both kinds of accidents
happened at the same company.
That, to me, reveals a culture inside the company--
I mean, I know we keep coming back to this word "culture,"
but it's right at the root
of what happened in both sets of accidents.
>> NARRATOR: In a statement, Boeing said it is
dedicated to transparency,
and it is "implementing a
comprehensive plan to
strengthen safety and quality."
Less than seven weeks after the Alaska Air incident,
the executive running the MAX program was out.
♪ ♪
In early March, the F.A.A. said it had found
multiple quality control issues with the MAX.
The agency also released a report that
found Boeing's safety culture
has been "inadequate and confusing."
And now, the Justice Department is
investigating the company.
>> Cultural change doesn't happen overnight,
especially at big corporations like this.
And it doesn't happen just because
you got slapped with a fine.
It's the product of millions of decisions.
Whatever it might mean
in terms of lost profits that impact the share price
in the short term.
But if Boeing wants to get back to that place of grandeur
where it was, for so long,
one of the most important American companies,
it's gonna take not four years,
but it might take 14.
>> NARRATOR: More than 170 MAX 9s
were grounded by the F.A.A.
after the Alaska Airlines incident.
Nearly all are now back in service.
Captioned by
Media Access Group at WGBH
access.wgbh.org
>> For more on this and other "FRONTLINE" programs,
visit our website at pbs.org/frontline.
♪ ♪
FRONTLINE's "Boeing's Fatal Flaw" is available on
Amazon Prime Video.
♪ ♪
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