BREAKING NEWS: The Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments In Trump Immunity Claim In 2020 Election Case

Forbes Breaking News
25 Apr 2024159:51

Summary

TLDRThe provided transcript captures a complex legal discourse, likely from a Supreme Court hearing, where the issue of presidential immunity from criminal prosecution is under debate. The dialogue involves various justices and counsels delving into the constitutionality of prosecuting a sitting or former president for official acts. The core argument presented by the petitioner is that all official acts by a president should be granted immunity, a stance that could impact the balance of power and the ability to hold the executive branch accountable. The government's side argues against absolute immunity, suggesting that it could lead to unchecked presidential power and abuse. The justices explore hypotheticals, the historical context of the Constitution, and the potential for future prosecutorial abuse. The discussion also touches on the implications for the presidency and democratic stability, with an emphasis on the need for a careful balance between enabling bold executive action and preventing executive overreach.

Takeaways

  • 📜 The discussion revolves around the concept of presidential immunity, specifically whether a sitting or former president can be criminally prosecuted for official acts.
  • 🇺🇸 Historically, no U.S. president has been prosecuted for official acts during their tenure, and the framers of the constitution viewed a strong executive as crucial for liberty.
  • ⚖️ The argument is made that charging a president could lead to de facto blackmail and extortion by political rivals, potentially distorting decision-making processes.
  • 🚫 The original meaning of the executive vesting clause and a 200-year tradition support the notion that prosecuting a president for official acts is incompatible with the U.S. constitutional structure.
  • 🤔 The source of presidential immunity is principally rooted in Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution, which outlines the executive powers and has been interpreted to include a broad principle of immunity.
  • 👉 The distinction between 'official acts' and 'private conduct' is pivotal. Official acts are those that fall within the scope of the president's constitutionally defined powers and duties.
  • 🤝 Interactions between the president and other branches of government, such as communicating with Congress or the public, are considered official acts and thus potentially immune.
  • 🚨 Concerns are raised about the implications of removing immunity, including the potential for future presidents to act with impunity, knowing they cannot be criminally prosecuted after leaving office.
  • 🛡️ It is suggested that existing legal safeguards, such as impeachment and the advice of the Attorney General, provide sufficient protection against presidential misconduct.
  • 📖 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions and historical precedents, such as the case of Marbury v. Madison, are cited as supporting the existence of some form of immunity for the president.
  • 🏛️ The Supreme Court's role in interpreting the Constitution and the potential for it to craft procedural rules that balance the functioning of the presidency with the rule of law is acknowledged.

Q & A

  • What is the main argument presented by the speaker regarding presidential immunity from criminal prosecution?

    -The speaker argues that without presidential immunity from criminal prosecution, there can be no presidency as known for 234 years in American history. They contend that the threat of prosecution post-office could distort presidential decision-making and lead to de facto blackmail and extortion by political rivals.

  • What historical precedent is mentioned to support the argument for presidential immunity?

    -The speaker refers to the historical tradition spanning 200 years where no president has been prosecuted for their official acts, and the original understanding of the executive vesting clause, which is seen as supporting a broad principle of immunity for the president's official acts.

  • How does the speaker address the question of what constitutes an 'official act'?

    -The speaker points to two cases, Fitzgerald against Nixon and Brewster, which provide guidance on what constitutes an official act. They argue that the court should look at the level of specificity at which the acts are described and whether they fall within the president's official responsibilities.

  • What is the significance of the 'executive vesting clause' in the context of this argument?

    -The 'executive vesting clause' of Article 2 Section one is identified as the principal root of the immunity. It is interpreted as encompassing not only the executive powers laid out explicitly but also all the powers originally understood to be included therein.

  • How does the speaker respond to hypothetical scenarios where a president might commit a crime?

    -The speaker suggests that even in hypothetical scenarios where a president commits a crime, such as ordering an assassination for personal gain, the president would still be immune from prosecution for the official act of making an appointment, as the act of accepting a bribe is not considered an official act.

  • What is the speaker's stance on the potential for a president to be charged for actions taken during their term?

    -The speaker argues that prosecuting a president for official acts is an innovation with no foothold in history or tradition and is incompatible with the constitutional structure. They assert that the president should not face criminal liability for official acts taken during their term.

  • What is the argument regarding the source of presidential immunity?

    -The argument is that the source of presidential immunity is principally rooted in the executive vesting Clause of Article 2 Section one of the Constitution, which is interpreted to include all powers originally understood to be included therein.

  • How does the speaker differentiate between official and private acts of the president?

    -The speaker suggests that official acts are those that fall within the president's official responsibilities and powers, while private acts are those done for personal gain or outside the scope of the president's official duties.

  • What is the significance of the 'Outer Perimeter test' mentioned in the transcript?

    -The 'Outer Perimeter test' is a legal analysis used in the case Fitzgerald against Nixon, which provides guidance on determining what constitutes an official act of the president that may be protected by immunity.

  • What is the position of the speaker on the potential for a president to be prosecuted after leaving office?

    -The speaker argues against the idea that a president should be prosecuted after leaving office for their official acts, asserting that such a threat would distort presidential decision-making and lead to de facto blackmail and extortion.

  • How does the speaker justify the need for immunity in the context of the presidency?

    -The speaker justifies the need for immunity by arguing that it is essential for the president to make bold and fearless decisions without the looming threat of prosecution, which could be used as a political tool by rivals.

  • What is the speaker's view on the implications of the Court's decision on presidential immunity?

    -The speaker believes that the Court's decision could have far-reaching implications beyond the specific case, affecting the balance of powers, the ability of the president to perform their duties, and the potential for political manipulation of the legal process.

Outlines

00:00

😀 Presidential Immunity and the Constitution

The paragraph discusses the concept of presidential immunity from criminal prosecution. It emphasizes that no president has been prosecuted for official acts in the 234-year history of the United States. The framers of the constitution intended an energetic executive, and the threat of post-office imprisonment could distort presidential decision-making. The speaker argues against prosecuting a president for official acts, stating it is incompatible with the constitutional structure and historical tradition.

05:00

🏛️ The Source of Presidential Immunity

The source of presidential immunity is rooted in the executive vesting clause of Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution. The speaker suggests that the immunity extends to all powers originally understood to be included therein. The discussion also references the Outer Perimeter test from Fitzgerald v. Nixon, highlighting how it provides guidance on determining what constitutes an official act.

10:01

🤔 Determining Official Acts vs. Private Conduct

The paragraph delves into the complexity of distinguishing between a president's official acts and private conduct. It poses hypothetical situations involving past presidents and potential charges against them. The conversation suggests that accepting bribes and other such acts for personal gain do not constitute official acts, and thus, do not fall under immunity.

15:01

🚫 Indictment and the Heart of Presidential Powers

The discussion addresses the indictment's premise that Congress, through vague statutes, can regulate the president's exercise of powers, such as the appointment and removal power. The speaker argues against this, stating that it goes to the heartland of presidential powers and that the indictment ties together a series of official acts with a private aim or purpose, which could be alleged in virtually any indictment.

20:04

🤔 The Nature of Presidential Motivation and Acts

The paragraph explores the motivation behind a president's actions, particularly when those actions could be seen as personal gain rather than official responsibility. It questions whether immunity should apply if actions are taken for personal reasons rather than in the public interest. The speaker also discusses the historical context and the lack of a clear statement in the Constitution regarding immunity.

25:05

📜 The Issue of Clear Statutes and Presidential Conduct

The speaker disputes the allegations of fraudulent activities and argues that even if the president's actions are deemed official, they should not be included in the indictment if they are immune. The paragraph also discusses the potential need for a clear statement in statutes that criminalize the president's official acts, emphasizing the importance of such clarity in the legal framework.

30:06

🏢 Official vs. Private Acts in Presidential Conduct

The paragraph focuses on the distinction between official and private acts in the context of the president's conduct. It argues that private acts should not be conflated with official ones and that the latter should be protected. The discussion also touches on the potential consequences of acknowledging private acts in the indictment and how it affects the prosecution's case.

35:07

🤔 The Consequences of Presidential Immunity

The speaker discusses the implications of granting or denying immunity to a president. It raises concerns about the potential for future presidents to act with impunity if they know they cannot be criminally prosecuted after leaving office. The paragraph explores the balance between allowing bold presidential action and preventing abuse of power.

40:09

🏛️ The Constitutional Framework and Executive Power

The paragraph examines the constitutional framework surrounding executive power and the president's responsibilities. It addresses the idea that the president is not above the law and must act in accordance with it. The discussion also considers the various checks and balances in place to prevent executive overreach and the potential consequences of removing the threat of criminal prosecution.

45:10

🤔 The Role of Motivation in Presidential Actions

The discussion explores the role of motivation in determining whether a president's actions are official or private. It questions whether a president should be immune from prosecution even if their actions are deemed official but motivated by personal gain. The paragraph also debates the potential risks of allowing personal motives to influence the application of criminal laws to presidential conduct.

50:11

📜 The Clear Statement Rule and its Application

The speaker challenges the clear statement rule, arguing that it is not applicable in the context of the case. The paragraph discusses the need for clarity in statutes when they apply to the president and the potential implications of such clarity for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.

55:13

🏛️ The Balance of Power and Presidential Accountability

The final paragraph emphasizes the importance of balancing the power of the presidency with the need for accountability. It discusses the potential risks of both chilling presidential action with the threat of prosecution and allowing a president to act without fear of legal consequences. The speaker argues for a nuanced approach that respects the constitutional framework and the role of the courts in interpreting statutes.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Presidential Immunity

Presidential immunity refers to the legal protection that a sitting or former president may have against criminal prosecution. In the context of the video, it is a central theme as the discussion revolves around whether a president is immune from prosecution for official acts while in office or after leaving office, and the potential consequences of such immunity for the functioning of the presidency and the legal system.

💡Constitutional Structure

The constitutional structure refers to the framework of a nation's government as defined by its constitution, including the separation of powers and checks and balances. In the video, it is mentioned in relation to the president's powers and the potential for misuse of those powers, emphasizing the importance of the system of governance in preventing abuses and ensuring accountability.

💡Clear Statement Rule

The clear statement rule is a principle in statutory interpretation where a court will not find a statute applicable to the president unless Congress has made a clear statement that it intends to apply. This rule is discussed in the video as a potential safeguard against the application of criminal statutes to the president's official acts.

💡Impeachment

Impeachment is a process by which a legislative body brings charges against a high official of government. It is mentioned in the video as a political remedy for presidential misconduct, distinct from criminal prosecution, and as a potential prerequisite for criminal liability after a president has left office.

💡Article II Powers

Article II powers refer to the powers vested in the executive branch of the U.S. government by the Constitution. These powers are discussed in the video in the context of determining which presidential actions may be protected from criminal liability and which may not, with a focus on whether certain acts are considered 'official' and thus potentially immune.

💡Separation of Powers

Separation of powers is a model for the governance of a state, wherein the state is divided into branches, each with separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility. The concept is invoked in the video to discuss the limits of presidential power and the role of the judiciary in reviewing the actions of the executive branch.

💡Executive Vesting Clause

The executive vesting clause is a section of the U.S. Constitution (Article II, Section 1) that establishes the executive branch of government under the direction of the president. It is mentioned in the video as a potential source of the president's immunity from prosecution for official acts.

💡Political Accountability

Political accountability refers to the responsibility of public officials to be answerable for their actions while in office, particularly through the electoral process or impeachment. The video discusses this in the context of a president who may believe they are above legal accountability, and the potential risks this poses to the rule of law.

💡Structural Checks

Structural checks are mechanisms within a government's constitution that are designed to prevent any one branch or person from gaining too much power. In the video, they are discussed as a means of deterring presidential misconduct and ensuring that the president does not act in a manner that is above the law.

💡Public Authority Defense

The public authority defense is a legal doctrine that may be invoked when a public official is charged with a crime based on actions taken within the scope of their official duties. It is discussed in the video as a potential safeguard against criminal liability for the president's official acts, contrasting with the concept of immunity.

💡Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion refers to the ability of a prosecutor to decide whether and how to prosecute a case within the bounds of the law. The video touches on this concept in the context of the Department of Justice's role in deciding whether to pursue criminal charges against a president or former president.

Highlights

The discussion emphasizes the importance of the presidency and the need for a president to make bold decisions without the looming threat of prosecution post-office.

The argument that prosecuting a president for official acts could lead to de facto blackmail and extortion by political rivals while in office.

Historical context provided, noting that no president has ever been prosecuted for official acts in the 234-year history of the United States.

The significance of the executive vesting Clause of Article 2 Section one as a potential source of presidential immunity.

The importance of distinguishing between official acts and private conduct when considering presidential immunity.

The potential implications of the court's decision on future presidencies and the balance of power.

The debate on whether the president's actions, even if for personal gain, should be immune from prosecution under the doctrine of official acts.

The examination of the original meaning of the executive vesting Clause and the framers' intent regarding presidential immunity.

The proposition that the lack of a clear statement in statutes suggests that Congress did not intend to apply laws to the president's official acts.

Discussion on the hypothetical scenario where a president orders an assassination for personal reasons and its relation to official immunity.

Concerns raised about the potential for future presidents to commit crimes with abandon, knowing they have immunity while in office.

The assertion that the impeachment clause serves as a prerequisite for criminal prosecution, thus protecting the office of the president.

The exploration of the concept that the president is not above the law and the checks and balances in place to prevent abuse of power.

The potential for a president to pardon themselves and the constitutional questions that this raises.

The argument that the president, like any other citizen, is subject to prosecution for personal acts and that official acts are protected by the Constitution.

The emphasis on the importance of the rule of law and the need for a president to act within the confines of the law while in office.

Transcripts

00:00

Mr

00:05

s Mr chief justice and may it please the

00:08

court without presidential immunity from

00:11

Criminal prosecution there can be no

00:13

presidency as we know it for 234 years

00:18

of American history no president was

00:20

ever prosecuted for his official

00:23

acts the framers of our constitution

00:26

viewed an energetic executive as

00:28

essential to securing Liberty

00:31

if a president can be charged put on

00:34

trial and imprisoned for his most

00:36

controversial decisions as soon as he

00:38

leaves office that looming threat will

00:41

distort the president's decision-making

00:43

precisely when bold and fearless action

00:45

is most

00:47

needed every current president will face

00:50

de facto blackmail and extortion by his

00:52

political Rivals while he is still in

00:56

office the implications of the Court's

00:59

decision here extend far beyond the

01:02

facts of this

01:04

case could President George W bush have

01:07

been sent to prison for obstructing an

01:09

official proceeding or allegedly uh

01:12

lying to Congress to induce war in

01:15

Iraq could President Obama be charged

01:18

with murder for killing US citizens

01:20

abroad by drone

01:22

strike could President Biden someday be

01:25

charged with uh unlawfully inducing

01:27

immigrants to enter the country

01:29

illegally for his border

01:31

policies the answer to all these

01:34

questions is no Prosecuting the

01:37

president for his official acts is an

01:39

innovation with no foothold in history

01:41

or tradition and incompatible with our

01:43

constitutional

01:45

structure the original meaning of the

01:47

executive vesting Clause the framer's

01:50

understanding and intent an unbroken

01:53

historical tradition spanning 200 years

01:56

and policy considerations rooted in the

01:57

separation of powers all Council against

02:00

it I welcome the Court's

02:03

questions uh mru to your last Point

02:06

could you be more precise as to the

02:08

source of this immunity the source of

02:11

the immunity is principally rooted in

02:12

the uh executive vesting Clause of

02:14

Article 2 Section one and how does that

02:16

happen uh that that the source of it

02:19

justice Thomas I think is as you

02:21

described in your separate opinion than

02:22

catovsky for example that the executive

02:25

vesting Clause does not include only

02:27

executive powers laid out explicitly

02:29

therein but it is all the powers that

02:30

were originally understood to be

02:32

included therein and marber against

02:35

Madison itself provides strong evidence

02:37

this kind of immunity a broad principle

02:39

of immunity that protects the

02:40

president's official acts from scrutiny

02:44

direct sitting in judgment so to speak

02:46

of the article three courts that that

02:48

matches the original understanding of

02:49

the exec how exactly would we determine

02:53

uh uh what the what an official Act is I

02:58

said I point the court to two cases for

03:00

that obviously Fitzgerald against uh uh

03:03

Nixon is the best guidance that the

03:06

Court gives where the court adopted the

03:08

Outer Perimeter test and this court

03:10

engaged an analys analysis there that's

03:13

very instructive here where it looked at

03:14

the level of specificity at which the

03:17

acts are described in in that case a

03:19

civil case here it would be the

03:20

indictment what if you have um let's say

03:23

the official Act is appointing

03:25

ambassadors and the President appoints a

03:27

particular individual to a country but

03:29

it's in exchange for a bribe somebody

03:31

says I'll give you a million dollars if

03:33

I made the ambassador to whatever how do

03:35

you analyze that that I think would fall

03:37

under this Court's uh discussion in

03:39

Brewster where the Court held with

03:40

respect to legislative acts that bribery

03:42

is not an official act which also

03:44

matches the court common law background

03:46

so the way that this court and Brewster

03:48

kind of sliced at the Joint was to say

03:51

accepting the bribe and the agreement to

03:52

sex the bribe are not official acts

03:54

that's private conduct an appointment

03:57

would not be would be essentially an

03:59

unrestrict power of this court that

04:00

Congress couldn't directly regulate it's

04:02

not accepting the bribe isn't an

04:04

official act but appointing an

04:05

ambassador is certainly within the

04:07

official responsibilities of the

04:08

president so how could you how how does

04:11

your official Acts or the official

04:15

acts border boundary um uh come into

04:19

play when it's going to be official uh

04:21

assuming that the president is Innocent

04:23

but the whole question is whether he's

04:25

going to be uh found innocent or guilty

04:28

uh again I think Brewster and Johnson uh

04:31

do address that or very persuasively at

04:33

least in a slightly different context

04:34

Brewster and Johnson say the indictment

04:37

has to be expunged of all the immune

04:39

official acts so there has to be

04:40

determination what's official what's not

04:42

official you expunged the official you

04:44

say okay we're Prosecuting because you

04:46

accepted a million dollars they're

04:47

supposed to say not say what it's for

04:49

because the what's for part is within

04:52

the uh president's official duties uh

04:54

there has to be we would say independent

04:56

source of evidence for that and keep in

04:58

mind that this indictment chares what

05:00

this court has described as unrestrict

05:02

powers of the president so the premise

05:04

The Logical premise of this indictment

05:06

is that Congress by passing vague and

05:08

general criminal statutes has purported

05:11

to directly regulate the president's

05:13

exercise of things like the exercise of

05:15

the appointment and removal power uh

05:17

things like his ability to speak

05:18

directly to the American public core

05:20

exercises of his authority under the

05:22

recommendations Clause to recommend to

05:24

Congress members of Congress the

05:26

measures he thinks necessary and

05:28

expedient so you have a indictment in

05:30

this case that goes right to the

05:31

heartland of the president's powers that

05:33

alleges a whole series of official acts

05:36

and tries to tie them together by saying

05:38

well there's a private aim or a private

05:40

purpose in that case and that's a

05:42

situation which of course could be

05:43

alleged in virtually any indictment

05:44

Council it can be alleged but it has to

05:47

be

05:48

proven mum in say is a concept long um

05:53

viewed as appropriate in law that there

05:55

are some things that are so

05:57

fundamentally evil that they have to be

06:00

protected

06:01

against now I

06:04

think and and your uh answer uh below

06:10

I'm going to give you a chance to say if

06:12

you stay by it if the president

06:15

decides that his

06:18

rival is a corrupt

06:21

person and he orders the military or

06:25

orders someone to assassinate him is

06:28

that within his official acts that for

06:31

which he can get immunity it would

06:33

depend on the hypothetical but we can

06:35

see that could well be an official act

06:36

it could and why because he's doing it

06:38

for personal reasons he's not doing

06:42

it at like President Obama is alleged to

06:45

have done it to protect the country from

06:48

a terrorist he's doing it for personal

06:51

gain and isn't that the nature of the

06:54

allegations here that he's not doing

06:57

them doing these acts in

07:00

furtherance of an

07:02

official responsibility he's doing it

07:05

for personal gain I I agree with that

07:08

characterization of the indictment and

07:09

that confirms immunity because the

07:12

characterization is that there's a

07:13

series of official acts that were done

07:14

for an un because immunity says even if

07:18

you did it for personal gain we won't

07:22

hold you

07:24

responsible what do you how could that

07:27

be that's an extremely strong Doctrine

07:29

in this Court's case law and cases like

07:31

Fitzgerald well we go back to Justice

07:33

Thomas's question which was where does

07:36

that come

07:37

from there are mik here who tell us that

07:40

the

07:41

founders actually talked about whether

07:44

to Grant immunity to the president and

07:48

in fact they had had state constitutions

07:51

that granted some criminal immunity to

07:54

Governors and yet they didn't take it up

07:57

instead they F they pass an impeachment

08:00

Clause that basically says you can't

08:03

remove the president from from office

08:06

except by a uh trial in the Senate but

08:11

you can impeach him

08:13

after so or you can impose criminal

08:17

liability we would be

08:19

creating a situation in which we would

08:22

be saying is this is what you're asking

08:24

us to

08:25

say which is that a president is

08:28

entitled not to make a

08:32

mistake but more than that a pre

08:36

president is entitled for total personal

08:39

gain to use the trappings of his

08:43

office that's what you're trying to get

08:45

us to

08:47

hold without facing criminal liability

08:51

your honor I would say three things in

08:52

response to that first the doctrine that

08:55

immunity does not turn on the allegedly

08:58

improper motivation our purpose is

09:00

something that this court has reaffirmed

09:01

in at least nine or 10 that's absolute

09:03

immunity but qualified immunity does say

09:06

that whatever act you take has to be

09:09

within what a reasonable person would do

09:13

I'm having a hard time

09:15

thinking that creating false documents

09:19

that submitting false documents that

09:22

ordering the assassination of AAL that

09:25

accepting a bribe and countless other

09:28

laws that could be broken for personal

09:30

gain that anyone would say that it would

09:33

be reasonable for a president or any

09:36

public official to do that your honor as

09:39

this court said very persuasively in

09:41

Fitzgerald that the allegation that this

09:43

particular act would be done for an

09:47

unlawful purpose or was unlawful could

09:49

be made in every case and therefore if

09:51

that were the doctrine that the

09:53

allegation of improper purpose is what

09:55

deprives the objective acts of their

09:57

immunity then the would have no purchase

10:01

and that's reflected in many of the

10:02

other courts cases isn't isn't the work

10:05

though of the improper motive uh at

10:09

least in the absolute immunity context

10:11

to tell us what are official acts and

10:13

what are not I mean I had understood

10:15

that even in the ab first of all your

10:18

ask is absolute immunity isn't it

10:20

principal position that's your your your

10:22

position is you want the same kind of

10:24

doctrine that we've applied in other

10:26

contexts when we say an official has

10:27

absolute immunity um and my

10:30

understanding is that when we say that

10:31

we mean for their official acts is that

10:35

right yes we okay so any official acts

10:39

then in that world the real

10:41

decisionmaking from the court standpoint

10:44

is whether or not something is an

10:45

official act or not correct uh that is

10:48

an important determination by all means

10:50

I mean that's the determination in the

10:52

absolute immunity world because if you

10:54

determine that it's an official act then

10:56

the principle is that you get immunity

10:57

for it correct that is correct all right

11:00

so my question and I think the Chief

11:02

Justice may have asked this at the

11:03

beginning is how do you determine what

11:06

or maybe Justice Thomas how do you

11:07

determine what is an official act and

11:10

when we're talking about the kinds of

11:11

scenarios that Justice Sodor brought up

11:14

one could say that when the president is

11:16

using the trappings of his office to

11:18

achieve a personal uh uh gain then he's

11:23

actually not acting officially even if

11:26

the doctrine was absolute immunity so

11:28

what do you say about that two things in

11:30

response to that first to the last point

11:32

that allegation that this was really

11:34

motivated by an improper private purpose

11:37

could be made in every single case no I

11:39

understand that but but but it would

11:40

have to be made I'm I'm just trying to

11:41

assess even if we had the doctrine of

11:44

absolute immunity that same allegation

11:47

and the facts related to it would come

11:49

in because the person would be arguing

11:51

that he was not acting in His official

11:53

capacity he wasn't doing something

11:55

official he was doing it personal

11:57

correct the I agree age the the

12:00

objective or I'm not sure I agree but

12:02

but the point I would make response to

12:03

that is in Fitzgerald against Nixon this

12:06

court emphasized that that would result

12:07

in an intrusive uh discussion or

12:09

determination of the president's

12:11

personal motives for every official act

12:13

and again this is not just in the case

12:15

of the presidency right can I just ask

12:16

you another another quick question U

12:18

before my colleagues take it over here

12:21

um at the beginning of your analysis

12:23

when you were giving your opening

12:25

statements you were talking about um you

12:28

know the you suggested that the lack of

12:30

immunity and the possibility of

12:33

prosecution in the presidential context

12:35

is like an innovation um and I

12:37

understood it to be the status quo I

12:40

mean I understood that every president

12:43

from the beginning of time essentially

12:45

um has understood that there was a

12:47

threat of prosecution if for no other

12:49

reason than the the Constitution

12:51

suggests that they can be prosecuted

12:53

after impeachment um that uh you know

12:56

the office of legal councel has said

12:58

forever that presidents are amable to a

13:00

threat of prosecution and they have

13:02

continued to function and do their jobs

13:05

and do all the things that presidents do

13:07

so it seems to me that you are asking

13:09

now for a change in what the law is

13:11

related to immunity I would quote from

13:15

what Benjamin Franklin said at the

13:17

Constitutional Convention which I think

13:18

reflects best the founders original

13:21

understanding and intent here which is

13:23

at the Constitutional Convention

13:24

Benjamin Franklin said history provides

13:27

one example only of a chief magistrate

13:30

who was subject to public Justice

13:32

Criminal prosecution and everybody cried

13:35

out against that as no I understand but

13:37

since Benjamin Franklin everybody has

13:39

thought including the presidents who've

13:41

held the office that they were taking

13:43

this office subject to potential

13:45

criminal prosecution no I don't I see

13:47

the opposite I see all the evidence

13:49

going the other way Marbury against

13:51

Madison Mississippi against Johnson

13:52

discussed this broad immunity principle

13:54

that naturally what was up with the

13:56

pardon what was up with the pardon for

13:57

President Nixon I think

13:59

uh if everybody thought that presidents

14:02

couldn't be prosecuted then what what

14:03

was that about well he was under

14:05

investigation for both private and

14:06

public conduct at the time official acts

14:08

and private conduct I think everyone has

14:10

properly understood that the president

14:11

since like President Grant's Carriage

14:13

writing incident everyone has understood

14:15

that the president could be prosecuted

14:17

counil on on that score you there does

14:20

seem to be some common ground between

14:22

the you and your colleague on the other

14:24

side that no man's Above the Law and

14:28

that the president can't can be

14:30

prosecuted after he leaves office for

14:32

his private conduct is that right we

14:34

agree with that and then the question

14:37

becomes as we've been exploring here

14:38

today A little bit about how to

14:40

segregate private from official conduct

14:43

that may or may not uh enjoy some

14:46

immunity and we I'm sure we're going to

14:48

spend a lot of time exploring that but

14:51

uh the DC circuit in blazing game chief

14:55

judge um there joined by the panel

14:59

express some views about how to

15:01

segregate private conduct for which no

15:04

man is above the law from official acts

15:07

do you have any thoughts about the test

15:09

that they came up with there yes we

15:11

think in the main that test especially

15:13

if it's understood through the lens of

15:14

Judge cis's separate opinion is a very

15:17

persuasive test it would be a great

15:18

source for this court to rely on in

15:21

drawing this line and it emphasizes the

15:23

breadth of that test it talks about how

15:25

uh uh actions that are you know

15:27

plausibly connected to the president's

15:29

official Duties are official acts and it

15:32

also emphasizes that if it's a close

15:34

case or it appears there's

15:35

considerations on other side that also

15:37

should be treated as immune those are

15:39

the the aspects of that that we'd

15:40

emphasize as potentially guiding the

15:42

court that left open in that case the

15:44

possibility of further proceedings and

15:47

trial exactly right and that would be a

15:50

very natural course for this court to

15:51

take in this place the court can and

15:53

should reverse the categorical holding

15:55

of the DC circuit that there's no such

15:57

thing as official acts especially when

15:59

it comes to but you'd agree further

16:00

proceedings would be required that is

16:02

correct there would have to be and I

16:04

would point the court to Anderson

16:05

against kraton where the court said

16:06

there' be kind of two stages of these

16:07

further proceedings there's looking at

16:09

the indictment itself or in that case it

16:11

was a you know a complaint but look at

16:13

the charging document itself and see

16:15

whether on the face of it this is

16:16

alleging official acts and if not or it

16:18

can't be determined then there'd be a

16:20

factual proceeding and all that under

16:22

Mitchell against foresight and so forth

16:23

would have to occur before any other

16:25

proceedings in the district

16:27

Mr go ahead uh Mr Sarah you began by

16:32

explaining why you believe that uh

16:36

immunity from Criminal prosecution is

16:38

essential for the proper functioning of

16:41

the

16:42

presidency uh but my question is whether

16:45

the very robust form of immunity that

16:49

you're advocating is really necessary in

16:52

order to achieve that result so just to

16:54

take one possible alternative suppose

16:57

the rule were that a former president

17:01

cannot be prosecuted for official acts

17:05

unless no plausible justification Could

17:09

Be Imagined for uh what the president

17:13

did taking into account history and

17:17

legal precedent and the information that

17:21

was provided to the president at the

17:22

time when the Act was taken would that

17:25

be sufficient or if it is insufficient

17:27

why would it be insufficient

17:29

that might be a much better rule than

17:31

what emerged from the lower courts here

17:33

we think it would be insufficient

17:34

because again that long line of CAS is

17:37

talking about using the president's

17:39

motives and the intrusive sort of

17:42

consideration of the president's motives

17:44

as transforming acts to official and

17:46

unofficial uh uh would be would come

17:48

into play and of course once you can

17:50

make that allegation all of a sudden

17:52

you've open the door you no longer have

17:54

a per se clear bright rine rule you have

17:56

a a determination in every single case

17:59

well what if it were not what if it did

18:00

not involve any subjective element it

18:02

was purely objective you would look

18:05

objectively at the various relevant

18:08

factors that sounds to me a lot like

18:11

blazing game and especially view to the

18:14

lens of Judge Cass is a separate opinion

18:16

and that may not be different than what

18:17

we're proposing to the court today well

18:19

blazing game had to do with the

18:20

difference between official conduct and

18:22

private conduct right that's correct I

18:25

sorry I understood the court to be

18:26

asking that no this this would apply

18:29

and just a possibility I don't know

18:30

whether it's a good idea or a bad idea

18:32

or whether it can be derived from the

18:34

structure of the Constitution or the

18:35

vesting clause or any other source but

18:39

this would be applied in a purely

18:42

objective on Purely objective grounds

18:44

when the president invokes an official

18:48

power in taking the action that is that

18:50

issue yes I believe the reason I think

18:52

of Blazing game is because it talks

18:53

about an objective context specific

18:55

determination to winnow out what's

18:57

official and what is purely private

18:59

conduct and again in a with a strong

19:01

degree of difference to what I'm sorry I

19:04

if I understood Justice Leo he's

19:06

suggesting not that he's suggesting

19:10

whether even if it is an official

19:13

act whether you still Grant immunity if

19:18

that act is not

19:20

plausibly viewed as within the

19:25

realm of

19:27

law of uh he can correct me if I'm wrong

19:31

he no that's that that was the question

19:34

that I think would be a superior rule

19:36

than what then the categorical denial

19:38

that emerged in the trial court here I

19:39

do think it would I'm I'm not quite sure

19:41

why he used the word plausible because

19:43

that seems

19:45

to negate

19:49

um might as well give absolute if you're

19:51

saying plausible because anybody could

19:53

argue

19:55

plausibility we don't even require

19:57

plausible we require reasonable in

20:00

qualified immunity so well I mean one

20:03

might argue that it isn't plausibly

20:06

legal to order SEAL Team Six and I I I I

20:10

don't want to slander SEAL Team Six

20:12

because they're no seriously they're

20:14

honorable they're honorable uh officers

20:18

and they are bound by the uniform code

20:21

of military Justice not to obey unlawful

20:24

orders but no I think one could say it's

20:27

not plausible that that is legal that

20:29

that action would be legal and and I'm

20:32

sure you thought I've thought of lots of

20:33

hypotheticals I'm sure you've thought of

20:35

lots of hypotheticals where a president

20:37

could say I'm using an official power

20:40

and yet the president uses it in an

20:42

absolutely outrageous manner uh that if

20:45

we an objective determination May well

20:46

be a uh uh an interesting uh approach to

20:50

take this so apply it to the allegations

20:53

here what is plausible about the

20:57

president assisting and

20:59

creating a uh a fraudulent slate of

21:04

electoral candidates assuming you accept

21:07

the facts of the complaint on their

21:10

face um is that plausible that that

21:14

would be within his right to do

21:16

absolutely RoR we have the historical

21:18

President we SED in the lower courts of

21:20

President Grant sending federal troops

21:21

to Louisiana and Mississippi in 1876 to

21:25

make sure that the Republican electors

21:26

got certified in those two cases which

21:28

delivered the election to Ruther for be

21:29

Hayes uh the notion that it's completely

21:31

implausible I think just can't be

21:33

supported based on the face of this

21:35

indictment or even knowing the Slate is

21:37

fake knowing that the Slate is fake that

21:41

they weren't actually elected that they

21:43

weren't certified by the state he knows

21:46

all those things the indictment itself

21:48

alleges I dispute that characterization

21:51

the the indictment fixes the word label

21:54

to the so-called fraudulent elees it

21:56

fixes the word fraudulent but that's a

21:57

complete miscar ation on the face of the

21:59

indictment it appears that there was no

22:01

deceit about who had emerged from the

22:03

relevant State conventions and this was

22:05

being done as an alternative basis but I

22:07

want to address a more higher level

22:09

point a fundamental point which is that

22:12

uh uh as Justice alito's question

22:14

indicated there's a whole series of

22:16

structural checks other than criminal

22:18

prosecution that are designed to deter

22:20

these kind of you know outlandish

22:22

scenarios are extraordinarily obviously

22:24

illegal things and that's been viewed in

22:26

this Court's opinions going all the way

22:28

back to at least where do you think the

22:30

DC circuit went wrong in how it

22:33

determined what was official versus

22:35

what's personal well I read I read the

22:38

opinion Below in this particular case as

22:40

adopting a categorical view it does not

22:42

matter is the the logic of their their

22:44

opinion because there is no immunity for

22:47

official acts and therefore uh uh you

22:49

know that's the end of the story I don't

22:51

really think they went wrong in blazing

22:53

game in the Civil context when they

22:54

engage in the same uh uh uh

22:56

determination with respect to what's

22:58

official and what isn't official there

22:59

we agree with most of what that opinion

23:01

said and for some official acts that are

23:04

not within the Article 2 exclusive power

23:07

okay so official acts but not within the

23:10

Article 2 exclusive power uh even for

23:13

those I assume you would think that a

23:16

clear statement has to be uh required a

23:20

clear statement in the statute covering

23:22

the president if the president's

23:23

official acts are going to be

23:25

criminalized absolutely obviously the

23:27

issue is you know know at the highest

23:30

possible level when it comes to the

23:31

unrestrict powers like as in this

23:33

indictment the well I'm assuming the

23:35

exclusive Powers Are Walled off uh and

23:38

can't be prosecuted before there's a lot

23:41

of official powers that are not

23:42

exclusive to the president under his

23:45

Article 2 Authority uh but for those I

23:47

understood you to be saying at a minimum

23:50

there would need to be a clear statement

23:52

in the statute referencing the president

23:54

so that the president's on notice uh and

23:57

can um

23:59

conduct himself or herself accordingly

24:01

that's absolutely correct and that'd be

24:03

consistent both with Franklin and public

24:04

citizen in cases along series of other

24:07

clear statement can I follow up on go

24:09

ahead go ahead so you concede that

24:12

private acts don't get immunity we do

24:14

okay so in the special council's brief

24:17

on pages 46 and 47 he urges us even if

24:21

we assume that there's even if we were

24:23

to decide or assume that there was some

24:25

sort of immunity for official X that

24:27

there were sufficient private acts in

24:28

the indictment for the trial to go for

24:30

the case to go back and the trial to

24:32

begin immediately and I want to know if

24:33

you agree or disagree about the

24:35

characterization of these acts as

24:37

private um petitioner turned to a

24:39

private attorney was willing to spread

24:40

knowingly false claims of election fraud

24:42

to spearhead his challenges to the

24:44

election results private as Alle I mean

24:46

we dispute the allegation but that

24:48

sounds private to me sounds private

24:50

petitioner conspired with another

24:51

private attorney who caused the filing

24:53

in court of a verification signed by

24:55

petitioner that contained false

24:56

allegations to support a challenge that

24:58

also sounds private three private actors

25:01

two attorneys including those mentioned

25:03

above and a political consultant helped

25:05

Implement a plan to submit fraudulent

25:06

slates of presidential electors to

25:08

obstruct the certification proceeding

25:10

and petitioner and a co-conspirator

25:12

attorney directed that effort uh you

25:15

read it quickly I believe that's private

25:16

I don't want to so those acts you would

25:18

not dispute those were private and you

25:20

wouldn't raise a claim that they were

25:22

official as characterized what we would

25:23

say your honor if I may what we would

25:25

say as official as things like meeting

25:27

with the Department of Justice to

25:28

deliberate about who's going to be the

25:29

acting Attorney General of the United

25:30

States communicating with the American

25:32

public communicating with Congress about

25:34

matters of enormous fa concern thank

25:37

you uh thank you Council and what is the

25:40

consequence in terms of going forward

25:42

with your uh acknowledgement that those

25:44

are private acts as opposed to official

25:46

acts if you look at the uh if you look

25:48

at the uh uh the indictment here there's

25:50

a bunch of Acts that we think are just

25:52

clearly official there may be

25:53

allegations that mostly relate to what

25:55

the government has described here as

25:57

private aim or private end and the court

25:59

should remand or or address itself but

26:02

remand for a Brewster likee

26:04

determination which is what's official

26:06

and what's private the official stuff

26:07

has to be expunged completely from the

26:09

indictment before the case can go

26:10

forward and there has to be a

26:12

determination at least on remand of

26:14

what's official a two-stage

26:15

determination of what's official and

26:17

what's private well if you expunged the

26:18

official part from the indictment how do

26:20

you I mean that's like a the one-legged

26:23

stool right I mean giving somebody money

26:26

isn't bribery unless you get something

26:27

in exchange and if what you get in

26:29

exchange is to become the ambassador to

26:31

a particular country uh that is official

26:35

the appointment that's within the

26:36

president's prerogatives The Unofficial

26:38

part is I'm going to get a million

26:40

dollars for it so if you say you have to

26:42

expunge uh the official part how does

26:44

that go forward uh this particular D we

26:48

say virtually all the over conduct is

26:50

official we don't believe it would be

26:51

able to go forward I mean there could be

26:52

a case where it would but if you look at

26:55

even the government's brief in this case

26:56

divides up the indictment into things

26:58

that other than the uh

27:01

elector allegations don't

27:04

really are they haven't disputed that

27:06

they are official acts but what they do

27:08

is say well we tie it all together by

27:10

characterizing it as done and these are

27:12

the allegations that uh the court just

27:14

referred to by an improper private aim

27:16

or private end again that's their words

27:18

and that just runs loggerheads you know

27:20

dead said against this Court's case law

27:22

and you don't look at when immunity

27:24

determinations the the the mo improper

27:27

motivation or purpose thank you justice

27:30

Thomas uh Mr s uh in assessing the uh uh

27:35

official acts of a president do you

27:38

differentiate between President acting

27:41

as president and the president acting as

27:44

candidate yes we do and we don't dispute

27:47

essentially the Blazing game discussion

27:50

of that okay but of course that has to

27:51

be done by objective determinations not

27:54

by looking at what was the purpose of

27:55

what you did this that's the most

27:56

important point there did you you uh uh

27:59

in this litigation challenge the

28:01

appointment of special counsel not

28:04

directly we have done so in the southern

28:06

district of Florida case and we totally

28:07

agree with the analysis provided by

28:09

attorney general me and attorney general

28:11

mu Casey and and it points to a very

28:13

important issue here because one of

28:15

their arguments is of course that uh uh

28:18

you know we should have this presumption

28:19

of regularity that runs into the reality

28:21

that we have here an extraordinary

28:23

prosecutorial power being exerted by

28:26

someone who has never uh uh uh nominated

28:28

by the president or or or confirmed by

28:31

the Senate at any time so we agree with

28:34

that position we we we hadn't raised it

28:35

yet in this case when this case went up

28:37

on

28:38

appeal Justice Alo when you say that the

28:42

official act should be expunged from the

28:44

indictment that in itself would not

28:46

achieve very much

28:48

unless uh evidence of those official

28:51

Acts were precluded at trial so is that

28:54

what you're saying that the prosecution

28:56

should not be permitted at trial to

28:59

prove the official acts as part of the

29:01

conspiracies that are alleged absolutely

29:03

and we think that's just the clear

29:05

implications of Brewster and Johnson and

29:06

their discussion is very in a very

29:08

analogous context thank you J I'm a

29:11

little bit confused by that um if you

29:15

have a scheme to defraud um or a scheme

29:19

to accept bribery there's evidence from

29:22

which you can infer that scheme and one

29:25

of it is that the appointment actually

29:27

happened it's an official act you

29:29

wouldn't expunge that as evidence you

29:32

would instruct the jury that there's no

29:35

liability for the actual appointment

29:39

that the liability is for accepting the

29:42

bribe similarly here I don't think the

29:45

indictment is charging that the

29:49

obstruction um occurred solely because

29:53

of conversations with the justice

29:55

department they're saying you look at

29:58

all of the private acts and you look in

30:01

the context of some of the public acts

30:04

and you can

30:05

infer the intent the private

30:09

intent from them so I'm not sure that I

30:13

understand why your problems couldn't be

30:16

taken care of at trial with an

30:19

instruction if we believe if the court

30:22

were to find I'm not even sure how they

30:24

could but if it were to find that some

30:27

public acts could not be the basis of

30:31

criminal

30:32

liability I think the best thing I can

30:34

say to that uh uh is and I think this

30:37

ties into the chief Justice's question

30:39

about a one-legged stool Brewster and

30:41

Johnson in subsequent cases like H

30:43

housekey verus meaner essentially say

30:46

that that this is a one-legged stool

30:47

problem it will be difficult for some of

30:49

these prosecutions to proceed and that

30:51

is the implications of official immunity

30:53

which is dictated in the Constitution

30:55

here by the executive besting clause

30:59

Justice Kagan can continue on in in

31:01

Justice Barrett's vein a little bit and

31:03

ask you about some of the allegations of

31:05

the indictment and whether there

31:07

official Acts or not in your view so um

31:10

the defendant signed a verification

31:12

affirming false election fraud

31:14

allegations made on his behalf and a

31:16

lawsuit filed in his name against the

31:19

Georgia government Governor uh I don't

31:21

think we've disputed that that's

31:22

official I I'm sorry that that is

31:25

unofficial that that's unofficial same

31:27

for the defendant called the chairwoman

31:29

of the Republican National Committee

31:31

asked her to gather electors in targeted

31:33

States falsely represented to her that

31:35

such electors votes would be used only

31:37

if ongoing litigation in one of the

31:40

states changed the results in the

31:41

defendant's favor we have taken the

31:43

position that that is official that's

31:45

official yes why would that be official

31:47

because the organization of alternate

31:48

slates of electors is for based on for

31:51

example the historical uh uh example of

31:54

President Grant is something that was

31:55

done pursuant to an ancel and

31:58

Preparatory to the exercise of the core

32:01

recommendation Clause power so when

32:03

President Trump couldn't he have taken

32:05

this action just in the status of a

32:08

candidate the fact that he could have

32:09

done so doesn't demonstrate that he did

32:11

do so in this case and based on the

32:13

allegations we think it's clear he did

32:14

not that this was done in an official

32:16

capacity the defendant asked the Arizona

32:19

House speaker to call the legislature

32:21

into session to hold a hearing based on

32:23

their claims of election fraud

32:25

absolutely an official act for the

32:27

president Comm communicate with State

32:28

officials on a matter of enormous

32:30

Federal interest and concern attempting

32:32

to defend the uh uh the Integrity of a

32:34

federal election to communicate with

32:36

State officials and urge them to view

32:37

what he views as their job uh uh under

32:40

state law and federal law that's an

32:42

official act well attempting to defend

32:44

the Integrity of the election I mean

32:46

that's the defense the allegation is

32:49

that he was attempting to

32:50

overthrow an election essentially

32:53

exactly right in neither allegation of

32:56

what the purpose is should make it

32:57

determinate to it should make a

32:58

difference as to whether it's immune

33:00

that is extremely strong precedent from

33:02

this court does it um does it strike you

33:05

as odd that your understanding of uh

33:09

immunity goes Way Beyond what olc has

33:12

ever claimed for the a former president

33:15

I view the olc opinions here as strongly

33:17

supporting us because anytime a

33:18

congressional statute basically got

33:20

anywhere near touching the president's

33:22

prerogatives they've said oh we're going

33:23

to interpret the statute narrowly to

33:25

avoid that well that's a different

33:27

question I mean uh what olc has always

33:29

said is that sitting presidents get

33:32

immunity but former presidents no now

33:35

there might be um uh a different

33:38

argument made about whether a statute or

33:41

whether a statute as applied to

33:42

particular conduct uh is is is uh

33:46

properly um uh available against the

33:49

president but that's a very different

33:51

argument than the immunity claim that

33:54

you're making here which OC has

33:57

definitively not supported I don't I

33:59

don't know if I put it that way I don't

34:01

recall an opinion directly addressing it

34:02

but more fundamental to us your honor is

34:05

in fact the language of cases like

34:06

Marbury and statements like made by

34:10

Benjamin Franklin at the Constitutional

34:11

Convention statements of George

34:13

Washington talking about the massive

34:15

risk of factional strife and how that

34:17

could destroy the Republic and erect a

34:19

new government on the ruins of public

34:21

Liberty that's what we rely on

34:22

principally here I site the olc opinions

34:25

because of course what you see there is

34:27

a very strong Trend that if there's any

34:29

statute that might trench in any way on

34:31

the president's prerogatives which they

34:33

they adop they interpret it to avoid

34:35

that um uh if a president sells nuclear

34:38

secrets to a foreign adversary is that

34:42

immune that sounds like similar to the

34:44

bribery example likely not immune now if

34:46

it's structured as an official act he

34:47

would have to be impeached and convicted

34:49

first before what does that mean if it's

34:51

structured as an official act well I

34:53

don't know in the hypothetical whether

34:54

or not that would be an official act

34:55

you'd probably have to have more details

34:57

to apply the Blazing game uh uh analysis

35:00

or even the Fitzgerald analysis that

35:02

we've been talking about how about if a

35:04

president um orders the military to

35:07

Stage a

35:10

coup uh I think that as the Chief

35:13

Justice pointed out earlier where there

35:14

is a whole series of you know sort

35:17

of guidelines against that so to speak

35:20

like the UCMJ for prohibits the military

35:22

from following a plainly unlawful act if

35:24

one adopted Justice alos test that would

35:26

fall outside now if one adopts for

35:29

example the Fitzgerald test that we

35:30

advance that might well be an official

35:32

act and he would have to be as I'll say

35:33

in response to all these kinds of

35:35

hypotheticals uh has to be impeached and

35:37

convicted before he can be criminally

35:38

prosecuted but I emphasize to the court

35:40

that well he's gone let's say this

35:42

president who ordered the military to

35:44

Stage aoup he's no longer president he

35:47

wasn't impeached he couldn't be

35:49

impeached um but but he ordered the

35:52

military to Stage a coup and you're

35:54

saying that's an official act uh I think

35:56

it would depend that's immune I I I

35:58

think it would depend on the

35:59

circumstances whether it was an official

36:00

act if it were an official act again he

36:02

would have to be imp what does I mean

36:03

depend on the circumstances he was the

36:06

president he um uh is the

36:08

commanderin-chief um he talks to his

36:11

generals all the time and he told the

36:13

generals I don't feel like leaving

36:15

office I want to Stage jaku is is is

36:17

that immune if if it's an official act

36:20

there needs to be impeachment and

36:21

conviction beforehand because the

36:23

framers viewed the RI that that kind of

36:26

official Act is an official act if it's

36:28

an official act it's imp is it an

36:30

official act on on the way you described

36:32

that hypothetical it could well be I I

36:35

just don't know you'd have to again it's

36:36

a fact specific context specific

36:38

determination that answer sounds to me

36:40

as though it's like yeah under my test

36:42

it's an official act but that sure

36:43

sounds bad doesn't it well it certainly

36:45

sounds very bad and that's why the

36:47

framers have and that's why the framers

36:49

have a whole series of structural checks

36:51

that have successfully for the last 234

36:54

years prevented that very kind of

36:56

extreme hyp itical and that is the

36:59

wisdom of the framers what they viewed

37:00

as the risk that needed to be guarded

37:02

against was not the the notion that the

37:04

president might Escape you know a

37:06

criminal prosecution for something you

37:08

know sort of very very unlikely in these

37:10

unlikely scenarios they even much more

37:11

likely and much more destructive to The

37:13

Republic the risk of factional strife

37:15

discussed by George Washing framers did

37:17

not put an Immunity Clause into the

37:19

Constitution they knew how to there were

37:21

immunity Clauses in some state

37:23

constitutions they knew how to give

37:25

legislative immunity they didn't provide

37:27

immunity to the president and you know

37:30

not so surprising they were reacting

37:32

against a monarch who claimed to be

37:34

above the law wasn't the whole point

37:36

that the president was not a monarch and

37:39

the president was not supposed to be

37:40

above the law uh I would say two things

37:43

in response of that uh immunity they did

37:46

put an Immunity Clause in in a sense

37:48

they put in the executive vesting clause

37:49

which was originally understood to have

37:51

to adopt a broad immunity principle that

37:53

set forth in the very broad language of

37:55

marber against Madison and also so they

37:58

did discuss and consider what would be

38:00

the checks on the presidency and they

38:02

did not say oh we need to have criminal

38:03

prosecution right there at the

38:05

Constitutional Convention Benjamin

38:07

Franken says we don't have that that's

38:08

not an option everybody cried out

38:10

against that as unconstitutional the

38:12

structural check were adopting his

38:14

impeachment and it's very clear on that

38:15

in Pages 64 to 69 of the second volume

38:18

of faren thank you justice Gorsuch just

38:22

returning to the chief Justice's

38:23

hypothetical about the Ambassador sale

38:27

uh and bribery um Congress has a statute

38:30

that specifically names the president

38:34

and says he can be um uh criminally

38:37

prosecuted for bribery presumably after

38:40

he leaves office um outside the core

38:44

areas that that Justice Kavanaugh was

38:46

talking about when Congress speaks

38:49

clearly couldn't a statute like that

38:52

Congress provide a statute like that

38:55

that would allow all manner of evidence

38:58

to come in to prove the case I think our

39:01

position is that would have to be an

39:03

unofficial act purely private conduct

39:05

for that prosecution to go forward all

39:07

right but but outside the core areas of

39:09

executive power if there is a clear

39:11

statement from Congress that something

39:14

is unlawful and it applies to the

39:16

president I I'm struggling to see why in

39:19

that case perhaps uh the evidence could

39:23

come in yeah the strongest possible case

39:25

in our view is what you've described as

39:27

kind of of the core executive powers the

39:29

unrestrict powers within the meeting of

39:31

CA law but again the holding of for

39:33

example Brewster and Johnson that we've

39:35

relied on doesn't turn on how Central it

39:37

is of a legislative act it just as if

39:40

it's an official act which here we would

39:41

say is applies basically the Outer

39:43

Perimeter test of Fitzgerald against

39:45

Nixon that doesn't come in what would

39:47

happen if if presidents were under uh

39:50

fear fear that their successors would

39:54

criminally prosecute them for their acts

39:56

in office whether it it's whether

39:58

they're engaged in drone stri all the

40:00

hypotheticals I'm not going to go

40:02

through them um it seems to me like one

40:04

of the incentives that might be created

40:06

is for presidents to try to Pardon

40:09

themselves do you have any thoughts

40:11

about that that is H didn't think of

40:14

that until your honor asset that is

40:15

certainly one incentive that might be

40:17

creative what we think is most important

40:19

we've never answered whether a president

40:21

can do that um happily it's never been

40:24

presented to us and if if the doctr of

40:27

imun remains in place that's likely to

40:28

remain the case uh for those very issues

40:31

as Fitzgerald I think very powerfully

40:33

emphasized the real concern here is is

40:35

there going to be bold and fearless

40:37

action is the president going to have to

40:39

make a controversial decision where his

40:41

political opponents are going to come

40:42

after him the minute he leaves office is

40:44

that going to unduly deter is that going

40:46

to dampen the ardor of that president to

40:49

do what our constitutional structure

40:51

demands of him or her which is bold and

40:53

fearless action in the face of

40:55

controversy and perhaps if he feels he

40:57

has to he'll pardon himself every every

41:00

four years from now on but that as the

41:02

court pointed out wouldn't provide the

41:04

security because the legality of that is

41:05

something that's never been addressed

41:07

now one of the checks and balances in

41:08

addition to um impeachment that you've

41:11

discussed is subordinate liability um

41:14

you don't contest that everybody

41:16

following an unlawful order beneath the

41:19

president of the United States can be

41:21

immediately prosecuted do you I'm sorry

41:25

the court is asking whether they could

41:26

the president gives an unlawful order uh

41:29

calling the troops what all the examples

41:31

we've

41:33

heard every subordinate beneath him

41:35

faces criminal prosecution don't they uh

41:38

that is what Governor Morris said

41:40

explicitly at the Constitutional

41:42

Convention that is co- agitators could

41:44

be prosecuted there is an important

41:45

caveat because of course there would

41:46

have to be a uh a statute that would

41:49

govern that for them to be prosecuted

41:51

we've got lots of statutes the criminal

41:53

law books are are replete but I mean

41:58

do you agree is that one check that's

42:00

available absolutely and again the only

42:02

caveat that I was making is if that

42:05

statute was doing what marber says you

42:08

can't do which is going after the

42:09

subordinates to restrict for example a

42:11

core executive function the Franklin

42:13

clear statement rule might be triggered

42:14

and you might not be able to go after

42:16

that President so I don't think Congress

42:17

can say well we can't go after the

42:19

president directly but we're going to

42:20

criminalize the way that the president

42:22

speaks to Congress under the exercise of

42:24

the recommendations clause and therefore

42:26

we're going to put in a criminal statute

42:28

that says if you provide false

42:29

information to Congress in carrying out

42:32

the president's recommendation Powers

42:33

you you can be immediately prosecuted

42:35

that would at least be a very difficult

42:36

question but the fundamental point of

42:38

drawing that distinction between the

42:39

president himself and his co- agitators

42:42

in the word of Governor Morris the

42:43

Constitutional Convention is an

42:44

excellent

42:46

distinction Justice Kavanaugh just

42:49

follow up on the olc opinions question

42:52

uh as you read them and I think I read

42:54

them they articulate a clear statement

42:56

rule as to this Court's cases uh for

42:59

covering official acts and your point I

43:03

think but I just want to underscore this

43:05

is that none of the statutes alleged

43:07

here or cited here have a clear

43:10

statement covering the president

43:12

therefore meaning that the president uh

43:15

can't be charged for any official acts

43:17

under this under these statutes that's

43:19

absolutely correct they're extended Way

43:21

Beyond I mean this that's separate from

43:23

the question what's official versus

43:24

what's personal but for that bucket that

43:26

is official official there's no clear

43:28

statement period that's right and as to

43:31

purely private conduct we don't think

43:33

that clear statement rule would be

43:34

invoked but as to official acts uh these

43:37

statutes the ones charged in the

43:38

indictment are just way far a field from

43:41

purporting to criminal eyes in clear

43:42

terms uh the president's official acts

43:45

and then um you're just to clarify this

43:48

the the president's not above the law

43:51

the president's not a king the founders

43:54

thought that um I think your point in

43:57

response to that is the president is

43:59

subject to prosecution for all personal

44:01

acts just like every other American for

44:04

personal acts the question is acts taken

44:07

in official capacity that's correct and

44:09

even those of course if there was

44:10

impeachment and conviction could be

44:12

prosecuted on r view and we'd emphasized

44:14

a whole series of structural checks in

44:16

addition to that uh uh uh which deter

44:18

those kind and have successfully

44:20

deterred presidential mises for 234

44:22

years then on the source of immunity

44:25

it's not explicit in the con tion but

44:28

also uh executive privilege is not

44:30

explicit in the Constitution yet in

44:32

United States versus Nixon the court

44:34

unanimously said that the Article 2

44:37

executive power in the Constitution

44:39

encompassed executive privilege and the

44:42

same principle presumably would apply to

44:45

Executive immunity being encompassed

44:47

within that executive power is

44:49

historically understood that's

44:50

absolutely correct and there's a very

44:52

telling passage in free enterprise fund

44:54

where this court talked about how

44:55

there's a letter from James madis to

44:57

Thomas Jefferson at the time of the

44:59

founding where Madison said hey the S

45:02

the removal power they did not expressly

45:04

take this away so the 1789 Congress

45:06

understood that it was left in place so

45:08

if the original understanding of the

45:09

executive vesting Clause is Broad enough

45:11

to Encompass that it would have to be

45:13

expressly taken away which is the

45:15

opposite of the presumption that they're

45:16

advancing here and then lastly I think

45:19

you've acknowledged in response to

45:20

others questions that some of the acts

45:22

in the indictment are private and your

45:26

view is that some are official is it

45:29

your position then that that analysis of

45:31

which is which should be undertaken in

45:33

the first instance by the DC circuit or

45:36

the district court most likely the

45:37

district court under the logic of

45:39

Anderson thank you justice

45:42

Barrett so Mr sour you've argued that

45:45

the impeachment Clause suggests or

45:48

requires impeachment to be a gateway to

45:50

criminal prosecution right yes I think

45:53

that's the plain meaning of that second

45:54

phrase in the Clause okay so there are

45:57

are many other people who are subject to

45:59

impeachment including the nine sitting

46:01

on this bench and I don't think anyone

46:03

has ever suggested that impeachment

46:06

would have to be the gateway to criminal

46:08

prosecution for any of the many other

46:10

officers subject to impeachment so why

46:12

is the president different when the

46:13

impeachment Clause doesn't say so

46:15

someone very important has made the

46:17

opposite suggestion as to the president

46:19

himself which is solicitor general bour

46:21

which is reformed in the olc opinions on

46:24

this where the where solicor General Bor

46:27

in 1973 as to the issue of the vice

46:29

president reviewed the historical

46:30

materials and he said the sequence is

46:32

mandatory only as to the president that

46:35

is doj's view of the original

46:37

understanding of the impeachment

46:37

judgment clause which is exactly our

46:39

position the sequence is mandatory only

46:41

as to the president keep in mind that

46:43

the criminal prosecution of a president

46:45

president prior to impeachment

46:47

contradicts in our view the plain

46:49

language of the Constitution but also

46:50

hundreds of years of history and what

46:52

doj admits is the framer's intent and so

46:56

we say that that practice whatever its

46:57

validity should not be extended to this

46:59

novel context where it clashes with the

47:02

Constitutional criminal conduct isn't

47:04

discovered until after the president is

47:06

out of office so there was no

47:08

opportunity for impeachment we say the

47:09

framers assumed the risk that of under

47:11

enforcement by adopting these very

47:13

structural checks as Justice Kia said

47:15

and Morrison against Olsen the

47:16

separation of powers uh uh prevents us

47:19

from writing every wrong but it does so

47:21

that we do not lose Liberty okay and and

47:23

the special Council makes uh a point

47:25

that I think is a pretty compelling one

47:27

you admit that if the president were

47:29

successfully impeached that he could be

47:31

criminally prosecuted after impeachment

47:33

right assuming the prosecution was for

47:36

the same conduct of which he was

47:37

convicted not impeached he must be

47:39

convicted that word conviction is right

47:40

there in the Clause okay granted um but

47:43

you also say that these criminal

47:46

statutes unless they explicitly mention

47:48

the president don't apply to him so how

47:51

can you say that he would be subject to

47:53

prosecution after impeachment while at

47:55

the same time saying that he's exempt

47:57

from these criminal statutes well there

47:59

are statutes as they concede where

48:01

president Congress has pered to two or

48:04

three they haven't done a comprehensive

48:06

review I think this looks like all they

48:07

did was Tech search for president in 18

48:09

us code again under Franklin that's a

48:12

very telling indication that the word

48:13

president is not in the statute isn't

48:15

necessarily a a a magic word requirement

48:17

so to speak but more fundamentally than

48:20

that more fundamentally in that they can

48:21

see there are statutes that exist in

48:23

addition to that much impeachment could

48:25

occur as a result of private cont

48:27

so the impeachment judgment Clause does

48:29

do significant work by authorizing the

48:32

subsequent prosecution of a president

48:33

there because what the framers if you

48:34

look at what they're discussing in the

48:36

thing is in the Constitutional

48:38

Convention is principally concerns about

48:39

private conduct which of course we can

48:41

see or noty okay so just to pick up

48:43

justice kagan's example of a president

48:45

who orders a coup let's imagine that he

48:48

is impeached and convicted for ordering

48:50

that coup and let's just accept for the

48:52

sake of argument your position that that

48:54

was official conduct you're saying that

48:56

he couldn't be prosecuted for that even

48:58

after conviction and an impeachment

49:00

proceeding if there was not a statute

49:03

that

49:04

expressly referenced the president and

49:07

made it criminal for the president there

49:09

would have to be a a statute that made a

49:11

clear statement that Congress purported

49:13

to regulate the president's conduct okay

49:15

thank you justice Jackson so I think I

49:19

Now understand better your position um

49:23

in in your discussions with Justice

49:25

Kavanaugh became clear that you are

49:27

saying that for the private acts of a

49:29

president there's no immunity but for

49:32

the official acts of the president there

49:33

is immunity is that your position I

49:36

agree with that all right um so one

49:40

thing that occurs to me is that this

49:41

sort of difficult line drawing problem

49:44

that we're having with all of these

49:45

hypotheticals is this a private act or a

49:48

Public Act um is being necessitated by

49:52

that assumption because of course if

49:55

official acts did get absolute immunity

49:58

then it would matter we wouldn't have to

50:00

identify which are private and which are

50:02

public correct that in fact is the

50:04

approach of the DC circuit there's no

50:06

determination that needs to be made but

50:07

I'm just I'm just making so to the

50:09

extent we're worried about like how do

50:10

we figure out whether it's private or

50:12

public we have to we have to understand

50:13

that we're only doing that because of an

50:16

underlying assumption that the public

50:18

acts get immunity so let me explore that

50:21

assumption um why is it as a matter of

50:24

theory and I'm hoping you can sort of

50:26

Zoom way out here that the president um

50:30

would not be required to follow the law

50:33

when he is performing his official acts

50:36

everyone else everyone else there are

50:38

lots of folks who have very uh

50:41

high-powered jobs who make a lot of

50:43

consequential decisions and they do so

50:46

against the backdrop of potential

50:48

criminal prosecution if they should uh

50:51

break the law in that um capacity and we

50:56

understand and we know know as a matter

50:57

of fact that the president of the United

50:59

States has the best lawyers in the world

51:02

when he's making a decision he can

51:05

consult with pretty much anybody as to

51:07

whether or not this thing is criminal or

51:10

not so why would we have a situation in

51:14

which we would say that the President

51:16

should be making official acts without

51:18

any uh responsibility for following the

51:21

law I respectfully disagree with that

51:23

characterization the president

51:24

absolutely does have responsibility he

51:26

absolutely is required to follow the law

51:29

in all of his official acts but the

51:31

remedy for that is the question could he

51:33

be subject to personal vulnerability

51:36

sent to prison for making a bad decision

51:38

after he leaves office but but other

51:39

people who have consequential jobs and

51:42

who are required to follow the law make

51:45

those determinations against the

51:47

backdrop of that same kind of risk so

51:50

what is it about the president um I mean

51:53

I've heard you say it's because the

51:55

president has to be able act boldly do

51:58

you know make kind of consequential

52:00

decisions I mean sure but again there

52:04

are lots of people who have to make life

52:05

and death kinds of decisions and yet

52:07

they still have to follow the law and if

52:09

they don't they could be sent to prison

52:11

etc etc so I say two things in response

52:14

to that both from Fitzgerald that's the

52:16

very uh uh sort of inference or

52:18

reasoning that this court rejected in

52:20

Fitzgerald no but let me just Fitzgerald

52:22

was a civil situation in which the

52:24

president actually was in a different

52:26

position than other people because of

52:29

the nature of his job the high-profile

52:31

nature and the fact that he touches so

52:33

many different things when you're

52:34

talking about private civil liability

52:37

you know anybody on the street can sue

52:39

him we could see that the president was

52:41

sort of different than the ordinary

52:43

person when you say should he be immune

52:44

from civil liability from anybody who

52:47

wants to sue him but when we're talking

52:49

about criminal liability I don't

52:51

understand how the president stands in

52:52

any different position with respect to

52:55

the need to follow the law as he is

52:57

doing his job than anyone else he he is

53:00

required to follow the law and what not

53:02

if there's no criminal prose if there's

53:04

no threat of criminal prosecution what

53:06

prevents the president from just doing

53:08

whatever he wants all the structural

53:09

checks that are identified in Fitzgerald

53:11

and a whole series of this courts cases

53:12

that go back to Martin against M for

53:14

example impeachment oversight by

53:16

Congress uh public oversight there's a

53:18

long series of them if it's Gerald

53:20

directly addresses this in the Civil

53:21

context and we think that langage

53:23

naturally P I'm not sure that's that

53:26

that that's much of a back stop and what

53:28

I'm I guess more worried about you seem

53:30

to be worried about the president being

53:32

chilled I think that we would have a

53:34

really significant opposite problem if

53:37

the president wasn't chilled if someone

53:39

with those kinds of powers the most

53:42

powerful person in the world with the

53:45

greatest amount of authority um could go

53:48

into office knowing that there would be

53:50

no potential penalty for committing

53:54

crimes I'm trying to understand what

53:56

what the disincentive is from turning

53:59

the Oval Office into U you know the the

54:02

the the seat of criminal activity in

54:04

this country uh I don't think there's

54:06

any allegation of that in this case and

54:07

what George Washington said is what

54:09

Benjamin Franklin said is we view the

54:11

prosecution of a chief executive is

54:13

something that everybody cried out

54:14

against is unconstitutional and what

54:16

George Washington said is we're worried

54:17

about factional Strife which will no I'm

54:21

Al so let me let me let me put this

54:22

worry on the table if the potential for

54:24

criminal liability is taken off off the

54:26

table wouldn't there be a significant

54:29

risk that future presidents would be

54:31

emboldened to commit crimes with abandon

54:35

while they're in office it's right now

54:37

the fact that we're having this debate

54:39

because olc has said that presidents

54:42

might be prosecuted um presidents from

54:45

the beginning of time have understood

54:47

that that's a possibility that might be

54:49

what has kept this office from turning

54:51

into the kind of uh crime Center that

54:54

I'm envisioning but once we say

54:57

no criminal liability Mr President you

54:59

can do whatever you want I'm worried

55:02

that we would have a worse problem than

55:04

the problem of the president feeling

55:06

constrained to follow the law while he's

55:08

in office I respectfully disagree with

55:10

that because it the the regime you've

55:12

described is the regime we've operated

55:14

under for 234 years there has not been

55:16

an expectation based on 234 years of

55:19

unbroken politic all right let me ask

55:21

you another question that let me ask you

55:23

another question about this clear

55:24

statement um line of questioning first

55:27

of all I I didn't see you argue that

55:30

below I don't know I understand that you

55:33

have that set of in your briefs here but

55:35

did you argue before the DC circuit

55:37

something about a clear statement with

55:39

respect to statutes uh yes uh in our

55:41

separately filed motion for motion to

55:43

dismiss based on statutory grounds we

55:45

extensively argued not just this clear

55:47

statement rule but a whole panel but

55:48

that's not that's not the question

55:49

presented in this case the question

55:51

presented in this case comes out of your

55:52

motion for immunity so to bring in now

55:56

an argument that you didn't raise below

55:58

it seems to me you forfeited it no I

56:00

believe it's fairly included within the

56:02

question presented especially especially

56:04

because the court expanded the question

56:05

presented from what either of the party

56:06

submitted but not to statutory

56:08

interpretation I mean that that argument

56:10

goes to statutory and avoidance um you

56:14

know con constitutional avoidance

56:16

statutory interpretation you asked for

56:18

immunity which is a totally different

56:20

thing I think they're very closely

56:21

related logically the question is is

56:24

does immunity exist and to what extent

56:26

does it and the argument is immunity at

56:28

least exists to the extent that it

56:30

raises a great constitutional question

56:31

that triggers the clear statement rule

56:33

that's a really totally

56:35

circular you you use that argument to

56:38

avoid constitutional questions you are

56:41

asking us a constitutional question here

56:43

so it doesn't even make sense to talk

56:45

about clear statement in rule the way

56:48

that it's come up in the context of an

56:50

immunity question but let me just let me

56:52

ask you this um about it uh I had one

56:56

more question

57:00

um yeah so what what is the argument

57:03

that the president of the United States

57:05

who you say is bound by the law is not

57:08

on notice that he has to do his job

57:11

consistent with the law I mean to the

57:13

extent that the clear statement rule

57:14

comes in at all it's about the person

57:16

not being on notice so I I guess I don't

57:19

understand why Congress in every

57:21

criminal statute would have to say and

57:23

the president is included I thought that

57:25

was the sort of background understanding

57:27

that if they're enacting a generally

57:29

applicable criminal statute it applies

57:31

to the president just like everyone else

57:33

so so what is the clear statement that

57:35

would have to be made in this context

57:37

under Franklin and under public citizen

57:40

Congress has to speak clearly before it

57:42

interferes with the president's powers

57:43

and we have here an indictment that

57:45

seeks to criminalize objective conduct

57:48

that falls within the heartland of core

57:50

executive Authority thank you thank you

57:53

Council

57:57

Mr

57:58

deven Mr chief justice and may it please

58:01

the court this court has never

58:04

recognized absolute criminal immunity

58:07

for any public official petitioner

58:10

however claims that a former president

58:13

has permanent criminal immunity for his

58:15

official acts unless he was first

58:17

impeached and convicted his novel Theory

58:21

would immunize former presidents for

58:23

criminal liability for bribery treason

58:26

reason sedition murder and here

58:29

conspiring to use fraud to overturn the

58:32

results of an election and perpetuate

58:35

himself in power such presidential

58:38

immunity has no foundation in the

58:40

Constitution the framers Knew Too Well

58:43

the dangers of a king who could do no

58:45

wrong they therefore devised a system to

58:48

check abuses of power especially the use

58:52

of official power for private gain here

58:56

the executive branch is enforcing

58:58

Congressional statutes and seeking

59:01

accountability for petitioners alleged

59:04

misuse of official power to subvert

59:07

democracy that is a compelling public

59:10

interest in response petitioner raises

59:13

concerns about potential abuses but

59:17

established legal safeguards provide

59:20

layers of protections with the article 3

59:23

courts providing the ultimate check the

59:26

existing system is a carefully balanced

59:29

framework it protects the President but

59:33

not at the high constitutional cost of

59:36

blanket criminal

59:37

immunity that has been the understanding

59:39

of every president from the framing

59:42

through Watergate and up to today this

59:46

court should preserve it I welcome the

59:48

Court's

59:49

questions uh Mr dban uh does the

59:52

president um have immunity uh or

59:56

uh are you saying that there's no

59:58

immunity presidential immunity even for

60:01

official acts yes justce Thomas but I

60:04

think that it's important to put in

60:07

perspective the position that we are

60:09

offering the court today uh the

60:12

president as the head of the Article 2

60:15

Branch can assert as applied Article 2

60:19

objections to criminal laws that

60:22

interfere with an exclusive power

60:24

possessed by the president or that

60:26

prevent the president from accomplishing

60:29

his constitutionally assigned functions

60:32

that is the Constitutional doctrine that

60:35

currently governs the separation of

60:37

powers what petitioner is asking for is

60:40

a broad blanket immunity that would

60:43

protect the president a former president

60:46

from any criminal exposure absent

60:49

impeachment and conviction which has

60:51

never happened in our history and we

60:53

submit that is not necessary in order to

60:56

assure that the president can perform

60:59

all of the important tasks that the

61:02

constitution reposes in him uh over over

61:05

in not so distant past uh the presidents

61:10

or certain presidents have engaged

61:12

in uh various uh activity coups or uh

61:19

Pro operations like operation Mongoose

61:22

when I was a a

61:24

teenager uh and and yet there were no

61:28

prosecutions uh why if you if what

61:31

you're saying is right it would seem

61:33

that that would have been ripe for uh

61:36

criminal prosecution of someone so

61:39

Justice Thomas I think this is a central

61:41

question the reason why uh there have

61:44

not been prior criminal prosecutions is

61:48

that there were not crimes and I want to

61:50

explain why there are layers of

61:52

safeguards that assure that former

61:54

presidents do not have to lightly assume

61:58

criminal liability for any of their

62:00

official acts at the outset there is a

62:03

statutory construction principle that is

62:06

applicable here it arises when there is

62:09

a serious constitutional question about

62:12

applying a criminal statute to the

62:14

president's acts it is not and I'm sure

62:16

that we will discuss this that no

62:18

statute can apply to the president in

62:20

His official capacity absent a

62:23

designation of the president in it but

62:25

there is a principle that if there is a

62:27

serious constitutional question courts

62:29

will strive to construe the statute so

62:32

that it does not apply to the president

62:35

in addition to that the president I

62:38

think has been mentioned earlier has

62:40

access to advice from the attorney

62:42

general and it would be a due process

62:44

problem to prosecute a president who

62:48

received advice from the attorney

62:50

general that his actions were lawful

62:53

absent the kind of collusion or

62:55

conspiracy

62:56

that itself represented a criminal

62:58

violation which I don't really see as

63:01

being a realistic option and then if I

63:03

could say one more thing because you

63:05

raised the question about uh potential

63:07

overseas taking of life and the office

63:10

of legal counsel has addressed this

63:12

quite specifically there is a background

63:15

principle of criminal law called the

63:17

Public Authority uh exception to

63:20

liability and it is read into federal

63:23

law unless Congress takes specific take

63:26

action to OU it which it never has done

63:29

as far as I am aware and in a case in

63:32

which the uh president sought to engage

63:34

in overseas activity that would result

63:37

in The Taking of Life olc did not say

63:39

the federal murder statute doesn't apply

63:42

that would be the the thrust of my

63:44

friend's argument on clear statement

63:47

instead olc went through an extensive

63:49

analysis on why the Public Authority

63:52

defense would prevent it from being

63:55

considered a violation of law to go

63:57

after a terrorist for

63:59

example um the court of appeals below

64:03

whose decision we're reviewing said

64:05

quote a former president can be

64:08

prosecuted for his official acts because

64:10

the fact of the prosecution means that

64:13

the former president has allegedly acted

64:15

in defiance of the laws do you agree

64:18

with that

64:19

statement well I think it sounds

64:22

tautologically true but I I want to

64:24

underscore that

64:26

the obligation of a president is to take

64:29

care that the laws are Faithfully

64:31

executed well the re I think it sounds

64:34

tautologically true as well and that I

64:37

think is the clearest statement of the

64:38

Court's holding which is why it concerns

64:41

me it as I read it it says simply a

64:44

former president can be prosecuted

64:46

because he's being prosecuted well I I

64:48

would not suggest that that's either the

64:51

proper approach in this case or

64:53

certainly not the government's approach

64:56

um a prosecution does of course invoke

64:59

uh Federal Criminal Law the allegations

65:03

have to be presented to a grand jury

65:05

which votes upon the indictment well

65:08

that's what I I mean shortly after that

65:10

statement in the court that Court's

65:12

opinion that's what they said but

65:13

there's no reason to worry because the

65:15

prosecutor will act in good faith and

65:17

there's no reason to worry because a

65:19

grand jury will have returned the

65:20

indictment now you know how easy it is

65:22

in many cases for a prosecutor to get a

65:25

grand jury to uh bring an indictment and

65:28

Reliance on the fa good faith of the

65:30

prosecutor um may not be uh enough in

65:34

the uh some cases I'm not suggesting

65:38

here um so if it's tological and those

65:41

are the only protections that the court

65:43

of appeals below gave and that is no

65:46

longer your position you're not

65:48

defending that position why shouldn't we

65:51

either send it back to the court of

65:52

appeals or uh issue an opinion making

65:56

clear that that's not the law well I I

65:58

am defending the court of appeals

66:00

judgment and I do think that there are

66:02

layered safeguards that the court can

66:05

take into account that will amarate

66:07

concerns about unduly chilling

66:09

presidential conduct that concerns us we

66:12

are not endorsing a regime that we think

66:15

would expose former presidents to

66:17

criminal prosecution in bad faith for

66:20

political animists without adequate

66:23

evidence uh a politically driven

66:25

prosecution would violate the

66:27

constitution under weight versus United

66:30

States it's not something within the

66:32

Arsenal of prosecutors to do prosecutors

66:35

take an oath the Attorney General takes

66:37

an oath so well I I don't want to

66:40

overstate the your Honor's concern with

66:43

potentially relying solely on good faith

66:46

but that's an ingredient and then the

66:47

courts stand ready to adjudicate motions

66:51

based on select a prosecution political

66:54

animous this court relied on those very

66:57

Protections in Advan case just two years

67:00

ago but what what concerns me is as you

67:04

know the court of appeals did not get

67:06

into a focus consideration of what acts

67:09

we're talking about or what documents

67:11

we're talking about because of its

67:13

adoption of what you termed and I agree

67:16

quite correctly as a tological

67:18

statement because the fact of

67:20

prosecution was enough enough to take

67:23

away any official immunity the Act of

67:25

prosecution they had no need to look at

67:28

what courts normally look at when you're

67:31

talking about a privilege or immunity

67:33

question well I I think I would take

67:34

issue Mr chief justice with the idea of

67:36

taking away immunity there is no

67:39

immunity that is in the Constitution

67:42

unless this court creates it today there

67:45

certainly is no textual immunity we do

67:47

not submit that that's the end of the

67:49

story United States versus Nixon wasn't

67:51

a textually based case neither was Nixon

67:54

versus Fitz we endorse both of those

67:57

Holdings but what is important is that

68:01

no public official has ever had the kind

68:03

of absolute criminal immunity that my

68:06

friend speaks of even with respect to

68:08

the speecher debate clause it's very

68:11

narrow it's focused on legislative acts

68:13

it's not focused on everything that a

68:15

congressman does and it responds to a

68:18

very specific historical circumstance

68:20

that basically involved the two other

68:23

branches uh potentially harassing

68:25

legislators and preventing them from

68:27

doing their jobs that's why it ended up

68:29

in the Constitution nothing like that

68:32

ended up in uh in the constitution for

68:35

the presidents and that's because one of

68:37

the chief concerns of the framers was

68:40

the risk of presidential misconduct they

68:43

labored over this they adopted an

68:47

impeachment uh structure that separated

68:50

removal from office as a political

68:52

remedy from Criminal prosecution this

68:55

departed from the British model the

68:57

British model was you get impeached and

69:00

criminally prosecuted and convicted in

69:02

the same proceeding the framers did not

69:05

want that they wanted a political remedy

69:07

in case a president was engaging in

69:10

conduct that endangered the nation he

69:12

could be removed he can't be prosecuted

69:15

while he's a sitting president that's

69:16

been the long-standing justice

69:18

department position Mr dben you dispute

69:21

the proposition that a former president

69:24

has some form of immunity but as I

69:28

understand your argument you do

69:30

recognize that a former president has a

69:33

form of special protection namely that

69:37

statutes that are applicable to

69:40

everybody must be interpreted

69:42

differently under some circumstances

69:44

when they are applied to a former

69:46

president isn't that true it is true

69:48

because justce Alo of the general

69:51

principle that courts constru statutes

69:53

to avoid serious Constitution questions

69:56

and that has been the long-standing

69:57

practice of the office of legal counsel

70:00

in the department of J all right so this

70:03

is more I think than just a a quarrel

70:08

about terminology whether what the

70:10

former president gets is some form of

70:12

immunity or some form of special

70:15

protection because it involves this

70:17

difference which I'm sure you're very

70:19

well aware of if it's just a form of

70:21

special protection in other words

70:23

statutes will be interpreted differently

70:25

has applied to a former president then

70:28

uh that is something that has to be

70:31

litigated at trial the the former

70:33

president can make a motion to dismiss

70:36

and may cite olc opinions and the

70:39

district court may say well that's fine

70:41

I'm not bound by olc and I interpret it

70:44

differently so let's go to trial and

70:47

then there has to be a trial and that

70:49

may involve uh great expense and it may

70:53

take up a lot of time and and during the

70:56

trial the the former president may be

70:59

unable to engage in other activities

71:02

that the former president would want to

71:03

engage in and then the outcome is

71:07

dependent on the jury the instructions

71:09

to the jury and how the jury returns a

71:12

verdict and then it has to be taken up

71:13

on appeal so the protection is greatly

71:17

diluted if you take the form uh if it

71:20

takes the form that you have proposed

71:22

and why is that better it's better

71:25

because it's more balanced the blanket

71:28

immunity that petitioner is arguing for

71:31

just means that criminal prosecution is

71:34

off the table unless he says that

71:38

impeachment and conviction have occurred

71:40

those are political remedies that are

71:42

extremely difficult to achieve in a case

71:44

where the conduct misconduct occurs

71:47

close to the end of a president's term

71:49

Congress is unlikely to crank up the

71:51

Machinery to do it and if the

71:53

impeachment trial has to occur at after

71:55

the president has left office there's an

71:57

open question about whether that can

71:59

happen at all so you're arguing against

72:02

most far-reaching uh aspects of of Mr

72:06

Sour's argument right that that is that

72:08

is correct and and let me turn then to

72:10

why what about uh to unpack it a little

72:13

more uh do you agree that there are some

72:16

aspects of Article 2 Presidential Power

72:19

that are exclusive and that Congress

72:21

cannot regulate and therefore cannot

72:23

criminalize absolutely okay for other

72:26

official acts that the president may

72:28

take that are not within that exclusive

72:31

power uh assume for the sake of argument

72:35

this question that there's not blanket

72:37

immunity for those official acts but

72:40

that to preserve the separation of

72:43

powers to provide Fair notice to make

72:46

sure Congress has thought about this

72:48

that Congress has to speak clearly to

72:51

criminalize official acts of the

72:53

president uh by a specific reference

72:56

that seems to be what the olc opinions

72:59

suggest I know you have a little bit of

73:00

a disagreement with that and what this

73:02

Court's cases also suggest so J kav I'd

73:05

like like to take all of those in turn

73:08

because I don't think this Court's cases

73:09

speak that broadly I definitely don't

73:11

think that the office of legal counsel

73:13

opinions stand for this broad

73:16

proposition that unless the president is

73:18

specifically named he's not in in the

73:20

statute and I don't think that that's

73:22

necessary in order to afford adequate

73:25

protection for the president's valid

73:27

Article 2 functions when you said unless

73:30

I sorry to interrupt but I want to just

73:31

get this out and you can incorporate in

73:32

the insert you said unless there's a

73:34

serious constitutional

73:36

question well it's isn't it's a serious

73:39

constitutional question whether a

73:41

statute can be applied to the

73:43

president's official act so wouldn't you

73:45

always uh interpret the statute not to

73:49

apply to the president even under your

73:51

formulation unless Congress had spoken

73:54

with some clarity think across the board

73:56

that a serious constitutional question

73:58

exists on applying any criminal statute

74:01

to the president the problem is the

74:03

vague stat you know obstruction and 3

74:05

371 conspiracy to fraud the United

74:07

States can be used against a lot of

74:10

presidential activities historically

74:12

with a uh creative prosecutor who wants

74:16

to uh go after a president well let me

74:21

try to backra that's what we're talking

74:23

about historically is the risk that and

74:26

and going forward the the risk so you

74:28

can take all of that I I think that the

74:30

the question about the risk is very

74:32

serious and obviously it is a question

74:35

that this court has to evaluate for the

74:38

executive branch our view is that there

74:41

is a a balanced protection that better

74:44

serves the interest of the Constitution

74:46

that incorporates both accountability

74:49

and protection for the president and I

74:51

want to go through the protections that

74:54

do exist but perhaps it's worth

74:56

returning uh at the outset to the

74:58

statutory construction question that you

75:00

raised the office of legal counsel has

75:02

said uh the offense of bribery of course

75:05

uh applies to the president it does not

75:08

name the president Justice coures

75:09

section 2011 does not specifically name

75:12

the president I assume that's personal

75:15

so well I I think that that's what

75:17

Brewster said bribery statute

75:21

607 says the president I've got it in

75:24

front of me and so there is there is

75:27

that let me just back up though just a

75:30

second to what was a quick exchange with

75:32

Justice Kavanaugh that I just want to

75:34

make sure I understand yeah did you

75:36

agree that there are some core functions

75:38

of the executive that uh president

75:41

conduct that Congress cannot criminalize

75:43

yes we so is is that a form I mean we

75:46

can call it immunity or you can call it

75:47

they can't do it but what's the

75:48

difference we call it an as applied

75:51

Article 2 challenge that we okay okay

75:55

can we call it immunity just for

75:56

shorthand sake so we so I think we are

75:59

kind of narrowing the ground of dispute

76:01

here it seems to me there is some some

76:03

area you you concede that an official

76:06

acts that Congress cannot criminalize

76:09

and now we're just talking about the

76:10

scope well I don't think it's a just but

76:13

I think it's a very significant gap

76:14

between any official Act and the small

76:17

core of exclusive official acts I I I

76:20

got that but I I want to explore that

76:22

okay so for example let's say say a

76:25

president leads a mostly peaceful

76:27

protest sit in in front of Congress uh

76:31

because he objects to a uh a piece of

76:34

legislation that's going through and it

76:37

in fact delays the proceedings in

76:40

Congress now under 1512

76:43

C2 uh that might be corruptly impeding

76:47

uh a proed an official proceeding could

76:50

is that core and therefore immunized or

76:52

whatever word euphemism you want to use

76:54

for that

76:55

or is that not core and therefore

76:58

prosecutable well without a clear

77:00

statement that applies to the president

77:02

it's not it's not core the core kinds of

77:05

activities that the court has

77:07

acknowledged are the things that I would

77:09

run through the Youngstown analysis and

77:12

it's a pretty small set but things like

77:14

the pardon power the power to recognize

77:16

foreign Nations the power to veto

77:18

legislation the power to make

77:20

appointments these are things that the

77:22

constitution specifically allocates to

77:26

the president once you get out so a

77:28

president then could be prosecuted for

77:30

the conduct I described after he leaves

77:33

office probably not but I want to

77:36

explain the framework of of why uh I

77:39

don't think that that would be uh

77:42

prosecution that would be valid um first

77:45

I think you need to run through all of

77:47

the sort of normal uh categories of

77:50

analysis is there a serious

77:52

constitutional question that's posed by

77:55

applying that statute to the president

77:57

if so then you may well default to it

78:00

does not apply at least on that fact

78:02

thought you said it that was my question

78:04

and you said it it fell outside that

78:07

core we'll call it immunity for

78:09

Simplicity sake yes but there's a

78:12

there's a separate category okay so why

78:14

couldn't he be prosecuted for leading a

78:16

civil rights protest in front of the

78:19

capital that that delays a vote on a

78:21

piece of important legislation so I

78:23

think what you need to do is run through

78:26

all of the very president specific

78:29

protective layers of analysis so one of

78:32

them is whether the statute would be

78:33

construed not to apply to his conduct

78:36

even if it's not uh part of that small

78:39

core of things that Congress can't

78:41

regulate it all if it operates to

78:43

prevent the president from fulfilling

78:45

his article no he he could have given

78:47

speeches against it he did yes but he

78:49

left he he he did something more and it

78:51

and it corruptly impeded and sought to

78:54

influence an official proceeding well so

78:56

I I don't know we we're starting with

78:59

the layers I think of protection and

79:01

we're now down through whether the

79:03

statute would be construed to apply to

79:05

him then there' be a question of whether

79:07

assum it does I will assume it uh then

79:10

then there's a question of whether he

79:11

has the State of Mind necessarily does

79:14

corrupt nobody knows what corrupt intent

79:17

means we've been around that tree we

79:19

will probably find out and and maybe it

79:21

means that he knows that he was doing

79:23

wrong is what uh government told us he

79:26

knows he's doing wrong he knows he

79:27

shouldn't be up there blocking

79:30

congressman from well let me get to the

79:31

next layer then which is that the

79:33

president does have access to the

79:35

attorney general to provide legal advice

79:38

and regularly gets legal advice from the

79:41

the Attorney General on the lawful scope

79:43

of the president's activities and we

79:45

could go down two tracks here one is

79:47

that the Attorney General advises him

79:49

that as an incident of his Article 2

79:52

Authority and in carrying out uh the

79:55

functions of the presidency he can

79:57

lawfully participate in that protest

80:00

it's kind of the First Amendment analog

80:02

to uh the president's official Powers

80:05

which the court is exploring in other

80:07

cases alternatively the Attorney General

80:10

could advise him I'm sorry Mr President

80:12

there's nothing in the language of this

80:14

statute that carves you out I don't see

80:16

a serious constitutional question in it

80:18

because you don't have to do that and I

80:19

would advise you not to fin be

80:22

prosecuted no no if if gets a negative

80:25

opinion from the attorney general he

80:27

still couldn't be prosecuted I'm going

80:28

to assume that most presidents are not

80:30

going to take an well but if he gets one

80:32

and does it anyway then he could be

80:33

prosecuted well so then if we are down

80:34

at that level I think what we are really

80:36

asking is whether the president is

80:38

subject to the criminal law and our

80:40

answer is yes he is subject to the

80:42

criminal law Mr can we go back to um the

80:45

bribery statute I like you understand

80:48

that the only thing that is covered by

80:51

that is the president is barred from

80:53

soliciting a receiving funds in any room

80:56

or building in the United States that

80:58

that is correct it's an extremely

81:00

official building it's a very limited

81:02

yes mention of and it really I think can

81:06

so as I understand this there's two very

81:08

limited Provisions mentioning the

81:10

president is included that's right

81:12

there's a whole number of Provisions

81:14

that exclude the president many many

81:17

many more that exclude the president

81:19

correct it's a kind of small number on

81:21

both sides of the now jce Barrett made

81:24

the point that if we say a president

81:27

can't be included in a criminal law

81:29

unless explicitly named then that would

81:32

par the

81:33

Senate from impeaching him for high

81:36

crimes or misdemeanor because that means

81:39

that he's not subject to the law at all

81:41

correct so I I think that's a tautology

81:44

you can't escape just s my what I think

81:48

that Justice Barrett was saying and we

81:49

would agree with it is that under my

81:51

friend's position after impeachment he

81:53

could be prosecuted Ed but under his

81:55

statutory construction approach there'd

81:58

be nothing to prosecute him for exactly

82:00

that's the point which is if he's not

82:02

covered by the criminal law he can't be

82:04

impeached for it for violating it all

82:07

right now could we go further on this

82:09

clear statement through

82:12

um the situations and you mentioned it

82:14

earlier in which we have looked to see

82:17

if the president is covered is

82:20

contextual correct correct and what are

82:23

the factors that generally we look at

82:25

I'm thinking specifically about whether

82:27

the APA covers the president correct and

82:30

what we did there was analyze what

82:33

powers were being given to in the

82:36

lawsuit and Etc we looked at words we

82:39

looked at structure we looked at

82:41

separation of powers issues relating to

82:45

our case law that said you can't direct

82:47

the president to do anything and this

82:48

would have been a subterfuge for that

82:50

correct all correct all right so I don't

82:54

know why two of my colleagues uh how

82:57

they would fashion a clear statement

82:59

rule that would say when the law says

83:02

any person can't accept the bribe that

83:06

that permits the president to do it so I

83:10

agree Justice Sodor that that that the

83:12

way that this court has interpreted

83:14

statutes that do carve out the president

83:16

Justice Kavanaugh asked about this was

83:18

very context specific uh the Franklin

83:21

case basically involved a holding that

83:24

we are highly unlikely to say that the

83:27

president is an agency something that

83:29

the government said would be a peculiar

83:32

understanding of agency when the effect

83:35

of it would be that we would review the

83:37

president's decisions under statutes for

83:39

abusive discretion which is a very

83:41

extraordinary thing to do I think even

83:43

going back to Marberry this is perhaps a

83:45

point on which I agree with my friend

83:47

Marberry says discretionary acts of the

83:49

president are not the kind of thing that

83:51

the court reviews all right could I go

83:53

back to your brief

83:55

and and um going back to what some of my

83:59

colleagues have asked you there appears

84:01

to be some narrowing principles to the

84:04

concept that the president is subject to

84:07

all criminal laws in all situations

84:10

correct you agree that if it affects

84:12

core

84:13

Powers um then the he would not be

84:17

subject to any laws that attempted to

84:19

limit those core Powers correct you're

84:22

defining core Powers as those specified

84:25

by Article 2 that is essentially correct

84:28

yes all right and the only words in the

84:31

constitution is that um uh that have to

84:36

do with the president in law is that he

84:39

shall take care that the law be

84:41

Faithfully executed correct that is

84:43

right hard to imagine that a president

84:45

who breaks the law is Faithfully

84:48

executing the law correct he has to

84:50

execute all of the laws all right Mr D

84:54

really I mean the presidents have to

84:56

make a lot of tough decisions about

84:59

enforcing the law and they have to make

85:01

decisions about questions that are

85:03

unsettled and they have to make

85:06

decisions based on the information

85:08

that's available do you really did did I

85:11

understand you to say well you know if

85:12

he makes a mistake he makes a mistake

85:14

he's subject to the criminal laws just

85:16

like anybody else you don't think he's

85:18

in a special a a peculiarly precarious

85:22

position he's in a special position

85:24

position for a number of reasons one is

85:26

that he has access to legal advice about

85:28

everything that he does he's under a

85:30

constitutional obligation to he's

85:33

supposed to be faithful to the laws of

85:35

the United States and the Constitution

85:36

of the United States and making a

85:38

mistake is not what lands you in a

85:41

criminal prosecution there's been some

85:43

talk about the statutes that are issue

85:45

in this case I think they are fairly

85:47

described as malaman statutes uh

85:51

engaging in conspiracies to defraud the

85:55

United States with respect to one of the

85:57

most important functions namely the

85:59

certification of the next president well

86:01

I I don't want to dispute the particular

86:03

application of of that of 371 conspiracy

86:07

to defraud the United States to the

86:09

particular facts here but would you not

86:12

agree that that is a peculiarly

86:15

open-ended statutory Prohibition in that

86:19

that fraud under that provision unlike

86:21

under most other fraud Provisions does

86:23

not have to do doesn't require uh any uh

86:28

uh impairment of a property interest

86:31

it's designed to protect the functions

86:33

of the United States government and it's

86:35

difficult to think of a more critical

86:37

function than the certification of who

86:39

won the election you know I I'm not as I

86:41

said I'm not discussing the particular

86:43

facts of this case but it applies to any

86:47

uh fraud that interferes seriously with

86:50

any government operation right so what

86:53

the government needs to show is an

86:54

intent to impede interfere or defeat a

86:57

lawful government function by deception

87:00

and it has to be done with Center these

87:03

are not the kinds of activities that I

87:05

think any of us would think a president

87:07

needs to engage in in order to fulfill

87:10

his Article 2 duties and particularly in

87:13

a case like this one I I want to pick up

87:15

on something that the court said earlier

87:18

about the distinction between a public

87:20

official acting to achieve public ends

87:22

and a public official acting to achieve

87:25

private ends as applied to this case the

87:28

president has no functions with respect

87:31

to the certification of the winner of

87:34

the presidential election it seems

87:37

likely that the framers designed the

87:39

Constitution that way because at the

87:41

time of the founding Presidents had no

87:44

two-term limit they could run again and

87:46

again and uh uh were expected

87:49

potentially to want to do that so the

87:51

potential for self-interest would

87:54

explain why the states conduct the

87:57

elections they send uh electors to uh

88:01

certify who won those elections and to

88:03

provide votes and then Congress in a

88:05

joint extraordinary joint session

88:07

certifies the vote and the president

88:10

doesn't have an official role in that

88:12

proceeding so it's difficult for me to

88:15

understand how there could be a serious

88:17

constitutional question about saying you

88:20

can't use fraud to defeat that function

88:23

you can't obstruct ed through deception

88:25

you can't deprive millions of Voters of

88:28

their right to have their vote counted

88:30

for the candidate who they chose thank

88:32

you Council uh justice Thomas Justice

88:39

Alo could we just briefly review the

88:42

layers of protection that you think

88:45

exists and I'm going to start with what

88:47

the DC circuit said so the first layer

88:50

of protection is that Attorneys General

88:51

and other justice department attorneys

88:53

can be trusted to act in a professional

88:56

and ethical manner right yes uh how uh

89:02

robust is that protection I mean most of

89:04

the the vast majority of Attorneys

89:06

General and Justice Department of

89:08

attorneys and we both served in the

89:10

justice department for a long time are

89:12

honorable people and they take their

89:15

professional ethical responsibilities

89:17

seriously but there have been exceptions

89:19

right both among Attorneys General and

89:21

among Federal prosecutors

89:24

there have been rare exceptions Justice

89:26

Alo but when we're talking about layers

89:28

of protection I do think this is the the

89:30

starting point and if the court has

89:33

concerns about the robustness of it I I

89:36

would suggest looking at the charges in

89:38

this case they well I'm going to talk

89:40

about this in in the abstract because

89:43

what is before us of course does involve

89:45

this particular case which is immensely

89:47

important but whatever we decide is

89:49

going to apply to all future presidents

89:52

so as for attorneys General there have

89:54

been two who were convicted of criminal

89:57

offenses while in office there were

89:59

others uh a Mitchell Palmer's one that

90:02

comes to mind who is widely regarded as

90:05

having abused the power of his office

90:07

would you agree with that I would but

90:10

they are to officials in a long line of

90:13

attorneys generals who did not and in

90:15

Departments of Justice that are staffed

90:17

by multiple people who do adhere to

90:20

their office and just Leo if I could

90:22

just the point that I wanted to make

90:23

about this case does go to the general

90:25

proposition the allegations about the

90:28

misuse of the Department of Justice to

90:31

perpetuate uh election fraud show

90:34

exactly how the Department of Justice

90:36

functions in the way that it is supposed

90:38

to petitioner is alleged to have tried

90:41

to get the Department of Justice to send

90:43

fraudulent letters to the states to get

90:46

them to reverse electoral results yeah I

90:49

understand I I understand that Mr drien

90:51

but as I said this case

90:54

will have effects that go far beyond

90:57

this particular prosecution so moving on

91:00

to the second level of protection that

91:02

the DC circuit cited Federal grand

91:04

juries will shield former presidents

91:07

from unwarranted

91:08

indictments how much protection is that

91:12

well it it affords two levels of

91:14

protection one is the probable cause

91:17

finding requires evidence I think some

91:19

of the fears about groundless

91:21

prosecutions aren't supported by

91:23

evidence and they're not going to get

91:24

out of the starting game I mean there

91:26

there's the old saw about inditing a ham

91:29

sandwich um yes but I think just you you

91:32

had a lot of experience in the Justice

91:34

Department you come across a lot of

91:36

cases where uh the the the US attorney

91:39

or another Federal prosecutor really

91:41

wanted to indict a case and the grand

91:43

jury refused to do so there are such

91:46

cases there yeah yes uh but I think that

91:50

the other every once in a while there's

91:51

an eclipse too uh well I think that

91:54

that's for the most reason is

91:56

prosecutors have no incentive to bring a

91:58

case to a grand jury and secure an

92:00

indictment when they don't have evidence

92:01

to prove guilt Beyond a reasonable doubt

92:03

it's self-defeating all right then the

92:05

third level is that former presidents

92:07

enjy all the protections afforded all

92:08

criminal defendants right and we've

92:10

discussed that and that may be true at

92:13

the end of the day but a lot can happen

92:16

between the time when an indictment is

92:20

returned and the time when the former

92:22

president finally gets a Vindication

92:25

perhaps on appeal isn't that correct it

92:29

is correct Justice Leo but I think that

92:31

we should also consider the history of

92:33

this country as members of the Court

92:35

have observed it's baked into the

92:38

Constitution that any president knows

92:40

that they are exposed to potential

92:42

criminal prosecution my friend says

92:44

after impeachment and conviction we

92:46

don't read the impeachment judgment

92:48

Clause that way but we are it's common

92:50

ground that all former presidents have

92:52

known that they could be indicted and

92:55

convicted and Watergate cemented that

92:58

understanding uh the Watergate Smoking

93:01

Gun tape involved President Nixon and HR

93:05

halderman talking about and then

93:07

deciding to use the CIA to give a bogus

93:11

story to the FBI to shut down a criminal

93:13

investigation I Mr sour and others have

93:16

identified events in the past where

93:19

presidents have engaged in conduct that

93:23

might have been

93:24

charged as a federal crime and you you

93:28

say well no that's not really true this

93:30

is Page 42 of your briefs so what about

93:34

President Franklin D Roosevelt's

93:36

decision to turn Japanese Americans

93:38

during World War II couldn't that have

93:40

been charged under uh 18 USC 241

93:45

conspiracy against civil rights today

93:47

yes given this Court's decision in Trump

93:52

versus United States in which uh the you

93:56

know Trump versus Hawaii excuse me where

93:59

the court said koram matu was overruled

94:01

I mean President Roosevelt made that

94:03

decision with the advice of his attorney

94:05

general that's a layer of is that really

94:07

true I thought I thought attorney

94:09

general ble thought that uh there was

94:11

really no threat of sabotage as did Jer

94:14

Hoover so I think that there is a lot of

94:16

historical controversy but it

94:19

underscores that that occurred during

94:21

wartime it implicates uh potential

94:24

commanderin-chief

94:25

concerns concerns about the exigencies

94:29

of National Defense that might provide

94:32

an as applied Article 2 challenge at the

94:35

time I'm not suggesting today but the

94:38

idea that uh a decision that was made

94:40

and ultimately endorsed by this court

94:43

perhaps wrongly in the Coram Matsu case

94:45

would support criminal prosecution under

94:47

241 which requires under United States

94:50

versus linear that the right have been

94:52

made specific so that there is notice to

94:54

the president I don't think that would

94:56

have been satisfying all right well we

94:57

could go through other historical

94:59

examples I won't do that let me just

95:00

touch briefly on a couple of other

95:02

things one is the relevance of advice of

95:06

council and I wasn't clear what your

95:07

answer is so if the president gets

95:10

advice from the attorney general that

95:14

something is lawful is that an absolute

95:17

defense yes uh I think that it is um

95:20

under the principle of entrapment by a

95:22

stopple this is a due process doctrine

95:25

that we referred to in our brief uh our

95:27

reply brief in Garland versus Cargill

95:30

this term at page 19 where we cited

95:33

authority of this court that if a

95:35

authorized government representative

95:37

tells you that what you are about to do

95:39

is lawful it would be a a root violation

95:43

of due process to prosecute you for that

95:45

will that won't that give presidents an

95:48

incentive to be sure to pick an attorney

95:50

general who can Will who will reliably

95:54

tell the president that it is lawful to

95:56

do whatever the president wants to do if

95:59

there's any possibly conceivable

96:01

argument in favor of it so I think the

96:04

Constitutional structure protects

96:06

against that risk the president

96:08

nominates the attorney general and the

96:10

Senate provides advice and consent and

96:13

these are the sort of structural checks

96:15

that have operated for 200 years to

96:18

prevent the kind of abuses that my

96:20

friend fears going forward as a result

96:23

of this once in history prosecution uh

96:27

on the question of whether a president

96:30

has the authority to Pardon himself

96:32

which came up earlier in the argument

96:35

what's the answer to that question I

96:36

don't believe the Department of Justice

96:37

has taken a position the the only

96:39

Authority that I'm aware of is a member

96:42

of the office of legal council wrote on

96:43

a memorandum that there is no self-part

96:46

Authority as far as I know the

96:48

department has not addressed it further

96:50

and of course this court had not uh

96:52

addressed it either well when you

96:54

address that question before us are you

96:56

speaking in Your Capacity solely as a

96:58

member of the special council's team or

97:01

or are you speaking uh on behalf of the

97:05

justice department which has special

97:09

institutional responsibilities I am

97:11

speaking on behalf of the justice

97:13

department we're representing the United

97:15

States now how don't you think we need

97:17

to know the answer to at least to the

97:20

Justice Department's position on that

97:22

issue in order order to decide this case

97:25

because if a president has the authority

97:28

to Pardon himself before leaving office

97:32

and the DC circuit is right that there

97:34

is no immunity from prosecution won't

97:38

the the predictable result be that

97:40

presidents on the last couple of days of

97:42

office are going to Pardon themselves

97:43

from anything that they might have been

97:45

conceivably charged with committing I I

97:48

really doubt that Justice Alo I mean it

97:49

sort of presupposes a regime that we

97:52

have never had except for President

97:54

Nixon and as alleged in the indictment

97:56

here presidents who are conscious of

97:58

having engaged in wrongdoing and seeking

98:00

to Shield themselves I think the

98:02

political consequences of a President

98:05

Who asserted a right of self- Pardon

98:07

that has never been recognized that

98:08

seems to contradict a Bedrock principle

98:11

of our law that no person shall be the

98:13

judge in their own case uh those are

98:16

adequate deterrence I think so that this

98:19

kind of dystopian regime is not going to

98:21

evolve all right let me and end with

98:23

just a question about what is required

98:28

for the functioning of the stable

98:31

Democratic Society which is something

98:33

that we all want um I'm sure you would

98:37

agree with me that a stable Democratic

98:40

Society requires that a candidate who

98:43

loses an election even a close one even

98:47

a hotly contested one leave office

98:50

peacefully if that candidate is the Inc

98:53

incumbent of course all right

98:56

now if a an incumbent who loses a very

99:02

close hotly contested election knows

99:05

that a real

99:08

possibility uh after leaving office is

99:10

not that the president is going to be

99:12

able to go off into a peaceful

99:14

retirement but that the president may be

99:17

criminally prosecuted by a bitter

99:20

political opponent will that not lead us

99:24

into a cycle that destabilizes the

99:29

functioning of our country as a

99:30

democracy and we can look around the

99:32

world and find countries where we have

99:34

seen this process where the loser gets

99:37

thrown in jail so I think it's exactly

99:40

the opposite Justice Alo there are

99:43

lawful mechanisms to contest the results

99:46

in an election and outside the record

99:49

but I think of public knowledge uh ier

99:54

and his allies filed dozens of electoral

99:58

challenges and in my understanding is

100:00

lost all but one that was not outcome

100:03

determinative in any respect there were

100:06

judges that that said in order to

100:09

sustain substantial claims of fraud that

100:12

would overturn an election result that's

100:14

certified by a state you need evidence

100:17

you need proof and none of those things

100:19

were manifested so there was an

100:21

appropriate way to challenge things

100:22

through the courts with evidence if you

100:24

lose you accept the results that has

100:27

been the nation's experience I think the

100:29

court is well familiar with that thank

100:31

you justice sod

100:34

mayor a stable Democratic Society needs

100:38

the good faith of its public officials

100:40

correct absolutely and that good faith

100:44

assumes that they will follow the law

100:47

correct now putting that aside there is

100:50

no failsafe system of government

100:54

meaning we have a judicial system that

100:58

has layers and layers and layers of

101:01

protection for accused defendants in the

101:05

hopes that the innocent will go free we

101:08

fail

101:11

routinely but we succeed more often than

101:15

not in the vast majority of cases the

101:18

innocent do go free sometimes they don't

101:21

and we have some post

101:24

um conviction remedies for that but we

101:28

still fail we've executed innocent

101:30

people having said that Justice um Alo

101:35

went through step by step all of the

101:38

mechanisms that could potentially fail

101:42

in the end if it fails

101:45

completely it's because we've destroyed

101:47

our democracy on our own isn't it it is

101:50

justice so to myor and I also think that

101:53

that there are additional checks in the

101:55

system of course the Constitutional

101:57

Frameworks designed a separated Powers

102:00

system in order to limit abuses I think

102:04

one of the ways in which abuses are

102:06

limited is accountability under the

102:07

criminal law for criminal violations but

102:10

the ultimate check is the Good Will and

102:13

faith in democracy and crimes that are

102:17

alleged in this case that are the

102:19

antithesis of democracy that sub it mind

102:23

that an encouragement to believe words

102:26

that been somewhat put into suspicion

102:29

here that no man is above the law either

102:33

in His official or private acts I think

102:35

that is an assumption of the

102:39

Constitution Justice Kagan Mr drean I

102:41

want to go through um your framework and

102:44

make sure I understand it so first on

102:47

the small category of things that you

102:50

say have absolute protection that they

102:52

are core executive functions yes um what

102:55

are those small

102:57

categories uh pardon power pardon veto

103:01

veto foreign

103:02

recognition uh appointments Congress

103:05

cannot say you can't appoint a federal

103:07

judge who hasn't received uh you know a

103:09

certain diploma it hasn't achieved a

103:11

certain age um there are a few other

103:15

powers commanderin-chief

103:16

commander-in-chief is is on the list but

103:20

I want to add to uh my answer on that

103:23

that Congress has substantial Authority

103:25

in the National Security realm Congress

103:27

declares war it raises armies it has

103:30

power over the purse that's more so that

103:32

may be viewed as not really in that core

103:34

set of functions which nobody has any

103:37

power but the president over yes I think

103:39

that there may be some aspects like

103:41

directing troops on the field in which

103:43

the president's power is completely

103:45

unreviewable okay now in in in um in the

103:49

next category where you where we've left

103:52

the core set behind

103:53

yes but we're still in the world of

103:55

official actions and that's where you

103:58

say there are various statuto

104:01

construction rules that might come into

104:03

play correct but you have characterized

104:05

those as something different from just

104:07

saying oh look the statute doesn't say

104:09

the president therefore it doesn't apply

104:11

to the president that's right so I

104:13

wanted to give you an opportunity to say

104:16

you know how that would look how that

104:18

analysis would look in a given case and

104:20

and in the course of responding that you

104:24

know I'm sort of thinking of something

104:25

like the olc opinion which says bribery

104:28

the president can be um tried and

104:32

convicted of bribery even in the part of

104:35

the bribery statutes that do not say the

104:38

president um why is that true that is

104:42

true because there is no serious

104:43

constitutional question that the

104:44

president needs to engage in bribery in

104:47

order to carry out his constitutional

104:49

functions and the office of legal

104:50

council pointed out that bribery is

104:52

enumerated

104:53

in the impeachment Clause so it falls

104:56

outside of anything that could be viewed

104:58

as inherent in the need of Article 2 to

105:01

function do you think the premise of

105:03

that olc opinion was that the bribery

105:05

was simply not official no or is the

105:08

premise that the bribery was official

105:11

and um and still the president could be

105:13

prosecuted for it I think that the

105:15

bribery is is the kind of hybrid that

105:17

illustrates the abuse of public office

105:20

for private gain that we think is

105:22

paradig atic of the kinds of things that

105:25

should be uh not held to be immune in a

105:28

bribery case the public official cannot

105:31

extract the bribe without the official

105:33

power to offer as uh the quidd or the

105:36

pro uh I guess the quo actually um uh so

105:42

it really is a crime that can only be

105:44

committed by public officials who misuse

105:46

their power and it was one of the things

105:48

that was most mistrusted many of the

105:51

acts that are charged in this IND or

105:53

that would violate Federal Criminal Law

105:55

similarly involve the misuse of official

105:58

power for private gain so if you were to

106:01

say like what the line is in this

106:03

category like when it is that the

106:05

statute should be understood as

106:08

precluding presidential prosecution and

106:10

when it is that the statute should be

106:11

understood as allowing it what general

106:14

principles should guide so the the the

106:17

general principles I think kind of

106:19

emerge from looking at what the office

106:21

of legal counsel has done so for example

106:24

with a respect to a federal statute that

106:27

prohibited appointments to courts of

106:29

people within certain degrees of

106:32

consanguinity uh the office of legal

106:34

council said this infringes on a very

106:36

important appointment power of the

106:38

president the power to appoint federal

106:40

judges it cannot be presumed that

106:43

Congress intended to do that because it

106:45

would raise a very serious

106:46

constitutional question the president is

106:48

out then there are categories of

106:51

statutes where the president is in like

106:53

for example the Grassroots lobbying

106:55

statute that the office of legal council

106:57

wrote an opinion about that and it said

107:00

for the president or other public

107:01

officials to go out into the world and

107:03

to promote their programs that can't be

107:06

what Congress intended to prohibit what

107:08

it did intend to prohibit is using

107:10

federal funds to J up Jin up an

107:12

artificial Grassroots campaign that gave

107:15

the appearance of emerging from the

107:17

people but it was really topped down and

107:19

the office of legal council said the

107:21

president and officials who carry

107:23

the president's uh mandates are subject

107:26

to that statute so that's a more nuanced

107:28

one and then the third example that I

107:30

will give you is uh the statute that

107:33

would Pro uh permit prosecution for

107:35

contempt of congress the office of legal

107:37

council concluded that a good faith

107:39

assertion of executive privilege as a

107:41

reason for not providing information to

107:44

Congress would preclude prosecution

107:47

because Congress cannot be deemed to

107:49

have altered the separation of powers in

107:52

such a man I think olc probably would

107:54

have gone on to say if Congress tried to

107:57

do it it would be deemed

107:58

unconstitutional but again this was a

108:00

statute that did not specifically name

108:03

the president there are only two that do

108:05

that so the entire Corpus of federal

108:08

criminal law including bribery offenses

108:11

sedition murder would all be off limits

108:14

if it were taken to the uh to the to the

108:18

extent that some of the questions have

108:20

suggested and for the general principle

108:22

does it raise a serious constitutional

108:24

question and if so to what extent can it

108:27

be carved out individually and there may

108:29

be some instances where the statutes

108:32

here could be carved out and uh a

108:34

particular act could be found to be

108:37

protected or does the statute across the

108:40

board in such a wide range of

108:43

applications somewhat analogous to over

108:45

breath analysis um infringe on the

108:48

president's power so that we're going to

108:50

say that that the president is just out

108:52

now that set of issues they see them

108:53

important and U May occasionally be

108:56

difficult um they also see them not

108:59

really before us in the way Justice

109:01

Jackson suggested earlier what do you S

109:04

I mean do you think they are before us

109:05

we should just clear it up here it is we

109:07

have a case um what what else could we

109:10

do how should we deal with this uh that

109:12

there are these lingering issues that go

109:15

beyond the question of whether there's

109:17

the kind of absolute immunity that um

109:20

the former president is invoking so I

109:22

think the court has discretion to reach

109:25

that issue even though Justice Jackson

109:27

is totally right it was not raised in

109:29

the district court and it was not raised

109:31

in the court of appeals and the the

109:34

analysis that I would use to get there

109:36

is a fusion of a couple of principles

109:38

one is the court has often resolved

109:41

threshold questions that are a

109:43

prerequisite to an intelligent

109:44

resolution of the question presented so

109:47

in a case like United States versus

109:48

grubs for example the court reached out

109:51

to decide what what anticipatory

109:53

warrants are valid under the Fourth

109:55

Amendment before turning to the question

109:57

whether the triggering condition for an

109:59

anticipatory warrant had to be in the

110:01

warrant so that's one principle and then

110:04

a a precedent that bears some analogy to

110:08

this is uh Vermont natural resources

110:11

agency versus United States xrel Stevens

110:14

it was a keam case and the first

110:17

question was whether a state agency was

110:20

a person within the meaning of the false

110:22

claim Act and the second question was

110:25

whether if the state agency was 11th

110:28

Amendment immunity kicked in and the

110:30

court wrote an analysis of why it could

110:33

reach both questions the reaching the

110:36

person question didn't expand the

110:38

Court's Jurisdiction and it made sense

110:40

as a matter of constitutional avoidance

110:42

to do that there are some considerations

110:44

that cut against this and I I want to be

110:47

clear that for overall government

110:49

equities we are not wild about uh

110:52

parties who raise a uh an immunity case

110:55

that can be uh presented to a court on

110:57

an interlocutory appeal and then

110:59

smuggling in other issues so we would

111:01

want to guide the court not to have an

111:04

expansive approach to that issue but the

111:07

final thing that I would say about this

111:09

is part of our submission to this court

111:11

is that the article one branch and the

111:14

article two branches are aligned in

111:16

believing that this prosecution is an

111:19

appropriate way to enforce the law

111:21

Congress by making the law the current

111:24

executive by deciding to bring it and

111:26

since a building block of that uh

111:28

submission is that Congress actually did

111:31

apply these criminal laws to official

111:33

conduct Court may wish to exercise its

111:35

discretion to resolve that issue okay I

111:37

have one last set of questions which um

111:40

has to do with the official un

111:42

unofficial line and you heard um Mr

111:45

Sour's responses to both Justice

111:47

Barrett's questions and my questions

111:50

about what he thinks counts as official

111:52

years and what he thinks counts as

111:54

unofficial here and I'm just wondering

111:56

what you took from um his responses and

111:59

also how you would characterize what is

112:02

official and what is not official in

112:05

this

112:06

indictment so um I I think petitioner

112:09

conceded that there are uh acts that are

112:12

not official that are alleged in the

112:13

indictment and we agree with him on all

112:15

of that I think I disagree with him on

112:17

everything else that he said about what

112:19

is official and what is not organized

112:22

ing fraudulent slates of electors

112:25

creating false documentation that says

112:28

uh I'm an elector I was appointed

112:30

properly I'm going to send a a vote off

112:33

to Congress that reflects that

112:35

petitioner won rather than the candidate

112:37

that actually got the most votes and who

112:39

was ascertained by the governor and

112:41

whose electors were appointed to cast

112:44

votes that is not uh official conduct

112:47

that is campaign conduct and I think

112:50

that the DC circuit in the blasing game

112:52

case did draw an appropriate distinction

112:56

a first-term president who's running for

112:58

reelection can act in the capacity as

113:00

office Seeker or office holder and when

113:04

working with private lawyers and a

113:07

private public relations uh advise her

113:10

to Jin up fraudulent slates of electors

113:14

that is not any part of a president's

113:16

job so there's I'm sorry there's an

113:18

allegation um in the indictment that has

113:20

to do with the removal of a justice

113:22

department official would would is that

113:25

core protected conduct we don't think

113:27

that that's core protected conduct I

113:29

don't think that that I would

113:30

characterize that episode quite that way

113:33

we do agree that the Department of

113:34

Justice allegations were a use of the

113:37

president's official power in many ways

113:41

we think that aggravates the nature of

113:43

this offense seeking as a uh candidate

113:47

to OU the lawful winner of the election

113:49

and have one self-certified with private

113:53

actors is a private scheme to achieve a

113:55

private end and many of the

113:57

co-conspirators alleged in the

113:58

indictment are private but for an

114:01

incumbent president to then use his

114:03

presidential powers to try to enhance

114:06

the likelihood that it succeeds makes

114:08

the crime in our view worse so in the

114:11

Department of Justice episode uh it's

114:14

cars very late in the election cycle

114:16

after many other schemes had failed um

114:19

and at that point the the petitioner is

114:24

alleged to have tried to pressure the

114:26

Department of Justice to send false

114:28

letters to the states claiming that

114:30

there were serious election

114:31

irregularities and that they should

114:33

investigate who they certified as a

114:35

president none of this was true the

114:37

Department of Justice officials all said

114:39

this is not true we are not going to do

114:41

that and at that point petitioner is

114:44

alleged to have threatened to remove the

114:46

Department of Justice officials who were

114:48

standing by their oath and replace them

114:51

with another person who would carry it

114:53

out we're not seeking to impose criminal

114:55

liability on the president for

114:57

exercising or talking about exercising

115:01

the appointment and removal power no

115:03

what we're seeking to impose criminal

115:05

liability for is a conspiracy to use

115:07

fraud to subvert the election one means

115:11

of which was to try to get the justice

115:13

department to be complicit in this the

115:15

case would have been no different if

115:17

petitioner were successful and he had

115:19

actually exercised the appointment and

115:21

removal power and had gone through and

115:23

those fraudulent letters were sent it

115:25

would have made the scheme more

115:26

dangerous but it would not have changed

115:28

the crime and how do we think about

115:29

things like conversations with the Vice

115:32

President in other words things that if

115:33

you say it that way it's clear that they

115:35

would fall under executive privilege but

115:38

how does that relate to the question

115:41

that we're asking here so this is one of

115:43

the most difficult questions for the

115:45

Department of Justice and I I want to

115:48

explain why that is if we are operating

115:51

under a f Gerald versus Nixon lens and

115:54

looking at this the way that we look at

115:56

things when there is a private lawsuit

115:59

filed against uh the president we take a

116:02

very broad view of what the Outer

116:04

Perimeter of official presidential

116:06

action is in order to be as protective

116:09

of the president against private

116:11

lawsuits that as this court explained in

116:14

Nixon versus Fitzgerald can be very

116:16

dilar is to the president's conduct of

116:18

business so if we were putting this

116:20

under a Fitzgerald lens we would then

116:22

have to answer to the question was he

116:25

acting in in the capacity as office

116:27

Seeker or was he acting in the capacity

116:30

as office holder and if you run through

116:33

the indictment you can find support for

116:36

those two

116:37

characterizations and the Department of

116:39

Justice has not yet had to come to grips

116:42

with how we would analyze that set of

116:45

interactions thank you justice Gorsuch

116:48

if you did though I just wanted to

116:50

confirm I thought I heard you thought

116:51

that blazing game framework was the

116:54

appropriate one is that largely yes

116:57

Justice Gorsuch we we agree with the

117:01

idea of um the distinction between

117:05

office holder and office Seeker we also

117:09

agree that if it's objectively

117:12

reasonable to view the activities as

117:15

those of office holder than the

117:17

Fitzgerald immunity kicks in I think we

117:20

would look more at content of the actual

117:24

interaction in order to make that

117:27

determination then blasting game

117:29

suggested at least on the facts of that

117:30

case might be appropriate can you give

117:32

me an example of what you have in mind

117:34

I'm just trying to understand what

117:35

Nuance you're suggest so so so blasting

117:39

game adopted a you know a generally very

117:41

favorable pro-government framework that

117:44

we

117:46

endorse okay not here because we don't

117:49

think that Fitzgerald applies in the

117:50

criminal cont I understand that but but

117:52

but but but putting that aside the

117:55

distinction between official act and

117:57

private office Seeker their test is you

117:59

think good enough for government work I

118:04

I on this one the department hasn't

118:08

taken a Next Step since the blasting

118:10

game decision but let me offer a few

118:12

thoughts just scor I think might clarify

118:15

it the blasing game decision focused on

118:18

objective contextual indications to try

118:20

to see whether the president was acting

118:22

as a campaigner as opposed to a uh you

118:26

know an office holder I I think that

118:29

that that decision can also be made by

118:32

looking at what the president actually

118:35

said and let me illustrate that with an

118:37

allegation that I think my talked

118:39

briefly uh that in one of the

118:42

interactions between petitioner and a

118:44

state official a petitioner is alleged

118:47

who have said all I need you to do is to

118:49

find me 11,000 votes and change uh I

118:53

think if you look at that that content

118:55

it's pretty clear that petitioner is

118:57

acting in the capacity as office Seeker

119:00

not as president and we would look at

119:02

that content okay okay but the test I'm

119:04

just focused on the legal test correct

119:07

I'm not hearing any objections to it

119:09

other than I think that the DC circuit

119:11

placed more uh content consideration off

119:15

limits than I would okay all right and

119:18

then I wanted to understand on the core

119:20

immunity or whatever word we use that

119:24

that it seems to me that we're narrowing

119:25

the ground of dispute here considerably

119:28

do do we look at motives the president's

119:31

motives for his actions I mean uh the

119:35

for example he has lots of War Powers as

119:38

we've discussed but he might use them in

119:40

order to enhance his election his

119:42

personal interests is that a relevant

119:45

consideration when we're looking at core

119:47

Powers so I I I am thinking of this more

119:50

as looking at the objective of the

119:53

activity as opposed to the kind of

119:57

subjective motive in the sense that your

119:59

honor is talking about I think that

120:00

there is a lot of concern about saying

120:03

an electoral motive to be reelected as

120:05

such every first term president

120:08

everything he does can be seen through

120:11

the um Prism by critics at least of his

120:15

personal interest in reelection yes and

120:17

so you wouldn't want that I I think you

120:20

would say personal MO motivations off

120:23

limits with respect to the core Powers

120:26

probably well with respect to the core

120:28

Powers we think those are just things

120:29

that can't be regulated at all like the

120:31

pardon power and veto right regardless

120:33

of motive correct regardless of Mo

120:36

that's right all right so then we're in

120:37

the non-core powers right where we're

120:39

fighting over what role do motives play

120:42

there I mean uh one could remove an an

120:47

appointee that well first of all is

120:49

maybe ask this first is removing an

120:52

appointee a presidential appointee a

120:55

core power or a non-core power in your

120:57

world so here I might need to

120:59

differentiate between the principal

121:02

officers that this court in cases like

121:04

Meyers and uh seila law has regarded as

121:09

uh having a constitutional status of

121:11

being removable at will from inferior

121:14

officers where Congress does have some

121:16

regulatory latitude to impose

121:18

restrictions on removal and and rest

121:22

side yeah I I understand that put

121:23

putting that aside yes appointing a

121:25

principal officer is a Core Power I am

121:29

not uh prepared to say that there is no

121:31

potential criminal regulation to say you

121:33

can't do it for corrupt purposes to

121:37

enrich yourself for example well bribery

121:40

all right but but but that's what I was

121:42

wondering do motives come into the Core

121:44

Power analysis or not and now I'm

121:46

hearing I I thought I heard no and now

121:48

I'm hearing maybe I think maybe might be

121:51

a little bit more appropriate because

121:53

it's not involved in this case the

121:55

department has not had to take a

121:56

position on exactly how uh these core

122:01

Powers would be resolved under an as

122:03

applied constitutional analysis none is

122:06

involved in this case and I guess I'm

122:07

wondering and I'm not concerned about

122:10

this case so much as future ones too but

122:14

uh these non-core powers and maybe core

122:16

powers where a president is acting with

122:19

at least in part a personal interest in

122:21

getting

122:22

reelected um everything he does yeah he

122:26

wants to get reelected and if you're if

122:28

you're allowing in motive to color

122:31

that um I I'm I'm wondering how much is

122:34

left uh of either the core or non-core

122:37

Powers so I I I would be fine with

122:40

carving that out and deeming that to be

122:43

something that's intrinsic in our

122:44

electoral system we're not talking about

122:47

applying criminal law to somebody who

122:49

makes an announcement that this program

122:51

will be be good for the United States

122:53

and somebody could come along and say

122:55

well you really did it to get reelected

122:57

leaving aside whether any of that

122:59

violates a criminal law I know that the

123:01

next question is assume that it does um

123:04

I'm doubtful that it in fact does

123:06

because I don't think criminal laws

123:07

generally operate on motives as opposed

123:09

to objectives and purposes but well all

123:13

right intentions I mean you frame a

123:15

motive is an intention and an intention

123:17

is a motive as you well know every day

123:18

of the week so let's put that aside I

123:20

understand we we put it putting that

123:22

aside um that really to me Falls in a

123:25

very different category and it is also

123:28

POS there's some motives or intents that

123:31

that are cognizable and others that

123:34

aren't I mean it's it's awkward right

123:36

when we look at back at like the

123:39

injunction uh back to Marbury in the

123:41

early cases you can't enjoin a president

123:44

yeah also me you could hold him in

123:46

contempt right sitting a sitting for

123:48

sure for sure just can I try one more

123:50

time let me just

123:52

spin this out just a second right and

123:54

and and it didn't matter what the

123:55

president's motives were we're not going

123:57

to look behind it right and and same

123:59

thing in Nixon we said gosh Nixon versus

124:03

Fitzgerald that's something courts

124:05

shouldn't get engaged in because

124:07

presidents have all manner of motives

124:10

and again I'm not concerned about this

124:12

case but I am concerned about future

124:15

uses of the criminal law to Target

124:17

political opponents based on accusations

124:20

about their motives m whether it's

124:22

reelection or who knows what corrupt

124:24

means in

124:26

1512 right we we don't know what that

124:28

means um maybe we'll find out sometime

124:31

soon but um the the dangerousness of

124:34

accusing your political opponent of

124:36

having bad motives and and if that's

124:39

enough to overcome your core powers or

124:42

any other

124:44

limits reactions thoughts yeah so I I I

124:48

think that you're raising a very

124:50

difficult question that's the idea right

124:51

I mean that is the idea testing testing

124:53

the limits of both sides arguments and

124:55

I'm going to say something that I don't

124:57

normally say which is that's really not

124:59

involved in this case we don't have we

125:02

don't have bad political motive in that

125:05

sense I understand that I appreciate

125:07

that but you also appreciate that we're

125:09

writing a rule for yes for the ages yes

125:12

and I think I would start by looking at

125:13

the statutes and and then seeing what

125:16

restrictions they do place on the

125:18

president's conduct and for example the

125:22

statute that prohibits uh fraud to

125:24

defeat the lawful functions of the

125:26

United States the statute defines what

125:28

the purpose is that the defendant has to

125:30

have in mind it has to be to defeat

125:33

something that the United States is

125:34

doing and it has to be by deception I

125:37

don't think that that gets us into the

125:39

realm of motive hunting in the area

125:42

where we are as concerned I think as the

125:45

court would be about doing something

125:46

that would undermine uh the presidency

125:49

and the executive branch and 1512 C2 we

125:53

may have different views on the clarity

125:55

and the scope of that statute I think if

125:58

the court does interpret corruptly is

126:00

involving a consciousness of wrongdoing

126:02

and elevates that to consciousness of

126:05

illegality then we're in a different

126:07

realm wanting to get reelected is not an

126:10

illegal motive and you don't have to

126:12

worry about Prosecuting presidents for

126:14

that yeah okay thank you Mr Dre Justice

126:17

Kavanaugh as you've indicated this case

126:19

has huge implications for the presidency

126:22

for the future of the presidency for the

126:24

future of the country in my view um

126:27

you've referred to the department a few

126:29

times as having supported the position

126:31

who in the department is it the

126:33

president the Attorney

126:34

General uh the solicitor general of the

126:36

United States uh part of the way in

126:39

which the special Council functions is

126:42

as a uh component of the Department of

126:45

Justice the regulations Envision that we

126:48

reach out and consult and on a question

126:51

of this magnitude that involves equities

126:53

that are far beyond this prosecution as

126:55

the questions of the court so it's a

126:57

solicitor general yes okay um second uh

127:03

like justice Gorsuch uh I'm not focused

127:06

on the Here and Now of this case um very

127:09

concerned about the future uh and I

127:11

think one of the Court's biggest

127:13

mistakes was Morrison versus

127:15

Olsen uh I think that was a terrible

127:17

decision for the presidency and for the

127:19

country and not because because there

127:21

were bad people uh who were independent

127:24

councils but President Reagan's

127:26

Administration President Bush's

127:28

Administration President Clinton's

127:30

administration were really uh hampered

127:33

yes uh in their view all three by the uh

127:37

independent Council structure and and

127:39

what I I'm worried about here is that

127:44

that was kind of let's relax Article 2 a

127:46

bit for the needs of the moment and I'm

127:48

worried about the similar kind of uh

127:51

situation applying here that was a

127:53

prosecutor investigating a president in

127:55

each of those circumstances and someone

127:58

picked from the opposite party the

128:00

current president uh and uh usually uh

128:05

was how it worked and and Justice Scalia

128:07

wrote that the the fairness of a process

128:10

must be judged on the basis of what it

128:12

permits to happen Not What It produced

128:14

in a particular case you've emphasized

128:17

uh many times regularity the Department

128:19

of Justice and he said

128:22

uh and I think this applied to the

128:23

independent Council system and it could

128:25

apply if presidents are routinely

128:27

subject to investigation going forward

128:30

one thing is certain however it involves

128:32

investigating and perhaps Prosecuting a

128:33

particular individual can one imagine a

128:36

less Equitable manner fulfilling the

128:38

executive responsibility to investigate

128:40

and prosecute what would the reaction be

128:42

if in an area not covered by the statute

128:44

the justice department posted a public

128:47

notice inviting applicants to an

128:49

assistant an investigation in possible

128:51

prosecution of a certain prominent

128:53

person does this not invite what Justice

128:55

Jackson described as picking the man and

128:57

then searching the law books or putting

128:59

investigators to work to pin some

129:01

offense on him to be sure the

129:04

investigation must relate to the area of

129:06

criminal offense specified uh by the

129:09

statute uh but that has often been and

129:12

nothing prevents it from being uh very

129:15

broad I paraphrased at the end because

129:16

it was referring to the judges yes um

129:20

that's the concern going forward is that

129:22

the the system will when when former

129:24

presidents are subject to prosecution in

129:28

the history of Morrison versus Olen

129:30

tells us it's not going to stop it's

129:32

going to it's going to cycle back and be

129:33

used against the current president or

129:36

the next president or and the next

129:37

president and the next president after

129:39

that all that I want you to try to allay

129:43

that concern why is this not Morrison V

129:45

Olsen Redux if we agree with you well um

129:50

first of all the the independent Council

129:52

regime did have many structural features

129:55

that emphasized an independence at the

129:59

expense of accountability we don't have

130:02

that regime now but even under that

130:04

regime Justice Kavanaugh I think if you

130:06

look at Lawrence Walsh's report on Iran

130:10

Contra uh I think this goes to a very

130:12

fundamental point for the court to

130:15

consider uh uh judge Walsh said I

130:19

investigated these matters the proof did

130:21

not nearly come close to establishing

130:23

criminal violations so we've lived from

130:26

Watergate through the present through

130:27

the independent Council ERA with all of

130:29

its flaws without these prosecutions

130:32

having gone off on a runaway train well

130:35

I think President Reagan President Bush

130:37

and President Clinton whether rightly or

130:39

wrongly thought oppos thought contrary

130:42

to what you just said I think nobody

130:44

likes being investigated for a crime but

130:46

it didn't result in the kind of

130:48

vindictive prosecutions that I I think

130:50

your honor is as raising as a

130:52

possibility we we have a different

130:54

system now I think there was a consensus

130:55

throughout Washington that there were

130:58

flaws in the independent Council system

131:00

it lapsed we now are inside the justice

131:03

department with full accountability

131:05

resting with the attorney general so the

131:08

special Council regulations now don't

131:10

operate the way that the independent

131:12

Council regulations do and I this court

131:16

would have something to say about it I

131:17

think if uh the independent Council

131:19

statute were revived I'm not sure that

131:21

anybody is in favor of that right now I

131:23

was just saying this is kind of the

131:24

mirror image of that is one way someone

131:27

could perceive it but I take your point

131:28

about the different structural

131:30

protections internally and like justice

131:32

scolia said let me I do not mean to

131:34

suggest anything of the sort in the

131:36

present case I'm not talking about the

131:37

present case uh so I'm talking about the

131:40

future uh SEC another point you said um

131:44

uh uh talked about the criminal statutes

131:46

it's very easy to characterize

131:47

presidential actions as false or

131:49

misleading under vague statute so um uh

131:55

president Lyndon Johnson statements

131:56

about the Vietnam War

131:59

MH say something's false uh turns out to

132:03

be false that he says about the Vietnam

132:04

War 371 prosecution so after he leads

132:08

office I think not but I we need this is

132:11

an area that I do think that merits some

132:14

serious and Nuance consideration

132:16

statements that are made by a president

132:19

uh to the public are not really coming

132:22

within the realm of criminal statutes

132:24

they've never been prosecuted I realize

132:27

that the court can say well what if they

132:29

were and and then I think you get to

132:31

what I would regard as a hard

132:34

constitutional question that would

132:35

probably guide the court away from

132:37

trying to resolve today although I do

132:40

think it's very different from our case

132:42

and distinguishable in important ways

132:44

but you're dealing here with two

132:46

branches of government that have a

132:48

Paramount interest in the integrity and

132:50

freedom of their interactions with each

132:52

other on the one hand the president of

132:55

course should be very free to send

132:57

usually his uh cabinet officials and sub

133:01

cabinet officials to testify to Congress

133:04

to provide them with the information

133:05

needed to enact legislation and to make

133:08

National policy and we're very concerned

133:11

about anything that would tramel that on

133:13

the other side of the equation Congress

133:15

has a compelling interest in receiving

133:18

accurate information and at the very

133:20

least I I AG not information that is

133:23

intentionally and knowingly false that

133:26

would pollute the legis how about I

133:28

think came up before President Ford's

133:31

pardon uh very controversial in the

133:34

moment yes hugely unpopular probably why

133:37

he lost in 76 yes uh now looked upon as

133:41

one of the better decisions in

133:44

presidential history I think by most

133:46

people um if he's thinking about well if

133:50

I grant this pardon to Richard Nixon

133:53

could I be investigated myself for

133:55

obstruction of justice on the theory

133:57

that I'm interfering with the

133:58

investigation of Richard Nixon so this

134:01

would fall into that small core area

134:03

that I mentioned to Justice Kagan and

134:05

Justice Gorsuch of uh presidential

134:08

responsibilities that Congress cannot

134:10

regulate how about President Obama's

134:12

drone strikes so the the office of legal

134:15

council looked at this very carefully

134:17

and determined that number one the

134:19

federal murder statute does apply to the

134:22

Executive Branch the president wasn't

134:24

personally carrying out the strike but

134:25

the aiding and abetting laws are Broad

134:28

and it determined that a Public

134:29

Authority uh exception that's built into

134:33

statutes and that applied particularly

134:35

to the murder statute because it talks

134:36

about unlawful killing did not apply to

134:40

the Drone strike so this is actually the

134:42

way that the system should function the

134:44

Department of Justice takes criminal law

134:46

very seriously it runs it through the

134:48

analysis very carefully with a

134:51

estblished principles it documents them

134:53

it explains them and then the president

134:55

can go forward in accordance with it and

134:57

there is no risk of prosecution for that

134:59

course of Activity thank you for your

135:01

answers Justice Barrett Mr dven I want

135:04

to pick up with that Public Authority

135:06

defense so I'm looking at the olc memo

135:08

that David Baron wrote that you cited in

135:10

your briefs and he describes the Public

135:13

Authority defense citing the model Penal

135:16

Code there are a few different

135:17

definitions but I'll just highlight this

135:19

one um

135:21

justifying conduct which is required or

135:24

authorized by the law defining the

135:27

duties or functions of a public officer

135:30

the law governing the armed services or

135:32

lawful conduct of war or any other

135:34

provision of law imposing a public duty

135:38

that sounds a lot like dividing a line

135:41

between official and private conduct it

135:43

it's I think it's narrower and I

135:45

recognize it's a defense not an immunity

135:47

but when we look at when you look at the

135:48

definition of it are you acting Within

135:51

the scope of authority conferred by law

135:53

or discharging a duty conferred by law I

135:55

think it's narrower than blasing game

135:57

narrower than Nixon versus Fitzgerald

135:59

but that's what it sounds like to me do

136:01

you agree or disagree you know just SP I

136:04

certainly understand the intuition that

136:06

when you act outside of your lawful

136:07

Authority you've kind of gone in a

136:09

Frolic and Detour you're no longer

136:11

carrying it out I don't really think

136:12

that that quite works for presidential

136:15

activity the only way that he could have

136:17

implemented the orders is by exercising

136:20

his Comm commander-in Chief authority

136:22

over the Armed Forces or his authority

136:25

to supervise the executive branch those

136:27

seem like core executive acts to me

136:29

there is such a possibility as an

136:32

unlawful executive

136:34

act I'm not sure that I understand your

136:36

answer I mean I was thinking it seemed

136:39

to me that in your briefs and today when

136:41

you referred to the public Authority

136:42

defense you said that's one of the

136:44

built-in protections and why immunity is

136:46

not necessary because in some of these

136:48

instances when the president takes such

136:51

actions that you know the Court's been

136:53

asking you might this result in criminal

136:54

prosecution you say well he could raise

136:57

this Public Authority defense and so I'm

136:59

saying isn't this Public Authority

137:01

defense if raised doesn't it sound like

137:03

a defense that says well I had I was

137:06

authorized by law to discharge this

137:09

function and therefore I acted lawfully

137:12

therefore I acted lawfully and not

137:14

criminally liable correct does that

137:17

involve a look into motives kind of this

137:19

is gets to what Justice was asking you

137:21

could you say I was acting within the

137:23

scope of my authority by granting a

137:25

pardon removing a cabinet officer but

137:28

then the Public Authority defense might

137:30

not apply because you had a bad motive

137:32

in doing so no I I I don't think so J

137:34

spett I think that it operates based on

137:36

objective facts disclosed to council

137:40

Council then provides the advice in this

137:41

case the Department of Justice and it

137:44

it's an objectively valid defense it's a

137:46

complete defense to prosecution so what

137:48

would be so bad I mean one thing that

137:50

strikes me is different well one thing

137:52

that's obviously different between the

137:53

Public Authority defense and Immunity is

137:55

an interlocutory appeal and having it

137:57

resolved at the outset what would be so

138:00

bad about having a question like that

138:03

resolved at the threshold having it be

138:04

an immunity the same kind of question

138:06

that could be brought up as a defense

138:08

later but have it be brought up at the

138:09

threshold as an immunity and then an

138:11

interlocutory appeal would be available

138:13

and it would be a freedom from standing

138:15

trial but not a a jet out not a get out

138:18

of jail free cart yes I I understand and

138:21

I think that if the court believed that

138:23

that was the appropriate way to craft

138:26

presidential protections it has the

138:29

authority to craft procedural rules that

138:31

Implement its Article 2 uh concerns that

138:36

said uh Public Authority is we're

138:39

calling it a defense but under many

138:41

statutes It's actually an exception to

138:43

liability itself and what you're really

138:46

talking about is trying the general

138:48

issue and generally in criminal cases

138:51

even cases that involve First Amendment

138:54

issues like threats statutes the jury is

138:57

the determinant of the facts and I have

139:00

a little bit of difficulty with the idea

139:02

of trying the whole public authority

139:05

issue separately to the judge and having

139:08

that go up on interlocutory appeal with

139:10

review of facts before you could ever

139:12

get it Forward into a criminal case that

139:16

said it if I would prefer a regime in

139:20

which the court uh altered some of the

139:23

procedural rules surrounding the

139:26

president than a total absolute blanket

139:29

immunity that takes away the the

139:31

possibility of criminal prosecution even

139:34

if it was a core violation of the

139:36

statute in the teeth of attorney general

139:38

advice and has no overriding public po

139:41

you think it has to be a jury question

139:43

and I I mean I let's see I wasn't

139:44

necessarily proposing actually treating

139:46

it as a defense that was done at the

139:49

outset and then subject to interlocutory

139:51

appeal I was proposing what about an

139:53

immunity doctrine that Drew from the

139:55

public Authority defense that the

139:57

Department of Justice thinks would

139:58

otherwise apply so just just go with me

140:01

on that for a minute why would it be so

140:03

bad for it not to be a jury question I

140:05

mean it seems to me that some of these

140:06

Article 2 concerns would be exacerbated

140:09

by having it go to a jury rather than a

140:10

judge so I I think some of them are uh

140:15

judge questions that could be resolved

140:17

on the face of the indictment if the

140:19

Department of Justice ever returned an

140:21

indictment that said the issuance of

140:23

this pardon or this series of Pardons

140:26

constituted obstruction of justice I

140:29

have a little difficulty hypothesizing

140:31

it but a motion could be made on the

140:33

face of the indictment that says Article

140:35

2 precludes Congress from regulating

140:37

these activities the indictment needs to

140:39

be dismissed and if the court wish to

140:42

attach to that kind of a rule

140:45

interlocutory appeal then that that

140:48

would be a a lesser safeguard than the

140:51

the one that my friend is proposing here

140:54

other kinds of defenses though really do

140:57

intersect with the general issue and for

140:59

those I have a much greater uh time

141:02

seeing how the court could Implement

141:04

that and would there be cost in going to

141:07

trial yes there is no perfect system

141:10

here we are trying to design a system

141:12

that preserves the effective functioning

141:14

of the presidency and the accountability

141:17

of a former president under the rule of

141:19

law and the perfect system that

141:21

calibrates all of those values probably

141:24

has not been devised I think that the

141:26

system that we have works pretty well

141:28

maybe it needs some few ancillary rules

141:31

it is different from the radical

141:33

proposal of my friend I I agree let let

141:35

me ask you about State

141:37

prosecutions because if the president

141:40

has some kind of immunity that's

141:42

implicit in Article 2 then that immunity

141:45

would protect him and from State

141:47

prosecutions as well a lot of the

141:50

protection that you're talking about are

141:52

internal protections that the federal

141:54

government has Protections in the

141:56

Department of Justice which obviously

141:58

are not applicable at the many many many

141:59

many uh state and local jurisdictions

142:02

across the country what do you have to

142:04

say to that so that raises a supremacy

142:06

clause issue and the court would run a

142:10

supremacy clause analysis that would

142:12

probably start with basic principles

142:14

like mullik versus Maryland the states

142:17

do not have the authority to burden

142:19

Federal functions and would then kind of

142:22

move through in Reagle where the court

142:25

said that a State murder prosecution of

142:28

a federal official guarding a Supreme

142:30

Court Justice and who fired a shot was

142:32

not permissible if the court thought

142:35

that you needed a more categorical rule

142:38

for the states I think the supremacy

142:40

clause certainly leaves it within the

142:43

Court's prerogative to determine that

142:45

the president unlike all other officials

142:47

deserves more of a robust Federal

142:50

defense than what I have justed it would

142:52

still be a defense in in the states it

142:54

wouldn't be I mean that's my point like

142:57

the you know it's one thing to say well

142:59

the president they're not going to be

143:00

these prosecutions that are politically

143:03

motivated the things that Justice

143:04

Kavanagh was referring to that might be

143:06

the danger of of the system one thing

143:08

that we have to worry about that might

143:09

not carry the day but you know that's a

143:11

concern it's totally different when you

143:13

take it outside of the Department of

143:16

Justice and its structures and then you

143:18

throw it out elsewhere the idea across

143:21

across the states the idea of an

143:22

immunity I think has a lot more purchase

143:25

if you're talking about something that

143:26

protects the former president from

143:28

standing trial and the state and state

143:30

and local level so I I I don't know that

143:32

you would have to design a system in

143:34

which the president would have to stand

143:36

trial at the state and local level

143:39

certainly within the Court's Authority

143:40

as a matter of supremacy clause law to

143:43

find an immunity but we we have been

143:46

talking here about at some length on the

143:49

distinction between official acts and

143:51

private

143:52

acts that will have to be determined by

143:54

some sort of a process any immunity

143:57

defense that the court announces can

143:59

still be met by a state assertion that

144:02

we're Prosecuting private conduct you're

144:04

going to have to have some process I

144:06

think having some legal process is not a

144:09

reason to cast aside a Nuance system

144:12

that actually looks at what protections

144:14

are necessary as opposed to what would

144:17

provide the absolute maximum insallation

144:20

for former presidents even if we

144:22

acknowledge that it's highly

144:23

prophylactic totally agree and I wasn't

144:25

actually contrasting the absolute

144:27

immunity rule I was saying that if there

144:28

were some sort of official private their

144:30

consequences towards about making

144:33

immunity okay and since you bring up the

144:34

private act it's my last question so I

144:38

had asked Mr sour about on page 46 and

144:41

47 of your brief yes you say even if the

144:44

court were inclined to recognize some

144:46

immunity for a former president's

144:47

official acts it should remand for trial

144:49

because the indictment alleges

144:51

substantial private conduct yes and you

144:53

said that the private conduct would be

144:55

sufficient yes the special counsel has

144:57

expressed some concern for Speed and

144:59

wanting to move forward so you know the

145:02

normal process what what Mr sour asked

145:05

would be for us to remand if we decided

145:07

that there were some official acts

145:09

immunity and to let that be sorted out

145:11

below it is another option for the

145:14

special Council to just proceed based on

145:16

the private conduct and drop the

145:18

official conduct well well two things on

145:21

that just first first of all there's

145:22

really an integrated conspiracy here

145:25

that had different components as alleged

145:27

in the indictment working with with

145:29

private lawyers to achieve the goals of

145:32

the fraud and as I said before the the

145:36

petitioner Reaching For His official

145:38

powers to try to make the conspiracies

145:40

more likely to succeed we would like to

145:43

present that as an integrated picture to

145:45

the jury so that it sees the sequence

145:48

and the gravity of the conduct and why

145:50

each step occurred that said if the

145:52

court were to say that the fraudin

145:55

elector scheme is private reaching out

145:57

to State officials as a candidate is

145:59

private trying to exploit the violence

146:02

after January 6th by calling senators

146:05

and saying please delay the

146:06

certification proceeding is private

146:08

campaign activity we still think

146:11

contrary to what my friend said that we

146:13

could introduce the interactions with

146:15

the justice department the efforts to

146:17

pressure the vice president for their

146:19

evidence

146:20

value as showing the defendant's

146:23

knowledge and intent and we would take a

146:26

jury instruction that would say you may

146:28

not impose criminal culpability for the

146:31

actions that he took however you may

146:34

consider it in so far as it Bears on

146:36

knowledge and intent that's the usual

146:38

rule with protected speech for example

146:40

under Wisconsin versus Mitchell my

146:43

friend analogizes this to the speech or

146:45

debate clause well we don't think the

146:46

speech or debate clause has any

146:48

applicability here it's a very explicit

146:50

constitutional protection that says uh

146:53

senators and representatives shall not

146:54

be questioned in any other place so it

146:57

carries an evidentiary component that's

146:59

above and beyond whatever official act

147:02

immunity he is seeking and the last

147:04

thing I would say on this is we think

147:05

that the concerns about the use of

147:07

evidence of presidential conduct that

147:10

might otherwise be official and subject

147:12

to executive privilege is already taken

147:14

care of by United States versus Nixon

147:16

that balances the president's interest

147:18

and confidentiality against the need of

147:20

the judicial system for all available

147:22

facts to get to the truth and once that

147:25

has been overcome we submit the evidence

147:28

can be used even if culpability can't

147:30

rest on it thank you justice Jackson

147:33

just to pick up where Justice Barrett

147:35

left off I I think I heard you say that

147:38

even if we decide here something a a

147:41

rule that's not the rule that you prefer

147:44

um that is somehow separating out

147:47

private from official acts and saying

147:49

that that that should apply here there's

147:53

sufficient uh allegations in the

147:55

indictment in the government's view that

147:57

fall into the private acts bucket that

148:00

the case should be allowed to proceed

148:01

correct because in an ordinary case it

148:05

wouldn't be stopped just because some of

148:07

the acts are allegedly IM immunized even

148:10

if people agree that some are immunized

148:13

if there are other acts that aren't the

148:15

case would go forward that is right all

148:17

right um going back to the clear

148:20

statement uh argument I I I'm struggling

148:24

with that argument because my

148:26

understanding was that when a charged

148:29

criminal statute is read narrowly in the

148:31

presidential context to not apply to the

148:34

president um a constitutional question

148:37

is being avoided so that you're doing

148:40

that to avoid having to deal with the

148:42

Constitutional question so what is the

148:45

Constitutional question that is being

148:47

avoided in those kinds of situations a

148:49

serious one this is just an application

148:52

of this Court's ordinary construction of

148:54

criminal statutes that if there is an

148:56

available interpretation that would

148:59

avoid a serious constitutional question

149:01

the Court's preference is to and the

149:03

nature I guess I'm going at what is what

149:05

is my understanding is that what is

149:07

being avoided in that situation is the

149:10

question of whether a former president

149:12

or you know can be held criminally

149:15

liable for doing the alleged act that is

149:17

being asserted in that statute

149:20

consistent with the Constitution so we

149:21

look at the statute it's got some

149:23

elements in it and we are saying well

149:25

gez if this statute and those elements

149:29

apply to the president's conduct in this

149:32

situation we'd have to a answer the

149:34

question can the president be held

149:37

liable consistent with the Constitution

149:39

for that behavior is that right so the

149:41

first step in that analysis I just want

149:43

to yes yes but the first step is is

149:46

there ambiguity and these statutes apply

149:48

to any person they apply to whoever

149:51

there's no ambiguity in those phrases

149:53

this court in nardone versus United

149:55

States concluded that similar words any

149:58

person yes apply to government officials

150:01

all right well assume let's just assume

150:03

that we I guess I'm just trying to get

150:05

at we're avoiding a constitutional

150:07

question if we do that in in the

150:10

ordinary case and and what's confusing

150:12

to me about this case is that we're not

150:14

being asked to avoid the Constitutional

150:17

question in fact the question of whether

150:20

or not the president can be held liable

150:22

consistent with the Constitution or does

150:24

he have immunity is the question that's

150:26

being presented to us so I don't

150:29

understand how the clear statement kind

150:31

of analysis even works it seems

150:34

completely tological to me for us to

150:38

hold that presidents cannot be

150:40

prosecuted under any criminal statute

150:42

without a clear statement from con uh

150:44

Congress to avoid the question of

150:47

whether or not the Constitution allows

150:49

them to be prosecuted we'd have to have

150:51

a reason right I mean we' we'd have to

150:54

have a rationale for applying the C

150:56

clear statement rule I I think the court

150:58

would have to have some rationale that's

151:00

not evident in either the existing

151:02

Doctrine or the text and just one data

151:04

point for the court in thinking about

151:06

how the clear statement rule Works in

151:09

United States versus Sun Diamond a case

151:11

about gratuities that court is probably

151:14

familiar with Justice Scalia wrote an

151:16

opinion for a unanimous Court in which

151:18

he used a hypothetic iCal about what

151:21

would happen if the president received a

151:23

sports replica Jersey at a typical White

151:26

House Event would that violate section

151:28

2011 C and the court offered a

151:31

construction that it had to be for

151:32

because an official act to avoid that

151:35

problem I think if there was such a

151:37

well-received understanding that

151:39

presidents are not included in general

151:41

Federal Criminal Law uh unless the

151:44

president is specifically named which he

151:46

is not in section 2011 Justice Scalia

151:49

would have thought of that and some

151:50

member of the Court would have reacted

151:52

and none did all right let me go on to

151:55

ask about um what you take the

151:59

petitioner's position to be in this case

152:02

because we've had a lot of talk about

152:04

drawing the lines um Justice Kavanaugh

152:07

Justice Gorsuch suggested that we should

152:10

be thinking about blasing game and um

152:13

that within the first we have private

152:15

versus official and then within official

152:17

now we have something about core Act

152:20

versus other acts as we try to figure

152:22

out you know at what level the president

152:25

is going to have immunity but I took the

152:28

petitioner's argument in this case not

152:30

to be inviting us to engage in that kind

152:33

of analysis I thought he was arguing

152:36

that all official acts get immunity and

152:39

so I didn't understand us to be um

152:44

having to drill down on which official

152:46

acts do and so my question is why isn't

152:49

an enough um for the purposes of this

152:53

case given what the petitioner has

152:54

argued to just answer the question of

152:57

whether all official acts get immunity

153:01

uh that that is enough and if the court

153:05

answers that question the way that the

153:07

government has submitted that resolves

153:09

the case I I want to make a

153:12

clarification that I may have left the

153:14

court with some uncertainty about the

153:16

official act analysis that my friend is

153:18

talking about is the Fitzgerald versus

153:21

Nixon Outer Perimeter test which is

153:24

extremely protective of the president

153:26

it's not looking at core versus

153:28

ancillary it's saying everything the

153:30

president does is a target for private

153:32

civil lawsuits that is not a great thing

153:35

and therefore they are all cut off

153:37

that's an absolute immunity kind of

153:39

concept right anything that's official

153:41

in the Outer Perimeter is not subject to

153:44

liability that is right and so we don't

153:46

have to then go well okay we have the

153:48

bucket of official now let's figure out

153:51

which within that might be subject to

153:53

liability not on the theory of absolute

153:55

immunity correct neither on the theory

153:58

of absolute immunity or on our Theory uh

154:00

on his theory everything's protected on

154:03

our Theory there is no immunity but this

154:05

is where I would draw the distinction

154:07

there are as applied constitutional

154:09

challenges that you run through the

154:10

Youngstown framework and this Court's

154:13

customary method of analysis and you

154:15

determine whether there's a infringement

154:17

of Article 2 so what you're saying is

154:19

even if we reject the absolute immunity

154:21

Theory it's not as though the president

154:23

is you know doesn't have the opportunity

154:26

to make the kinds of arguments that

154:28

arise as at the level of you know this

154:32

particular act or this particular

154:34

statute has a problem in uh retrospect I

154:37

think I hear you saying we should not be

154:39

trying to in the abstract set up those

154:42

boundaries ahead of time as a function

154:45

of sort of blanket immunity allow each

154:48

uh allegation be brought and then we

154:50

would decide in that context yes with

154:53

with the additional note that petitioner

154:55

has never made that argument and I think

154:57

it would be up to a district court to

154:59

decide whether to go that route at this

155:02

point in the litigation he's put all of

155:05

his eggs in the absolute immunity basket

155:07

all right and if we if we invite uh you

155:10

know if we see the question presented as

155:12

broader than that and we do say let's

155:13

engage in the core uh official versus

155:18

not core and try to figure out the line

155:21

um is this the right vehicle to hammer

155:25

out that test I mean I I'd understood um

155:29

that the most if not all but most of the

155:32

allegations here there's really no

155:34

plausible argument that they would fall

155:37

into core versus not such that they are

155:40

immune we don't think there are any core

155:43

acts that have been alleged in the

155:45

indictments that would be off limits as

155:47

a matter of Article 2 so if we were

155:49

going to do this kind of analysis try to

155:52

figure out what the line is we should

155:53

probably wait for a vehicle that

155:55

actually presents it in a way that

155:57

allows us to test the different sides of

156:00

the uh the standard that we'd be

156:02

creating right I don't see any need in

156:04

this case for the court to embark on

156:06

that analysis all right the final sort

156:08

of uh set of questions that I have have

156:11

to do with what I do take as a very

156:14

legitimate concern about uh

156:16

prosecutorial abuse about future

156:19

presidents being um targeted uh for

156:23

things that they have done in office I I

156:25

I take that concern I think it's a real

156:27

thing but I wonder whether some of it

156:30

might also be mitigated by the fact that

156:34

existing

156:35

administrations have a self-interest in

156:39

uh protecting the presidency that they

156:43

understand that if they go after the

156:44

former guy soon they're going to be the

156:46

former guy and they will have created

156:48

precedent that will be problematic so I

156:51

wonder if you might comment on whether

156:53

some of the caution from the justice

156:55

department and the prosecutors and

156:57

whatnot comes from an understanding that

156:59

they will soon be former presidents as

157:02

well I I think absolutely and I would

157:05

locate this as a structural argument

157:08

that's built into the Constitution

157:10

itself the executive branch I think as

157:13

this court knows has executive branch

157:15

interests that it at times asserts in

157:18

opposition to to Congress so that the

157:21

proper functioning of the president is

157:24

protected and I believe that that value

157:27

would be operative and is operative in

157:30

anything as momentous as charging a

157:32

former president with a crime and I

157:33

would also say I think and ask you to

157:35

comment on you know pre presidents are

157:39

concerned about being investigated and

157:41

prosecuted and it chills to some extent

157:44

their you know ability to uh do what

157:47

they want in office and that's a concern

157:50

on one side but can can you comment on

157:53

the concern about having a president

157:56

unbounded while in office a president

157:58

who knows that he does not have to

158:01

ultimately uh follow the law because

158:03

there is really nothing more than say

158:05

political accountability in terms of of

158:08

impeachment I mean we have amicus briefs

158:11

here from Professor leaderman for

158:13

example who says um you know a president

158:15

would not be prohibited by Statute from

158:17

perjuring himself under oath about

158:19

official Matters from corruptly altering

158:22

destroying or concealing documents to

158:24

prevent them from being used in an

158:26

official proceeding from suborning

158:28

others to commit perjury from bribing

158:30

Witnesses or public officials and he

158:32

goes on and on and on about the things

158:34

that a president in office with the

158:36

knowledge that they have no criminal

158:38

accountability would do I see that as a

158:41

concern that is at least equal to the

158:44

president being worried so worried about

158:47

criminal prosecution that he you know is

158:49

a little bit Limited in his ability to

158:52

function so can you talk about those

158:54

competing concerns so Justice Jackson I

158:57

think it would be a sea change to

158:59

announce a sweeping rule of immunity

159:02

that no president has had or has needed

159:06

I think we have also had a perfectly

159:08

functioning system that has seen

159:12

occasional episodes of presidential

159:15

misconduct the Nixon era is the

159:17

paradigmatic one the indictment in this

159:20

case alleges another for the most part I

159:23

believe that the legal regime and the

159:25

Constitutional regime that we have works

159:29

and to alter it poses more risks thank

159:32

you thank you thank you Council rebuttal

159:35

Mr

159:36

SAU I have nothing further your honor

159:39

thank you councel councel the case is

159:42

submitted the honorable court is now

159:45

adjourned until Thursday the 9th of May

159:47

at 10:00